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Abstract
This thesis consists of three separate, but related papers on how traditional political
institutions exist alongside the modern African state to affect political, social and economic
outcomes. It uses Sierra Leone as a case study, a country whose chieftaincy institution is
typical of traditional institutions promoted by the British colonial masters. The first paper
argues the inclusion of traditional institutions in the formal state in Sierra Leone was the
result of a political bargain between educated elites and traditional leaders over which
elite groups would form the first independent government. The outcome of the bargain
explains why the traditional institution in Sierra Leone has remained relevant. The paper
also shows that uneven access by traditional political leaders to formal state governance
is associated with inequalities in education and health outcomes at independence, and
that some of the effect has persisted over time. This paper provides possible reasons for
the unequal economic development within the country today.
The second paper investigates the effect of competition for the highest political
office within the chieftaincy institutions in Sierra Leone. I use a plausibly exogenous
variation in the competitiveness for selecting a paramount chief, and exogenous conflict
shocks to chiefdom politics to highlight a political logic that shaped the patterns of civilian
fatalities during the country’s decade long civil war (1991 to 2002). I show that the
intensity of competition is positively associated with the number of civilian fatalities. This
paper further shows that chiefdoms with possible power sharing arrangements among
chiefly elites experienced fewer deaths. The findings here highlight a potential drawback
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to competition and suggest a careful investigation of how political competition shapes
other social dimensions, such as collective action and social cohesion.
The final paper examines the extent to which a hybrid of state and traditional
institutions can work to provide public goods, in this case, dispute resolution in rural
areas. To do this, I evaluate a national policy that introduced Chiefdom Land Committees
(CLCs) to resolve land disputes in rural areas. CLCs are best viewed as a hybrid of formal
and informal institutions. CLCs combine customary norms with formal state processes
such as open deliberation, impartiality, and representation of interest groups in land
administration and dispute resolution. Using a difference-in-difference design, I find that
on average, chiefdoms with CLCs have higher land caseloads in the formal courts three
years on. By adopting the CLCs, chiefdoms plausibly made land issues more salient, but
instead of providing final resolutions, CLCs are conduits for the formalization of land
disputes.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
There is now ample evidence to suggest that traditional authorities and institutions have
remained an integral part of the modern sub-Saharan African (henceforth Africa) political
and economic architecture. Despite cross-country variation in relevance, traditional
authorities have largely survived the immediate post-independence move by most states
across the continent to abolish or diminish their powers (Logan, 2009). Various reasons for
the persistence and popularity of traditional authorities is surveyed in (Logan, 2013). The
move towards a decentralized system of public goods provision in the 1990s benefited the
resurgence of traditional authorities. In weak states where central governments lack the
capacity or willingness to provide public goods in rural areas, traditional authorities are
portrayed as critical to filling this gap (Herbst, 2000). Most states also made calculated
decisions in a "core-periphery" power sharing arrangement, for instance to gain access to
cash crops and minerals, or to galvanize support during elections, thereby giving legitimacy,
or maintaining the relevance of chiefs and traditional authorities (Boone, 2003; Baldwin,
2013).
But what impact do these institutions continue to have on economic, social and
political outcomes as countries across the continent solidify democratic institutions? Can
traditional institutions be used to fill critical gaps in public goods provision in rural areas,
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where modern states are unwilling or lack the capacity to do so? Furthermore, what are
the most salient features of these institutions that support political and economic progress
on the continent?
The dominant narrative of the impact of traditional institutions on politics and
development outcomes on the continent paints a negative picture. The persistence of
traditional authorities, who are largely unelected leaders, have been viewed as contradictory
to the democratization. Traditional institutions across the region have been linked to
patronage style politics that many have lamented has extended into the conduct of politics
at the centre, which has contributed to the underdevelopment of African political and
democratic institutions (Bratton & Van de Walle, 1994; Mamdani, 1996; Bates, 1981).
However, cross-country studies on the perception of traditional institutions and their
leaders (Logan, 2009, 2013; Wig & Kromrey, 2018) side step important differences in
these institutions across countries and even within countries.
Using Sierra Leone as a case study, this thesis exploits within country variation
in the chieftaincy institution to understand why the institution has persisted and how
it continues to affect public goods outcomes. In the first paper of this thesis, I study
how variation in chief’s access to state governance impacts public goods provision. In the
bargaining process for which elite groups will form the first post-independence government,
some traditional authorities had formal access to state governance through the state
legislature and others did not. Using archival data and the 1963 census, which is the first
complete census after independence, I show that this variation in formal access to the
state legislature produced disparities in public goods outcomes by independence. Some of
the resulting impacts have persisted over time, with the association still present in the
2004 and 2015 census, and the 2018 data on education infrastructure and outcomes.
In the second paper, I look at variation in the intensity of competition for
the highest political office of the chieftaincy institution- the paramount chieftaincy, to
18
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understand it’s impact on civilian deaths during the decade long civil war (1991 - 2002) in
the country. The paramount chieftaincy is contested by ruling houses or families, who were
recognised by the British colonial powers as the only people eligible to contest the position.
Largely through historical accident, the number of ruling houses in each chiefdom varies,
and the higher the number, the higher the level of competition for the office (Acemoglu,
Reed, & Robinson, 2014). Using a highly disaggregated conflict event fatalities data,
this chapter suggests that the number of ruling houses in each chiefdom is positively
associated with the number of civilian deaths during the war. It also suggests that
chiefdoms where power had been shared historically, perhaps because of some arrangement
to rotate reigning among houses, are associated with fewer civilian deaths. This paper
provides a caution for the wholesale adoption of predictions from democratic theory that
suggests that competition is a critical selection mechanism for ensuring that the best
leaders are selected in office, and the worst performing leaders are removed, thereby
leading to better responsiveness to citizens and public goods provision. The findings here
highlight a potential drawback to competition and suggest a careful investigation of how
political competition shapes other social dimensions, such as collective action and social
cohesion.
Finally, I exploit variation in the ability or willingness of the paramount chiefs
to adopt and implement a national land policy that aimed to help citizens resolve land
disputes peacefully without bringing them to the local courts. Cases that arrive at the
local courts take time to be resolved, and are costly to resolve. In weak states such
as Sierra Leone, the state often lacks the bureaucratic ability to project its power to
implement national policies and to provide critical public goods outside of major cities
and towns (Herbst, 2000), and as a result, must rely on local authorities. The policy
promoted the establishment of Chiefdom Land Committees (CLCs), which is viewed as
a hybrid of state and traditional institutions to help resolve land cases before they get
to the local courts. To evaluate the policy I built a dataset by geo-spatially mapping all
19
Introduction
the local courts in the country, and digitising ten years of court records from each court
where it was available. I also conducted a survey of all chiefdom administrations across
the country to understand which chiefdoms adopted the policy and how the policy is
being implemented. Contrary to the policy objectives, chiefdoms that adopted the policy
ended up with more land cases at the local courts. This papers raises questions about the
best way for the state to work with chiefs to provide critical services in rural areas. A
further question it raises is whether informal dispute resolution forums, such as the CLCs,
are a viable route to settle land disputes, and hence protect property rights in rural areas.
Throughout this thesis, traditional institutions are defined as institutions whose
rulers, often referred to as chiefs, "have power by virtue of their association with the
customary mode of governing a place-based community” (Baldwin, 2016b, p.21). Be-
cause of their status in their communities, the legitimacy of traditional leaders does not
necessarily have to depend on the state (Baldwin & Raffler, 2017). Furthermore, the
fact that these institutions are custom-based, they evolve over time as customs change.
For the most part, chiefs are not democratically elected into office. Various hereditary
rules and customary norms are used to select chiefs. The chieftaincy institution in Sierra
Leone is consistent with this definition, except that in Sierra Leone elections are used to
select paramount chiefs. Unlike other traditional institutions across the continent, the
chieftaincy institution in Sierra Leone has only gained more relevance (Acemoglu, Chaves,
Osafo-Kwaako, & Robinson, 2014a), and it is a critical part of providing public goods and
services, which is solidified in the Chieftaincy Act 2009. The state, NGOs and private
sector often have to think about how to interact with chiefs in programming decisions.
For instance, no donor funded project or large scale private sector investment in the
chiefdom can be implemented without consultation with paramount chiefs. Furthermore,
while there are variations in the institution across the country and over time, its core
has largely remained the same, bearing features of its colonial past. The economic and
political relevance, as well as the within country variation of the chieftaincy institution
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in Sierra Leone makes an interesting case to study how traditional institutions function
along side the state to affect economic and political outcomes.
The three papers present a mixed picture of the impact traditional institutions
continue to have along side the modern democratic state. While they can be used to
fill critical gaps in public goods provision, this is only limited to very localised areas, as
paper one demonstrates. There are also limits on the type of public goods and service
they can influence. Paper three suggests a potential weakness of traditional authorities in
handling land dispute resolutions, and that there might be a preference for resolutions
through formal courts whenever possible. Finally, this thesis also provides commentary
on the impact of the selection process of chiefs on social outcomes. Paper two suggests
competition can be potential bad for social cohesion and even collective action.
Theoretically, the first paper contributes to the regional favouritism literature.
Unlike other studies that look at ethnicity or birth place of presidents, this current case
study highlights a localised version of political favouritism, where ethnicity is largely muted,
thereby suggesting that the benefits of politics follows the most politically salient unit of
organisation, which may not necessarily be ethnicity or religion, as is often portrayed in
the literature in the African context. This point is also highlighted in the second paper,
where ruling houses that compete for the paramount chieftaincy share the same ethnicity,
for the most part, and yet some of the effect associated with ethnic-based politics is also
seen here.
Additionally, this thesis throws caution on the wholesale adoption of political
competition as necessarily desirable for selecting public officer holders. While Acemoglu,
Reed, and Robinson (2014) suggests competition constraints the power of chiefs and
support better economic outcomes, my thesis suggests that competition in the selection
of chiefs may also have adverse effect on social cohesion and collective action.
Lastly, in terms of policy relevance, I generated a new dataset by geo-spatially
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mapping all local courts across Sierra Leone, and digitised ten years of case records to
understand the extent to which traditional authorities and informal institutions help
resolve land disputes in paper three. Unlike previous studies that capture disputes by
conducting surveys, this paper captures actual disputes documented in local court records,
which makes this paper among the first to make a direct empirical link between a land
reform and land disputes litigated in formal courts. Furthermore, from a policy impact
perspective, the spatial mapping is now being used by the government of Sierra Leone to
optimize service provision in local courts.
The subsequent chapters provide the three papers that make up the body of my
thesis. The first paper provides some historical context for the chieftaincy institution and
possible reasons for its persistence in Sierra Leone. This also sets the stage for the empirical
analysis that follows. The final chapter concludes by highlighting the implications of my
research.
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Chapter 2
Chiefs and the Political Origin of
Education and Health Disparities in
Rural Sierra Leone
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Abstract
I investigate the effect of formally integrating traditional leaders or chiefs into state
governance systems on public goods provision. Chiefs typically rule over specific places
or communities and are not formally integrated in state governance. In Sierra Leone,
some chiefs double as state legislators while also serving as leaders in their chiefdoms.
Whether these particular chiefdoms have better outcomes in public goods provision is the
focus of this paper. Using the 1963 census data, I show that chiefdoms whose paramount
chiefs were elected to the colonial legislative council were associated with better public
goods provision in education and health by independence, compared to those that did
not. In addition, these same chiefdoms tend to have better education infrastructure today,
providing yet another example of how at-independence within-country inequalities in
education and health outcomes have persisted in parts of sub-Saharan Africa.
Key words: Colonial Legacy, Education Disparities
Chiefs and Disparities in Education and Health Outcomes
2.1 Introduction
The role of chiefs in public goods provision has been a key focus of most of the
research on traditional leaders in sub-Saharan Africa (Baldwin & Raffler, 2019). This line
of research has assessed features of the chieftaincy institutions, such as competition for
the office (Acemoglu, Reed, & Robinson, 2014) or the fact that chiefs are embedded in
their communities and can have longer time horizons compared to elected officials, which
allows them to better plan and deliver public goods (Baldwin, 2019).
This paper assesses whether formal access by chiefs to the central state governance
system enhances public goods provision by chiefs in their localities. Customary institutions
vary a lot on the continent (Baldwin & Raffler, 2019) but, for the most part, chiefs are
“rulers who have power by virtue of their association with the customary mode of governing
a place-based community” (Baldwin, 2016b, p.21). While they may have relationships
with state officials, they are not necessarily integrated in the formal state governance
system (Baldwin & Raffler, 2019). In some countries like in Ghana, chiefs have a national
assembly, but this is separate from the Ghanaian Parliament that makes laws for the
country. In Sierra Leone, some chiefs are formally integrated in the state legislature,
and have been since the colonial era. In preparation for independence, the first national
constitution in 1951 expanded membership for chiefs to the colonial legislative council,
which was responsible for making national laws and advising the colonial administration.
The position allowed selected chiefs to be at the seat of policy making at the national
level. Whether the home chiefdoms of the selected chiefs benefited deferentially than
other chiefdoms is the focus my empirical analysis.
To do this, I rely on archival and historical census data on education and
health outcomes. I first estimate an OLS model to compare outcomes at independence
between chiefdoms whose chiefs were members of the legislative council versus those
whose chiefs were not. My OLS estimations shows a strong positive association between
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at-independence public goods outcomes in education and health in chiefdoms where chiefs
were elected to the colonial legislative council a decade or so earlier. For education, I go a
step further by exploiting within chiefdom age cohort variation to construct treatment and
control groups in a difference-in-difference fashion. At independence, treatment cohorts
had higher literacy rates and school attendance. Furthermore, because education outcomes
are linked through generations, (Alesina, Hohmann, Michalopoulos, & Papaioannou, 2018)
this effect has a long tail and can still be observed in the recent census. On average,
these same chiefdoms tend to have a higher share of population that attained at least
primary education, and also have higher number of school infrastructure today, relative
to chiefdoms that did not have their chiefs on the legislative council.
There are at least three possible ways to make sense of this positive association
between chief membership of the legislative council and better public goods outcomes.
The first explanation may be that chiefs in the legislative council were more competent.
I use tax collection as a proxy for competence. The idea being, the more competent a
chief is the higher the amount of tax he/she may collect, which can be spent on public
goods provision. My evidence does not support this explanation as a possible channel, as
I find that chiefs that were not in the legislative council were able to collect as much tax
as those that were.
The second explanation is that chiefs that were in the legislative council were
better able to collaborate with the state to co-produce education public goods in their
chiefdoms. The provision of public goods in rural areas is often a co-production effort by
state and local authorities. When collaboration is better co-production is likely to happen
in an effective way (Baldwin, 2019). The evidence also does not seem to support the
co-production hypothesis. For instance, a good proxy for co-production in the education
sector in Sierra Leone is the availability of community schools. Community schools are
owned by the community and partially funded by government. I find there is no statistical
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difference in the number of community schools between chiefdoms with chiefs that were
in the legislative council versus those that were not.
A third explanation is that by being in the legislative council some chiefs had
greater access to central state resources that they can lobby for. However, instead of
distributing resources to other chiefdoms they represent in their district, chiefs send most
if not all resources to their own chiefdoms. This would be akin to regional favouritism,
where political leaders allocate government goods or adopt policies to mostly benefit their
preferred regions or co-ethnics (Hodler & Raschky, 2014; Kramon & Posner, 2013; Kasara,
2007; Lu & Wang, 2020). My analysis supports this hypothesis. For instance, differences
in health and education infrastructure is most notable when it is government owned or
provided.
This paper contributes to the debate on how best to integrate traditional au-
thorities with state institutions for political and economic development in modern Africa
(Goldstein & Udry, 2008; Acemoglu, Reed, & Robinson, 2014; Baldwin, 2016a, 2019;
Baldwin & Raffler, 2019; Logan, 2013; Boone, 2003). Previous studies have looked at
how the selection process of chiefs matter for public good provision (Acemoglu, Reed, &
Robinson, 2014). Still others asked whether the closeness of chiefs to their communities is
what is critical for producing local public goods and whether they are compatible with
democracy and accountability (Baldwin, 2019; Baldwin & Raffler, 2019). The current
paper suggests that unequal access by chiefs to formal state governance systems made a
difference in public goods provision, but in unequal ways. This has implications for think-
ing of traditional authorities as agents of economic development beyond their immediate
localities.
This paper also contributes to the ethnic or regional favouritism literature
(Hodler & Raschky, 2014; Kramon & Posner, 2013; Kasara, 2007; Burgess, Jedwab,
Miguel, Morjaria, & Padró i Miquel, 2015; Bates, 1974). Unlike other studies that look
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at ethnicity or birth place of presidents, this current case study highlights a localised
version of political favouritism, where chiefs potentially influence allocation of government
goods. Important to note in this case study context is that favouritism is not done along
ethnic lines, as most districts that elected chiefs have only one ethnic group distributed in
different chiefdoms. This case study shows that the benefits of politics follows the most
politically salient unit of organisation, which may not necessarily be ethnicity or religion.
This article further contributes to the literature on historical roots to inequalities
to education and human capital, and the persistence of at-independence disparities in
Africa (Alesina et al., 2018; Woodberry, 2012; Wantchekon, Klašnja, & Novta, 2015;
Nunn & Wantchekon, 2011). This case links current disparities and it’s persistence to the
colonial legacy of preferential access of some traditional authorities to the colonial powers
(Acemoglu, Chaves, et al., 2014a).
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: Section II provides an overview of
the evolution of the modern states and how chiefs became critical for which elite groups
formed the first government in Sierra Leone. Section III and IV present the data and
empirical strategy, respectively. Section V and VI show the results and a discussion on
possible mechanisms. The final section concludes.
2.2 The Context
Governance in Sierra Leone prior to independence followed the strategy of indirect
rule. From the viewpoint of the British colonial powers, the country was divided into two
administrative units – the Colony and the Protectorate. The Colony, now present-day
Freetown was where freed slaves were settled. These settlers became known as the Krios.
The Colony was governed through an executive council headed by the Governor. The
executive council was advised by the legislative council. Citizens of the Colony were
considered citizens of Great Britain. The Protectorate, which was the rest of the interior
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of the country was controlled by chiefs. The Governor ruled over the protectorate through
the chiefs. The chiefs were responsible for providing public goods, and as custodians of
rural land they had the power to tax, mobilize labour and administer justice. While
chiefs had the mandate to rule over their people, they got legitimacy from the colonial
government, who provided them with stipends, security, and other modern amenities
(Abraham, 1978).
Indirect rule meant for a long time that political activities in country were
only limited to the chiefdom level, where ruling houses within each chiefdom compete to
elect paramount chiefs, who ruled for life. However, politics at the national level gained
steamed when, in 1924, three changes were made to the legislative council to encourage
further integration between the Colony and the Protectorate. First, the legislative council
membership was to be expanded to 21 members and was to have jurisdiction in the
Protectorate. Secondly, it was to have an elected "unofficial Krio" business community
representative, and finally it was to also include three unofficial representative from the
Protectorate, all of whom were paramount chiefs, as it was argued that only the chiefs
would represent their people well (Cartwright, 1970).
The legislative council itself functioned very much like a parliament. It held
deliberations, which were chaired by the Governor to discuss a range of issues to govern
the country. It made laws and ordinances in the country. Issues of taxation, trade,
citizenship rights, and the provision of public goods were discussed at this level as shown
in the excerpt from the April 22nd 1902 legislative council meeting agenda in Figure 2.2
in the Appendix. Final decisions ultimately came from the executive council, but the
legislative council deliberations influenced these decisions. Prior to these changes, the
colonial legislative council had only had white representatives, and its activities did not
include the Protectorate. The changes meant that for the first time the Western elites
of the Colony and the traditional Protectorate elites were brought together and given
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opportunity to advise the majority European administrators and legislators.
As independence drew closer, Sierra Leone witnessed considerable administrative
and political changes as well. Key objectives of the colonial masters were to make chiefdoms
more economically viable and more democratic in the selection of paramount chiefs. The
aim was to close the development gap between the chiefdoms and the colony. In many
ways the conditions of the Protectorate was far worse than in the Colony. On education
for instance, school attendance in the Protectorate was only a tiny fraction of what it
was in the Colony. By 1948 while the Colony had well over 1500 pupils in secondary
school, the whole of the Protectorate had only a few hundred, and even that was found
only in the South, as shown in Figure 2.4 in the Appendix. Towards this end, chiefdoms
were formally transformed to Native Administration (NA) for political and administrative
purposes. By 1947 well over half of the chiefdoms were transformed to NA as shown in
Figure 2.3 in the Appendix. The NA system provided a formal structure for taxing and
bringing development in each chiefdom. Smaller chiefdoms were amalgamated to form
viable political and economic spaces. For a more inclusive representation in the selection
of Paramount chiefs, all villages with 20 male taxpayers were assigned a Tribal Authority
(TA), who could vote in paramount chief elections.
2.2.1 The 1951 Constitution
The administrative transformation of chiefdoms also elicited political demands
for greater inclusion in governing at the state level. The response of the colonial masters
to increased political activities, especially in the Protectorate was to formally form two
higher level consultative bodies, the Protectorate Assembly and the district councils.
The district councils were an assembly of paramount chiefs and non-chief elites from the
same district. Whereas the Protectorate Assembly was a gathering of chiefs (Cartwright,
1970). Consultation to advance the constitutional development of Sierra Leone as a nation,
intensified with a key objective of narrowing the Protectorate-Colony cleavage. The initial
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proposal for a constitution was for the Protectorate to have a greater majority of members
elected from the various African bodies, but less than the majority of the whole of the
legislative council. The intention was that if the Africans were to have a majority, the
Protectorate and the Colony representatives had to work together. The membership
under the proposed constitution was to have seven official members (Europeans), two
unofficial members nominated by the governor, four members from the Colony and ten
members from the Protectorate. The ten Protectorate members were to be elected from
the Protectorate Assembly.
This proposal drew concerns from the three main political groups, and further
heightened mistrust. On the one hand, the Krios who were more educated and already held
high government positions in Freetown thought they should get greater, if not majority,
representation. To them, a Protectorate majority was an affront, and a betrayal by the
colonial masters. They were suspicious that the Protectorate elites would use their new
power to constrain their rights.
The paramount chiefs on the other hand were largely in favour of most of the
provisions of the proposal, except for the literacy requirement. It was the educated
Protectorate elites who had the greatest risk of losing out. They largely held lower level
civil servant positions in the Provinces, and were disenfranchised as they were often
domiciled outside the home chiefdoms, and could not stand for elected office. The fact
that Protectorate members were to be elected from the Protectorate Assembly meant only
chiefs would be elected. While they welcomed the idea of greater Protectorate membership
in the Legislative council, they wanted more space for non-chief educated Protectorate
members. They pushed for the literacy requirement to stay, as well as additional selection
process outside the Protectorate Assembly.
The final constitution that emerged in 1951 made provision for non-chief elites
and made literacy optional for each district to consider. Of the 31 members, twenty
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one were Africans, of which fourteen were elected from the Protectorate, seven from the
Colony. Of those from the Protectorate, eight were paramount chiefs. Crucially also, four
members of the legislative council were added to the executive council. Elected members
could serve a term of five years, and could be reelected. See Figure 2.5 for the complete
list of members in the first legislative council in 1951.
By the time Sierra Leone got Independence in 1961, subsequent negotiations
were made so that a separate election process was made for ordinary members, and for
paramount chiefs to the legislative council, with each of the twelve districts selecting one
Paramount chief. The current system of electing members of parliament follows this rule.
Ordinary members compete in constituencies for popular vote, whereas paramount chiefs
from various chiefdoms in a district compete with each other to represent that district.
2.3 Data
2.3.1 Legislative Council Membership
My analysis aims to compare chiefdom level public goods provision in education
and health between chiefdoms whose paramount chiefs were members of the legislative
council versus chiefdoms that did not. Using minutes from legislative council meetings
for the period 1924 to 1958, and the Protectorate Handbook, I identified all chiefdoms
that had their paramount chiefs in the legislative council. The legislative council minutes
lists names of members from the Districts, as shown in Figure 2.5 in the Appendix. To
determine which member is a paramount chief and for which chiefdom, I cross checked
names with the list of paramount chiefs from the Protectorate Handbook, which lists
paramount chiefs for each District as shown in Figure 2.6 in the Appendix. I used the
1951 legislative council membership as the main explanatory variable, and the names of
all the paramount chiefs that were members are listed in Table 2.13 in the Appendix. The
binary variable takes value 1 if chiefdom has paramount chief in legislative council in 1951,
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and 0 otherwise.
The choice of 1951 was for two reasons. First, previous legislative councils,
from 1924 to 1950 had only three paramount chiefs that were hand picked largely by
the governor. On other hand, the 1951 legislative council was the first after the first
constitution that expanded African majority in decision making, with eight Paramount
chiefs. The second reason is that the only chiefdom level outcome data available was
captured after independence in 1963. An immediate concern that comes to mind was
whether membership to legislative council changed from 1951 to 1963. The answer to
this for the most part is no. From 1951 to 1957, there was no change in the chiefdoms
that had representation in the legislative council, which means using any of the years
in the period would not change the results. In the period 1958 to 1961, the legislative
council was furthered expanded and transformed to the House of Representatives. With
the expanded body, three additional chiefdoms were added, but the previous eight were
still represented in the period. Furthermore, in 1958, leadership of the country was all
but in the hands of the African elites, as the Executive Council was changed to a Cabinet
body that was headed by African elites, and the governorship, still held by the colonial
master was mainly a ceremonial role. To test the robustness of my finding I construct a
variable that takes value 1 if a chiefdom was represented in either the legislative council
or the House of Representative in the period 1951 to 1961, and 0 otherwise.
2.3.2 Outcome Data
For my main result, I look at education and health outcomes. For education, I
specifically look at primary school attendance and literacy rates from the 1963 census.
The first chiefdom level data on the outcomes are captured in the 1963 census. The data
is disaggregated by age cohorts and by gender. For each chiefdom, the total population
in each age cohort is given and the number of pupils that attended school that year is
given, as well as literacy rates, as shown by the raw data in Figure 2.7 in the Appendix.
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As primary school attendance is typically age bound, I exploit within chiefdom cohort
variation to construct treatment and control groups in difference-in-difference estimation
strategy. I provide summary statistics for the various age cohorts in Table 2.14.
I also use 2015 census data, which captures data on primary education attainment
in the population, and asked a related question of whether an individual had ever attended
school in the chiefdom. Both these questions provide a good indication of the extent
and history of education in the chiefdom. I only use individuals who are resident in
their chiefdom of birth. A final outcome data I use is the 2018 school mapping census,
which captures geo-spatial locations of all primary and secondary school facilities in the
country as shown in Figure 2.8 in Appendix. The data was collected by the government
to understand whether the current stock of school facilities across the country meets the
demand. It captures both recent and historical investments in education in the country. I
use the geo-spatial information to obtain the number of school facilities in each chiefdom.
Table 2.14 in the Appendix provides summary statistics for the outcome variables.
For health, I use the 1960 Protectorate Handbook which lists hospitals and
dispensaries in chiefdoms. The availability of these facilities are proxies for better health
outcomes, but represents government allocation of resources. The facilities are designated
according to ownership as shown in Figure 2.9 in the Appendix. The summary statistics
are given in Table 2.14 in the Appendix. Ideally, if the dates facilities were constructed are
known I would employ a difference-in-difference strategy in my estimation. Unfortunately
this information is not available, and hence I only use cross-sectional analysis for my
health outcomes.
2.3.3 Other Data and Chiefdom Controls
In addition to the outcomes listed above, I also used tax collected in the colonial
era by each chiefdom to assess any difference in education outcome associated with better
tax collection. The presence of missionaries in the chiefdom or the distance to nearest
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mission could also affect education outcomes. I control for these in my analysis. Other
chiefdom level controls in my analysis include geographic, economic, and institutional
factors, all obtained from published sources including Acemoglu, Reed, and Robinson
(2014), Glennerster, Miguel, and Rothenberg (2013), Nunn (2010), Michalopoulos and
Papaioannou (2013), and Gregory (1965). Table 2.15 in Appendix provides summary
statistics for these variables.
2.4 Empirical Strategy
I first rely on Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) to establish a link with membership
to the legislative council and better chiefdom level public goods provision. An immediate
concern is that there may be chiefdom level observables and unobservables that jointly
correlate with chief membership to the legislative council and better public goods outcomes.
For instance, missionaries’ activities in education in a particular chiefdom could mean
both better education outcomes, which also helps chiefs gain membership to the legislative
council as literacy was a requirement for membership. To partially address thes types
of concerns, I first identify chiefdom observables that may jointly correlate with chief
membership and better education outcomes, and control for these in the estimation. Table
2.16 in the Appendix shows a list observables that correlate with chief membership to the
1951 legislative meetings.
For my education outcomes, I take one more step to address concerns that
unobservables may confound my results. I exploit variations in age cohort within the
chiefdoms from the 1963 census data and membership to the legislative council to motivate
a difference-in-difference design. Schooling is typically age bound, which means the effect
of membership to the legislative council will only affect children of school going age. By
1963 most schools in the chiefdoms were still only for primary education, and attendance
to primary is typically between ages 6 to 12. For school enrollmentment to be associated
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with chief membership to the 1951 legislative council, most children would likely have to
be in this age bracket in 1963 when census was collected.
Using that information I construct five age cohorts, two of which I define as
treatment groups; T1; children that were 5 years old in 1963, T2; those that were 10 years
old in 1963. I also define three control groups, C1; children that were 15 years old in 1963,
C2; people 20 years old in 1963, and C3; people that were 25 years old and above in
1963.1 I use a similar strategy for literacy rate, although treatment and control groups are
harder to define directly as literacy is not bounded by age in a similar manner as primary
school enrollment. For instance, it is not exactly clear how long one has to be in school
to be literate. In addition, there might have also been other sources of education like
mission churches to promote literacy. However, it would be safe to assume that literacy
of older cohorts are less likely to be associated with membership to the 1951 legislative
council, whereas younger age groups are more likely. With this in mind, I define four age
cohorts, two potential treatment groups: T1; age group 10-19, T2; age group 20-29. And
two control groups: C1; age group 30-39 and C2; 40 years and over.
A potential concern for this cohort set up for both school enrollment and literacy
is the movement of people from one chiefdom to the next. If people are moving between
chiefdoms we can’t be sure that outcomes observed, say literacy, is as a result of the
particular chiefdom they find themselves in at the time of the census in 1963. In the
Sierra Leone context however, and especially pre-independence, this concern is reduced
because citizenship status is tied to chiefdoms, and because it is harder for non-natives
to gain access to land in other chiefdoms. With agriculture being the primary source
of livelihood for most people at this time, access to land limits the movement of people
between chiefdoms.
1 I include 5 and as treatment cohorts, because they are just at the border of primary school going
age groups.
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2.4.1 OLS Specification
The OLS specification is given as follows:
Yc = αd + δLegc +Xc + εc (2.1)
Where, Yc is the outcome variable for chiefdom c. From the 2018 school mapping, I use
number of schools and chiefdom enrolment. The parameter αd is for the district fixed
effects, and Legc is the dummy for PC of chiefdom c membership to legislative council in
1951. The vector Xc are relevant chiefdom controls such as geographic, economic, politics,
and pre-colonial centralization. The error term is given by εc and clustered at chiefdom
level. The correlation estimate is give by δ. For binary outcomes like primary education
attainment, this model can be viewed as a Linear Probability Model, and δ interpreted as
predicted probability.
As the 2015 census data are captured at the individual level, I use the following
specification:
Yic = αc + δLegc + Iic +Xc + εic (2.2)
Where, Yic is the outcome variable for unit/individual i in chiefdom c, αc is the district
fixed effects, and Legc is the dummy for PC of chiefdom c membership to legilative council
in 1951. I add relevant unit/individual controls with the vector Iic, and chiefdom controls
with Xc. The error term is given by εic and it is clustered at the chiefdom level. The
correlation estimate is given by δ.
2.4.2 DiD Specification
The difference-in-difference specification is as follows:
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Yct = αd + βt + δ(Legc × cohortt) +Xct + εct (2.3)
The outcome variables are number of children enrolled in school and literacy
rate from the 1963 census for chiefdom c. The parameters αd is for the district fixed
effects that captures shocks common to all districts and βt is the cohort fixed effects,
which captures characteristics common to everyone in the same age cohort from the same
chiefdom. cohortt is dummy for each age cohort t, which is interacted with Legc, the
dummy for PC of chiefdom c membership to legislative council in 1951. The vector Xct are
possible relevant chiefdom controls such as geographic, economic, politics, and pre-colonial
centralization. It also contains cohort characteristics in each chiefdom such as cohort
population. The error term is given by εct and clustered at chiefdom level. The correlation
estimate is give by δ, is the coefficient on the interaction term, which is the impact of
legislative council membership experienced by a particular cohort. This impact is the
relative increase school attendance or literacy with respect to the comparison cohort in
the same chiefdom.
I also do a more conventional difference-in-difference specification to estimate
the average treatment effect (ATT) as given by equation 3.4. With this specification, I
define treatment cohort treatct to takes value 1 if child in chiefdom c is 10 years or under
in 1963 and 0 otherwise, for primary school attendance. For literacy, treatct takes value 1
if person in chiefdom c is 15 years or under in 1963, and 0 otherwise.
Yct = αd + βc + δ(Legc × treatct) +Xct + εct (2.4)
Here, the parameters αd is for the district fixed effects, βc is the cohort fixed
effects as defined above. For school attendance, this includes five cohorts, and for literacy
four cohorts. The interaction term Legc ×treatct is the DiD estimator. The vector Xct are
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possible relevant chiefdom controls similar to 4.3 above. The parameter δ now captures
the ATT.
2.5 Results
In this section I present the results of my analysis. I first present simple mean
differences for the outcomes. I then present OLS estimates for the education and health
outcomes. For robustness, I then present difference-in-difference estimates for the 1963
education outcomes. I repeat my OLS analysis for education outcomes from the 2015
censuses and 2018 administrative mapping of school to capture if effects are persistent
over time.
2.5.1 Simple Mean Differences
Figure 2.1 below shows confidence interval plots of means for four main outcomes
of my study. The circles represent means for each outcome for the two groups, and the
dotted vertical lines represent confidence intervals. The dotted horizontal line is the
population mean. For each of these outcomes the mean for chiefdoms whose Paramount
chiefs were in the legislative council is much higher than other chiefdoms. Although
for some the differences are not statically significant, but they are large. For instance
in Panel (a) school attendance in 1963 is about 711 pupils in chiefdoms with chief in
legislative council versus 430 pupils in the other chiefdoms. Although this difference is
not statistically significant, it is economically significant at about 55% of the population
average.
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(a) School Attendance -1963 (b) Attained Primary Education-2015
(c) Number of Schools-2018 (d) Hospital or Dispensary Available-1958
NOTE- Dotted horizontal lines are outcome means for each group
Figure 2.1: Confidence Interval Plots of Outcomes for Each Group.
For hospitals or dispensaries, chiefdoms whose chiefs were in the legislative
council are almost twice as likely to have a hospital or dispensary as other chiefdoms, as
shown in Panel (d) in 2.1.
2.5.2 OLS Estimates
Education Outcomes
In this section I present correlation coefficients by estimating equation 4.1 above
using OLS. I start with education outcomes. Table 2.1 below presents the results for the
share of 5-29 year olds that were in school attendance in 1963. Column 1 is the most
parsimonious model with only district fixed effects. In column 2, I control for institution
and add demographic and economic controls in column 3 and 4 respectively. In column 5,
I control for the presence of missionaries in the chiefdom as a potential confounder of my
analysis.
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As predicted, the coefficient on PC membership to the 1951 legislative council is
positive and significant. In the most rigorous model the estimates are, δ = 0.019, (S.E =
0.010). This suggests that chiefdoms whose chiefs were members of the 1951 legislative
council are associated with a 1.9% higher share in population that attended school in
1963, compared to those that did not have chiefs on the legislative council. I estimated the
same model but using membership to the legislative council and house of representative
from 1951 to 1961. The results are shown in Table 2.17 in the Appendix. The correlation
coefficient is much larger, with δ = 0.035 (S.E = 0.010), in the most rigorous model in
column (5).
Table 2.1: School Attendance-1963
Share of 5-29 Year Old Attending School in 1963
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
PC Membership to 1951 Leg. Council 0.019* 0.024*** 0.018** 0.023** 0.019*
(0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010)
Population 1963 0.000** 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Mission Presence 0.009
(0.015)
District Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls for Chiefdoms Politics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Demographic Controls Yes Yes Yes
Geographic and Economic Controls Yes
Outcome Mean 0.082 0.082 0.082 0.082 0.082
Outcome Standard Deviation 0.048 0.048 0.048 0.048 0.048
Observations 145 145 145 145 145
R-squared 0.439 0.485 0.504 0.558 0.560
NOTE- Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Missing data on outcome
variable for four chiefdoms. Fixed effects are for all districts with data on outcome variable. Geographic
and economic controls include an indicator variable if the chiefdom had license for mining (diamonds and
non-diamond), distance to 1907 rail road. All distances are in km and are calculated with reference to chiefdom
centroids. Demographic controls include chiefdom 1963 ethnolinguistic fractionlization index. Controls for
institutions include political competition at chiefdom level, number of chiefs recalled, an indicator variable for
the presence of pre-colonial politically centralized ethnic groups, and whether chiefdom was amalgamated.
Next, I show results for literacy rates in Table 2.2 below. I calculate the share of
population age 10 years and above that is literate in each chiefdom and use as my outcome
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variable. Models (1) to (5) are similar to those in Table 2.1 above. With just the district
fixed effects in column (1), the coefficient is positive but not statistically significant. In
column (5) with all the controls the coefficient is significant, with δ = 0.012 (S.E = 0.006).
The result suggests that chiefdoms whose chiefs were members of the legislative council
were associated with a 1.2% higher share in literate population compared to chiefdoms
that did not have representation. I repeat the same model using membership to the
legislative council and House of Representative from 1951 to 1961 in Table 2.18 in the
Appendix. The estimates in columns (1) to (5) are all larger and statistically significant.
Table 2.2: Literacy Rate for Population 10 Years and Over
Literacy Rate 10 Years and Over - 1963
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
PC Membership to 1951 Leg. Council 0.010 0.013** 0.010* 0.013** 0.012**
(0.007) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006)
Population 1963 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Mission Presence 0.002
(0.007)
District Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls for Chiefdoms Politics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Demographic Controls Yes Yes Yes
Geographic and Economic Controls Yes
Outcome Mean 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04
Outcome Standard Deviation 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03
Observations 145 145 145 145 145
R-squared 0.175 0.236 0.371 0.426 0.426
NOTE- Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Missing data on outcome
variable for four chiefdoms. Fixed effects are for all district with data on outcome variable. Geographic
and economic Controls include an indicator variable if the chiefdom had license for mining (diamonds and
non-diamond), distance to 1907 rail road. All distances are in km and are calculated with reference to chiefdom
centroids. Demographic controls include chiefdom 1963 ethnolinguistic fractionlization index. Controls for
institutions include political competition at chiefdom level, number of chiefs recalled, an indicator variable for
the presence of pre-colonial politically centralized ethnic groups, and whether chiefdom was amalgamated.
Hospitals and Dispensaries
This paper investigates whether chiefdoms whose paramount chiefs were members
of the 1951 legislative council had better outcomes in public goods provision. And
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one hypothesis is that this may have happened through government allocations. Since
government does not only allocate one type of public good (Kramon & Posner, 2013),
I use access to hospitals or healthcare centers as another outcome variable to test this
hypothesis.
Table 2.3 below presents result of my analysis. The outcome variable is a binary
variable that takes the value 1 if a hospital or dispensary is present in the chiefdom,
and 0 otherwise. I estimate the equation 4.1 as a Linear Probability Model, such that
the coefficient is interpreted as the probability of observing a hospital or dispensary in
a chiefdom. Column (1) only has district fixed effects with additional chiefdom level
controls added, with full set of controls in column (5). In the most parsimonious model in
column (1), the coefficient is positive and statistically significant, suggesting that chief
membership to the 1951 legislative council is associated with a higher predicted probability
of a chiefdom having a hospital or a dispensary. The magnitude of the coefficient drops
from δ = 0.37, S.E = 0.15 in column (1) to δ = 0.25, S.E = 0.15, in column (5).
In Table 2.19 in the Appendix, I estimate the same model, but this time the
outcome variable is the number of hospitals or dispensaries. The results tell a similar
story, which is that chief membership to 1951 legislative council is associated with a higher
number of hospitals or dispensaries in chiefdoms.
2.5.3 DiD Estimates with 1963 Education Outcomes
Although I have used district fixed effects and controlled for chiefdom level ob-
servables in my OLS estimation, my estimates are still subject to biases from unobservable
differences across chiefdoms. I use a DiD estimation strategy to address these concerns.
Unfortunately, only the 1963 census data allows me to carry out this empirical strategy.
I present results from the DiD estimation starting with school attendance in
1963 in Table 2.4 below. Column (1) presents the most parsimonious model with only
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district and cohort fixed effects. I include chiefdom politics, demographic, and geographic
and economic controls in columns (2)-(5) respectively. As a base case, the interaction
term for cohort 5, people 25 years and above is left out. Cohorts 1 and 2 are considered
treatment groups, whereas cohorts 4, and base cohort are considered control groups. The
coefficients on the interaction term for each cohort captures the share of pupils in that
age group enrolled in school in 1963 in chiefdoms whose paramount chief was a member
of the 1951 legislative council relative to the base cohort.
As anticipated, the coefficient on the interaction with cohort 2, which is for
pupils ten years old is positive and statistically significant, with δ = 0.05 (S.E = 0.03),
suggesting that relative to the base cohort, school attendance was 5% higher for chiefdoms
whose paramount chief was member of the 1951 legislative council. The magnitude does
not change as I include more controls in the model in columns (2)-(4). It loses statistical
significance in column (5), when I control for missionary presence. The coefficients on the
interaction term with cohort 1 is statistically significant with δ = 0.03, (S.E = 0.01) in
column (2); δ = 0.02, (S.E = 0.01) in column (3); and δ = 0.02, (S.E = 0.01) in column
(4). The coefficient in column (5) is not statistically significant, although the magnitude
remains the same. As noted above, although possible, it is not typical for five year olds to
be in school, as such the magnitude of the coefficient is not too different from the base
cohort.
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Table 2.4: School Attendance-Relative to Comparison Cohort
Share of Children in School Attendance
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Memb. 1951 Leg.Council ×Cohort1 0.02 0.03** 0.02* 0.02* 0.02
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Memb. 1951 Leg.Council ×Cohort2 0.05* 0.05* 0.05* 0.05* 0.05
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Memb. 1951 Leg.Council ×Cohort3 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Memb. 1951 Leg.Council ×Cohort4 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Population 1963 0.00*** 0.00* 0.00**
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Mission Presence 0.01
(0.01)
District Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls for Chiefdom Politics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Demographic Controls Yes Yes
Geographic and Economic Controls Yes
Outcome Mean 0.082 0.082 0.082 0.082 0.082
Outcome Standard Deviation 0.104 0.104 0.104 0.104 0.104
Number of Chiefdoms 145 145 145 145 145
Observations 725 725 725 725 725
R-squared 0.64 0.65 0.65 0.67 0.67
NOTE- Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Missing data
on outcome variable for two chiefdoms. Fixed effects are for all district with data on outcome
variable. Geographic and economic Controls include an indicator variable if the chiefdom had
license for mining (diamonds and non-diamond), distance to 1907 rail road. All distances are
in km and are calculated with reference to chiefdom centroids. Demographic controls include
chiefdom 1963 ethnolinguistic fractionlization index. Controls for institutions include political
competition at chiefdom level, number of chiefs recalled, an indicator variable for the presence of
pre-colonial politically centralized ethnic groups, and whether chiefdom was amalgamated.
The interaction term with cohorts 3, and 4, the other control groups is not
statistically significant, with δ = 0.02, (S.E = 0.02) and δ = 0.01, (S.E = 0.01), respectively,
suggesting they are not statistically different from the base cohort. The magnitudes on
these coefficients are also much smaller, especially in comparison to cohort 2, which
supports the hypothesis of this paper.
Next, I present results for literacy rate in Table 2.5 below. The models are
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similar to those in Table 2.4 above. I used cohort 4 (people 40 years and above) as a base
case, which is left out. Cohorts 1 and 2 are considered treatment groups, whereas cohorts
4 and base cohort are considered control groups. The coefficients on the interaction term
for each cohort captures the share of people that are literate in that age group in 1963 in
chiefdoms whose paramount chief was a member of the 1951 legislative council relative to
the base cohort.
Table 2.5: Literacy Rate-Relative to Comparison Cohort
Literacy Rate
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Memb. 1951 Leg.Council ×Cohort1 0.02 0.02* 0.02 0.02* 0.02
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Memb. 1951 Leg.Council ×Cohort2 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Memb. 1951 Leg.Council ×Cohort3 0.01** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Population 1963 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Mission Presence 0.00
(0.01)
District Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls for Chiefdom Politics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Demographic Controls Yes Yes
Geographic and Economic Controls Yes
Outcome Mean 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04
Outcome Standard Deviation 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05
Number of Chiefdoms 145 145 145 145 145
Observations 1,160 1,160 1,160 1,160 1,160
R-squared 0.54 0.56 0.60 0.62 0.62
NOTE- Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Missing data on
outcome variable for two chiefdoms. Fixed effects are for all district with data on outcome variable.
Geographic and economic Controls include an indicator variable if the chiefdom had license for mining
(diamonds and non-diamond), distance to 1907 rail road. All distances are in km and are calculated
with reference to chiefdom centroids. Demographic controls include chiefdom 1963 ethnolinguistic
fractionlization index. Controls for institutions include political competition at chiefdom level, number
of chiefs recalled, an indicator variable for the presence of pre-colonial politically centralized ethnic
groups, and whether chiefdom was amalgamated.
As can be seen, the coefficient on the interaction term for cohort 1 is positive,
with δ = 0.02, (S.E = 0.01). It is weakly statistically significance across the five models.
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The coefficient on the interaction term for cohorts 2 and 3 are positive and identical, with
δ = 0.01, (S.E = 0.00) for both. This suggests that relative to the base, literacy rate was
1% higher among these age groups for chiefdoms whose paramount chiefs were members
of the 1951 legislative council. The fact that the coefficient on the interaction term for
one of the possible control groups, cohort 3, is identical to that of cohort 1 makes the
analysis less conclusive for literacy rate.
2.5.4 ATT Estimates
In Table 2.6 below, I present results for the ATT estimation for the share
of children in school attendance. The coefficient of the DiD estimator is positive and
significant in columns (1) to (4), with δ = 0.04 in column (4), suggesting that primary
school attendance for children in the treatment cohort, that is those that are 10 years and
under, in chiefdoms whose paramount chief were members of the 1951 legislative council
is about 4% higher than those that are not. This result is consistent to that in Table 2.4
above.
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Table 2.6: ATT Estimates for School Attendance
Share of Children in School Attendance
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Treat ×Memb.1951Leg.Council 0.03* 0.04** 0.03* 0.04* 0.03
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Cohort 1 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.07***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Cohort 2 0.20*** 0.20*** 0.20*** 0.20*** 0.20***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Cohort 3 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.12***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Cohort 4 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Population 1963 0.00*** 0.00** 0.00**
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Mission Presence 0.02
(0.01)
District Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls for Chiefdom Politics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Demographic Controls Yes Yes
Geographic and Economic Controls Yes
Outcome Mean 0.082 0.082 0.082 0.082 0.082
Outcome Standard Deviation 0.104 0.104 0.104 0.104 0.104
Number of Chiefdoms 145 145 145 145 145
Observations 725 725 725 725 725
R-squared 0.64 0.65 0.65 0.66 0.67
NOTE- Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Missing data on
outcome variable for two chiefdoms. Fixed effects are for all district with data on outcome variable.
Geographic and economic Controls include an indicator variable if the chiefdom had license for mining
(diamonds and non-diamond), distance to 1907 rail road. All distances are in km and are calculated
with reference to chiefdom centroids. Demographic controls include chiefdom 1963 ethnolinguistic
fractionlization index. Controls for institutions include political competition at chiefdom level, number
of chiefs recalled, an indicator variable for the presence of pre-colonial politically centralized ethnic
groups, and whether chiefdom was amalgamated.
The ATT estimate for literacy are also consistent with result in 2.5 above.
In Table 2.7 below the coefficient on the DiD estimator is also positive, with similar
magnitude, although not statistically significant.
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Table 2.7: Literacy Rate
Literacy Rate
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Treat X Memb. 1951 Leg. Council 0.02 0.02* 0.02 0.02 0.02
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Cohort 1 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.08***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Cohort 2 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Cohort 3 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Population 1963 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Mission Presence 0.00
(0.01)
District Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls for Chiefdom Politics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Demographic Controls Yes Yes
Geographic and Economic Controls Yes
Outcome Mean 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04
Outcome Standard Deviation 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05
Number of Chiefdoms 145 145 145 145 145
Observations 1,160 1,160 1,160 1,160 1,160
R-squared 0.14 0.56 0.59 0.62 0.62
NOTE- Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Missing data on
outcome variable for two chiefdoms. Fixed effects are for all district with data on outcome variable.
Geographic and economic Controls include an indicator variable if the chiefdom had license for mining
(diamonds and non-diamond), distance to 1907 rail road. All distances are in km and are calculated
with reference to chiefdom centroids. Demographic controls include chiefdom 1963 ethnolinguistic
fractionlization index. Controls for institutions include political competition at chiefdom level, number
of chiefs recalled, an indicator variable for the presence of pre-colonial politically centralized ethnic
groups, and whether chiefdom was amalgamated.
2.5.5 Persistence
A useful question to ask given the results so far is how long the observed effect
lasts? Do all the chiefdoms today have similar levels of public goods outcomes despite the
initial inequality observed at independence? To answer this question, I estimate equations
4.1 and 4.2 and use contemporary outcomes.
In Table 2.8 below I present results from estimating equation 4.2 using data
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from the latest population census conducted in 2015. The census asked individuals in the
population if they have attained primary education. I use this to construct my outcome
variable, which takes value 1 if an individual says they have attained primary education
and 0 otherwise. As data is captured at the individual level, I control for individual
level factors such as age, gender and ethnicity. All other controls are the same as the
chiefdom controls from the base result in 2.1 above. In column (5), I control for share
of population in school attendance in 1963, which captures any evidence of catch-up in
school attainment over the years. The coefficients in columns (1) to (4) are all positive
and statistically significant, with as high as δ = 0.04, suggesting that on average, primary
school attainment in chiefdoms whose chief was a member of the 1951 legislative council
is more likely to have attained primary education in 2015 compared to other chiefdoms.
The coefficient in column (5) is positive but not statistically significant, indicating that
there has been no catch-up over years. This result may in fact not be too surprising as
education outcomes tend to be sticky from generation to the next (Alesina et al., 2018).
In Table 2.9, I provide further evidence to suggest a persistence of the observed
effect on education. The table shows estimates from running equation 4.1, where the
outcome variable is the number of primary and secondary school facilities in each chiefdom.
This government data collection exercise mapped all existing schools in the country with
the aim of understanding whether efforts to replenish the stock of education facilities
through mass construction of schools since the end of the civil war had been enough to
meet demand. The dataset therefore gives a good sense of historical and contemporary
investment in education in the country. Models (1) to (5) are similar to those in the
base models. The coefficients are all positive and statistically significant. They are also
economically large. For instance in column (1), the result suggests that chief membership
to the 1951 legislative council is associated with about δ = 24 more school facilities in 2018.
In column (5), which also controls for the school attendance in 1963, this number drops
to δ = 16. This difference is above a third of the average number of schools per chiefdom.
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The results presented in the last two tables suggest that disparities in education outcomes
inherited at independence still persists today. Despite all the institutional changes and
development in the country, chiefdoms that were behind in public goods provision tend to
still be the ones lagging behind today.
Table 2.9: Number of Schools
Number of Schools
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
PC Membership to 1951 Leg. Council 23.97** 24.31*** 22.20** 17.64** 15.73*
(11.62) (9.09) (9.18) (8.81) (8.68)
Population Density 2015 0.16*** 0.10** 0.08* 0.08*
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05)
Mission Presence 16.74 23.35** 22.29**
(10.94) (11.10) (10.95)
Sch. Attendance 1963 (Share of Pop) 98.04
(68.92)
District Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls for Chiefdoms Politics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Demographic Controls Yes Yes Yes
Geographic and Economic Controls Yes Yes
Outcome Mean 47.2 47.2 47.2 47.2 47.2
Outcome Standard Deviation 36.83 36.83 36.83 36.83 36.83
Observations 149 149 148 148 146
R-squared 0.21 0.34 0.44 0.41 0.41
NOTE- Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Missing data for one
chiefdom in column 3 and three chiefdoms in column 5. Fixed effects are for all district with data on
outcome variable. Geographic and economic Controls include an indicator variable if the chiefdom had
license for mining (diamonds and non-diamond), distance to 1907 rail road. All distances are in km and are
calculated with reference to chiefdom centroids. Controls for institutions include political competition at
chiefdom level, number of chiefs recalled, an indicator variable for the presence of pre-colonial politically
centralized ethnic groups, and whether chiefdom was amalgamated.
2.6 Making Sense of the Results
So far I have shown a strong positive association between membership to the
1951 colonial legislative council and better public goods provision. What is less clear is
the mechanism through which this may have happened. Although I do not provide direct
evidence for the observed effect, I explore three possible explanations.
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The first explanation is that chiefdoms whose chiefs were members of the 1951
legislative council were able to collect more taxes from their chiefdoms compared to other
chiefdoms, which they used to provide education and health facilities in their chiefdoms.
This is a plausible explanation as the colonial government emphasized tax collection as a
means for Africans to self-govern in the waning days of the colonial era (Cooper, 2019).
One would expect members of the legislative council to be champions of such a cause.
I directly test this hypothesis by investigating whether there is any difference in the
amount of tax collected between chiefdoms with chiefs on the legislative council versus
not. I present my analysis in Table 2.10 below. The outcome variable is tax per thousand
chiefdom population collected in 1959. Although the coefficients on chief membership to
the 1951 legislative council are all positive in all the models, they are not statistically
significant and much smaller in magnitude relative to the mean. Suggesting that tax
collected would not have contributed to the observed effect.
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Table 2.10: Tax Collected
Tax Collected-1959 (£/Thousand 1959 Population)
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
PC Membership to 1951 Leg. Council 22.80 24.66 29.87 30.95 24.40
(24.51) (25.83) (26.18) (25.47) (21.87)
Population 1963 -0.00** -0.00** -0.00**
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Mission Presence 18.34
(13.29)
District Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls for Chiefdoms Politics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Demographic Controls Yes Yes Yes
Geographic and Economic Controls Yes Yes
Outcome Mean 1221.78 1221.78 1221.78 1221.78 1221.78
Outcome Standard Deviation 89.28 89.28 89.28 89.28 89.28
Observations 146 146 146 146 146
R-squared 0.68 0.69 0.70 0.71 0.71
NOTE- Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Missing data on outcome variable for
three chiefdoms. Fixed effects are for all district with data on outcome variable. Geographic and economic Controls
include an indicator variable if the chiefdom had license for mining (diamonds and non-diamond), distance to 1907 rail
road. All distances are in km and are calculated with reference to chiefdom centroids. Demographic controls chiefdom
1963 ethnolinguistic fractionlization index. Controls for institutions include political competition at chiefdom level,
number of chiefs recalled, an indicator variable for the presence of pre-colonial politically centralized ethnic groups, and
whether chiefdom was amalgamated.
Another related, but slightly different explanation, is that because state govern-
ments are weak and lack the capacity to produce public goods in rural areas, they rely
on local authorities, who were mostly chiefs to co-produce public goods. Co-production
could sometimes mean chiefs or the communities may start a project, for instance, that
the state would then complete. And would expect that because of the closeness to state
decision making, chiefs on the legislative council will be more likely to start projects
as they anticipate completion from state government. If this was the case, then these
chiefdoms would have many more community owned or initiated efforts.
To test this idea, I disaggregate hospitals and schools by type of ownership and
estimate equation 4.1 above for each type. Table 2.11 shows the result for hospitals.
Column (1) shows the outcome for government-owned hospital/dispensaries. Similarly,
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column (2) shows missionary owned facilities, and column (3) shows native administration-
owned hospital/dispensaries. The native administration in this case is equivalent to a local
or community ownership. Each coefficient can be interpreted as the predicted probability
of observing each type of hospital in the chiefdom. The coefficient, δ in column (3) is
positive but not statistically significant, suggesting that chiefdoms with chiefs in the
legislative council did not seem to have high chances of having community owned hospitals
or dispensaries.
I repeat the analysis for schools. The school mapping exercise designated school
by ownership, which includes, government schools that are hundred percent funded by
the state. Next are community schools, which get partial support from the state and
thus represent a co-production effort. The last two categories are missionary schools that
are funded by religious institutions and private schools, which are owned by individual
proprietors. The result is given in Table 2.12 below. The outcome in each column is a
binary variable that takes the value 1 for each type of school and 0 otherwise. As such
the models estimate the predicted probability of observing each type of school in the
chiefdom. The correlation coefficient δ is positive and statistically significant only for
government and missionary schools in columns (2) and (3) respectively. The magnitude
of the coefficient for community schools is much smaller, and not statistically significant
and does not support the co-production hypothesis.
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Table 2.12: Schools By Ownership
Community
School
Government
School
Missionary
School
Private
School
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4)
PC Membership to 1951 Leg. Council 1.56 6.39*** 14.07** 0.23
(2.00) (2.41) (5.78) (1.11)
Population Density (2015) 0.00 0.00 0.06** 0.03***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.00)
Mission Presence 5.54** 4.99* 4.63 1.39
(2.78) (2.58) (6.57) (0.93)
All Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Outcome Mean 8.21 8.23 29.02 1.63
Outcome Standard Deviation 8.68 7.67 23.09 5.02
Observations 148 148 148 148
R-squared 0.51 0.40 0.36 0.57
NOTE- Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Missing data on chiefdom. All
controls similar to Table 2.9
The third explanation I explore is that chiefs who were members of the legislative
council may have used their proximity to the government to disproportionately direct state
resources to their chiefdoms instead of evenly across all chiefdoms in the districts they
represented in their capacity as legislators. This argument is akin to regional favouritism.
This phenomenon is often discussed in the literature with respect to heads of state who
direct resources or implement policies that favour specific regions or ethnic groups (Hodler
& Raschky, 2014; Kramon & Posner, 2013; Kasara, 2007; Burgess et al., 2015; Bates,
1974). But the phenomenon can also apply in this context. Paramount chiefs in their
capacity as legislators have responsibility to provide public goods in the entire district
they represent. They influence policy and state allocation of resources. In the colonial era
they also had substantial influence in where mission schools and hospitals can be located,
as well as where to direct investments (Fenton, 1951; Richards, 2005; Fanthorpe, 2001).
But instead of directing resources or policies to benefit all chiefdoms in their district, the
incentives that shaped their office compelled them to focus only on their chiefdoms. To
begin with, even though chieftaincy position is a life term, inter-generational competition
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for the chieftaincy through ruling houses meant chiefs still had to care about how they
performed in office. Using their legislative position to direct resources was a good way to
leave a legacy that would benefit their lineage (Richards, 2003). They might even use
progress in their chiefdoms relative to others as an indication of their ability to do the
job. It, therefore, would not be a surprise if chiefs directed higher levels of public goods
to their own chiefdoms.
The direct way to empirically establish this fact is to show actual government
allocations in education and health that disproportionately went to favored chiefdoms.
Unfortunately the available chiefdom level data in the period under study does not
consistently document allocation from state government to the various chiefdoms. I only
rely on the outcomes associated with these allocations. The base result already makes a
clear association between legislative council member and better outcomes in education
and health. In this section, I have already presented evidence that these difference are
not due to better tax collection or co-production. The results in both Tables 2.11 and
2.12 show that the association between chief membership to the legislative council and
better outcomes is strongest when the public good is provided or owned by government. I
argue that this is plausibly because government allocations or policies disproportionately
benefited the favoured chiefdoms.
2.7 Conclusion
In this paper, I investigate the effect of formally integrating chiefs in state
governance. Chiefs typically rule almost exclusively in local communities. The link
between chiefs and the formal state is often informal and takes the form of a patron-client
association. How the formal connection between the state and chiefs affects public goods
provision is the focus of this paper.
Using archival data and the historical census data I show a strong correlation
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between the pattern of public goods provision in health and education at-independence
and the integration of chiefs in the colonial state legislature. My analysis also suggests
that there is degree of persistence to this correlation. Chiefdoms that had their chiefs
integrated in the state legislature still have better outcomes in education today. The
channels explored point to a localized regional favouritism, where chiefs in the legislature
disproportionately favour their own chiefdoms instead of the rest of the district.
This paper provides a political rational for the origin of disparities in education
and health outcomes and its persistence in the country. It provides the historical basis for
the complexity around using chiefs to provide local public goods. While it is clear that
the incentives that govern the institutions makes them perhaps more responsive in their
immediate community, their role as agents of the states for wider public goods provision
is less beneficial.
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Appendix
Figure 2.2: Excerpt from April 22nd 1902 Legislative Council Meeting Agenda
Issues discussed include voting, expenditure and revenue for the
Colony .
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Figure 2.3: Native Administration Creation Accelerated in this Period
Source: Data Collected from Various Archival Documents
Figure 2.4: A Golf Between The Protectorate and Colony on Education
Charted made using data from (Cartwright, 1970, p.25)
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Figure 2.5: Meeting Minutes from First Legislative Council Meeting in 1951
Figure 2.6: List of Paramount Chiefs in Bo District.
Obtained from 1961 Protectorate Handbook.R.B.S Koker of Bagbo
Chiefdom is the PC that represented Bo District in Legislative
Council.
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Table 2.13: Chiefdoms Represented in the 1951 Legislative Council
District Chiefdom Name of Paramount Chief
Bo Bagbo Hon. R.B.S Koker
Bombali Safroko Limba Hon. Alimami Dura
Kailahun Upper Jawi Hon. A.B Samba
Kambia Magbema Hon. Bai Farima Tass
Kenema Simbaru Hon. Kenewa Gamanga
Port Loko Mafroki Hon. Alikali Modu
Pujehun Kpanga-Kabonde Hon. Alimami Jaia Kai Kai
Tonkolili Kunike S. Hon. Bai Kur
NOTE- Names are matched from Paramount chiefs listed in the Protectorate
Handbook and from meeting minutes of the 1951 Legislative Council .
Figure 2.7: Raw Data for School Attendance by Age Cohort
Excerpt from 1963 Census on Chiefdom Level School Attendance.
Data shown for Lei Chiefdom
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Figure 2.8: Geo-Spatial Locations of Primary and Secondary Schools in Sierra Leone
Source: Latitude and Longitude coordinates obtained from Ministry
of Basic and Senior Secondary Education .
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Figure 2.9: Hospital and Dispensaries in Chiefdoms
Source: Protectorate Handbook 1960 .
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Table 2.14: Summary Statistics
Variable N Mean Std. Dev.
Leg Council Memb. 1951 149 0.05 0.23
Any Leg. House Rep Memb 1951-1961 149 0.12 0.33
Prop Sch. Attnd (All) 145 0.08 0.05
Prop Sch. Attnd (5 Yr. Olds) 145 0.07 0.06
Prop Sch. Attnd (10 Yr. Olds) 145 0.20 0.12
Prop Sch. Attnd (15 Yr. Olds) 145 0.13 0.09
Prop Sch. Attnd (20 Yr. Olds) 145 0.01 0.01
Prop. Literacy (All) 145 0.04 0.03
Prop. Literacy (10-14 Yr) 145 0.12 0.08
Prop. Literacy (15-19 Yr) 145 0.09 0.06
Prop. Literacy (20-24Yr) 145 0.03 0.03
Prop. Literacy (25-29Yr) 145 0.03 0.02
Ever Attend School (2015 Census) 494165 0.44 0.50
Primary Education Attainment (2015 Census) 298180 0.26 0.44
Number of Schools (All) 149 47 36.83
Number of Missionary Schools 149 29 23.09
Number of Community Schools 149 8 8.68
Number of Government Schools 149 8 7.68
Number of Private School 149 2 5.02
Hospitals or Dispensary Available (binary) 147 0.39 0.49
Number of Gov Hospitals or Dispensary 147 0.51 0.71
Gov. Hospitals or Dispensary Available (binary) 147 0.08 0.27
Native Admin. Hospitals or Dispensary Available (binary) 147 0.07 0.25
Mission Hospitals or Dispensary Available (binary) 147 0.10 0.30
NOTE- Legislative Council Membership Obtained from meeting minutes, and chiefdoms matched from
Protectorate Handbook Year 1958. Data on proportion of school attendance and literacy obtained from 1963
census. Data on primary education attainment obtained and share of population that ever attended school
obtained from 2015 censuses. Number of schools aggregated at chiefdom level from geo-spatial mapping of all
school in the country. Hospital and dispensary information obtained from 1960 Protectorate Handbook.
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Table 2.15: Summary Statistics for Control Variable
Variable N Mean Std. Dev.
Number of Ruling Houses 149 3.95 2.15
Chiefdom Amalgamated (binary) 149 0.31 0.46
Number Tribes 146 1.30 0.52
Presence of Hierarchical Tribe (binary) 149 0.28 0.45
Mission Presence (binary) 149 0.09 0.29
Distance to Nearest Mission (KM) 149 55.48 41.39
Population 1963 148 13259.59 9470.61
Years Since Chiefdom Became NA 148 17.65 5.84
Area (Sq_Km) 149 482.84 371.54
Distance to Coast (km) 149 105.33 65.61
Distance to 1907 Railroad (km) 149 44.19 30.34
Chiefdom Elevation 149 0.17 0.15
Average Slope 149 7.46 3.94
Average annual rainfall-15 to 20 years average (Inches) 149 113.19 17.35
Distance to 1895 Mitchell Trade Route(km) 149 20.19 19.94
Tax Collected in 1959 (£) 146 3615.91 2433.68
Tax Per 1963 Pop 1959 (£/pop) 146 0.33 0.47
1930 Mining Permits (binary) 149 0.17 0.38
Number of Cooperative 146 2.83 5.59
Number of Produce Marketing Board 147 1.73 3.97
NOTE- Data obtained from various sources. Missing data also for some covariates. Institutional
controls such as number of ruling houses, amalgamation, , and geographic controls such as distance to
coast, distance to 1895 trade routes, distance to 1907 railroad, 1930 mining permissions are all obtained
from (Acemoglu, Reed, & Robinson, 2014).Chiefdom slope, elevation, obtained from Glennerster et al.
(2013) and calculated using GIS software from rasters provided in the Harmonised World Soil Index
(HWSD). Presence of missionaries obtained from Nunn (2010). Rainfall data calculated using GIS
software, where each chiefdom is assigned rainfall data collected by the nearest distance to any of
38 rainfall station across the country from 1941- 1960 (Gregory, 1965).Produce marketing board and
number of cooperatives, and tax data obtained from 1960 Protectorate Handbook, (Sierra Leone Chief
Commissioner’s Office, 1942 -1960)
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Table 2.16: Determinants of 1951 Legislative Council Membership
Membership to 1951 Leg. Council
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4)
Mission Presence 0.23* 0.25** 0.26**
(0.12) (0.12) (0.12)
Population (1963) 0.00** 0.00** 0.00**
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Ln(Distance to 1895 Trade Routes (km)) -0.00 -0.01 -0.00 -0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
Area of Chiefdom (square km) -0.00 -0.00* -0.00* -0.00*
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Ln(Distance to 1097 Rail Road 9km)) 0.03** 0.03** 0.05** 0.05**
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Ln(Distance to Coast (km)) 0.07* 0.04 0.03 0.03
(0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04)
Mining Permission in 1930 -0.03 -0.05 -0.09 -0.08
(0.06) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08)
Pre-Colonial Political Centralization -0.04 -0.01 0.00 0.01
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Number of Ruling Houses -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Number of Chiefs in History of Chiefdom -0.00 -0.00 -0.01 -0.01
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Amalgamation 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.04
(0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06)
Number of Tribes in Chiefdom (1950s) -0.04 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04)
Average Chiefdom Elevation -0.38 -0.35 -0.05 0.00
(0.31) (0.30) (0.57) (0.58)
Average Chiefdom Slope -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Ln(Historic Average Annual Rainfall-1941-160s) 0.11 0.07 -0.11 -0.14
(0.14) (0.14) (0.29) (0.29)
Number of cooperatives 1960 0.00
(0.00)
Observations 146 146 146 146
R-squared 0.10 0.08 0.18 0.19
NOTE- Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Chiefs and Disparities in Education and Health Outcomes
Table 2.19: Number of Hospital and Dispensaries
Number of Hospital or Dispensary in Chiefdom in 1958
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
PC Membership to 1951 Leg. Council 0.63** 0.64** 0.50* 0.53** 0.46*
(0.28) (0.27) (0.26) (0.25) (0.27)
Population 1963 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Mission Presence 0.21
(0.21)
District Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls for Chiefdoms Politics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Demographic Controls Yes Yes Yes
Geographic and Economic Controls Yes Yes
Outcome Mean 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.51
Outcome Standard Deviation 0.71 0.71 0.71 0.71 0.71
Observations 147 147 147 147 147
R-squared 0.18 0.19 0.36 0.38 0.38
NOTE- Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Controls are same as those in
Table 2.3.
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Chapter 3
Game of Chiefs: Using Violent
Conflict for Political Gains. A Case
Study From the Sierra Leone Civil
War
72
Abstract
Do political rivals use violent conflicts to gain political advantage? And if so, under what
circumstances? To answer these questions, I take advantage of a plausibly exogenous
variation in ruling house rivalry and conflict shocks to chiefdom politics in Sierra Leone
to highlight a political logic that shaped the patterns of civilian fatalities during the
country’s decade-long civil war (1991 to 2002). Ruling houses are political dynasties
recognized by the British colonial authorities as the only groups to contest the paramount
chieftaincy. I show that the number of ruling houses in a chiefdom is positively associated
with the number of civilian fatalities. I further show that locations where there is a stable
balance of power, because historically houses rotate reigning, are negatively associated
with civilian deaths, relative to chiefdoms where the power dynamics among ruling houses
is unstable. The mechanism suggests a civilian-combatant co-production of violence,
where rival political actors target each other through denunciation, and insurgents who
punish to deter defection in areas under their control.
JEL Classification: D74 , O17, P48 Q34
Key words: Selective Violence, Civil Conflict, Customary Institutions, Chiefs, Sub-national
Political Competition, Sierra Leone
Game of Chiefs
3.1 Introduction
This paper highlights the role of political rivalry in understanding the pattern of
lethal violence against civilians in civil wars. The conflict literature underscores incentives
and constraints that shapes interactions between armed groups and unarmed civilians.
War-related factors, such as the incentives for territorial control by armed groups (Kalyvas,
2006; Kalyvas & Kocher, 2009), the incentives for survival by civilians (Wimmer & Miner,
2019; Valentino, Huth, & Balch-Lindsay, 2004; Kalyvas, 2006), and the recruitment and
organizational features of armed groups (Humphreys & Weinstein, 2006; Weinstein, 2006;
Arjona & Kalyvas, 2012a) are possible explanations for the pattern of violence in civil
conflicts. The role of politics is largely muted in these leading explanations. In studies
that highlight political rivalry, rivalry is endogenous to the conflict (Balcells, 2010, 2011).
When civil wars are ignited because of political rivalry, it is not surprising for supporters
of competing political parties to target each other to gain political advantage (Brosché &
Höglund, 2016; Esteban, Morelli, & Rohner, 2015; Querido, 2009).
How does political rivalry affect conflict outcomes when conflict is an exogenous
shock to the political setting? Would political actors use conflict to gain political ad-
vantage? Or would they act collectively to protect their communities against warring
factions? The empirical literature has little to say about these questions. This is in part
because data on political variables are often captured at a level much higher and cannot
be matched with the more spatially disaggregated conflict data available to researchers. It
is also often the case that ethnic divisions and political rivalry are intertwined in research
that links political rivalry and violence against civilians in civil wars (Wimmer & Miner,
2019; Weidmann, 2011).
In this paper, I take advantage of a political setting where political rivalry and the
civil conflict are orthogonal to each other, which allows me to isolate the effect of political
rivalry on civilian fatalities. In Sierra Leone, the lowest administrative political office is the
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paramount chieftaincy. The position is contested by ruling houses. Ruling houses consist
of established kinship networks that were recognized by the British colonial authorities
as the only groups allowed to contest the paramount chieftaincy. This institutional set
up makes chiefdom politics very local. Ruling houses are viewed by locals as political
dynasties. Political rivalry is intensified the higher the number of ruling houses in a
chiefdom. Furthermore, variation in the number of ruling houses was largely due to
historical accidents, making political rivalry plausibly exogenous (Acemoglu, Reed, &
Robinson, 2014). For a particular ruling house to gain the paramount chieftaincy, they
must galvanize kinship networks, and form alliances among local elites who are eligible
to vote in the chieftaincy elections. Once elected, paramount chiefs rule for life, making
chiefdom politics a high stakes game. Paramount chiefs are gatekeepers for the chiefdoms,
and have control over critical local economic resources such as land.
With respect to conflict, the Sierra Leone civil war was a national struggle aimed
at removing political heads at the centre of government in Freetown. Initially fighting
was between the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) and the Sierra Leone Armed Forces
(the national army). But through rebel attacks, military counterattacks, and the rise of
vigilante groups and civil defence forces, conflict eventually reached almost every chiefdom
in the country. As the war progressed, chiefs and their kinship networks became targets
(Guberek et al., 2006). This paper aims to understand how this shock to chiefdom political
rivalry affected conflict outcomes at the chiefdom level.
My empirical analysis suggests that there is a positive association between the
number of ruling houses and civilian fatalities during the Sierra Leone civil war. This
effect is substantial. My analysis suggests that on average any additional ruling house
in a chiefdom is associated with as much as 9% increase in civilian fatalities per event.
When results are analysed at the chiefdom level, I find that every additional number of
ruling house is associated with about 16% more civilian fatalities.
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I further show that pre-war balance of power among competing houses in chief-
doms shaped civilian survival outcomes differently. I investigate three cases: chiefdoms
where ruling houses have had almost equal reign of the paramount chieftaincy, which I
call Shared Power. I label the second case Monopoly Power, in instances where only one
ruling family has dominated power in a chiefdom even when there are two or more other
rival houses. I label the third case Unstable Power; in situations where no single ruling
house dominates but there is also no power sharing among ruling houses. I find that
locations where power is shared are negatively associated with civilian fatalities relative
to the Unstable Power category. Relative to Unstable Power cases, Monopoly Power cases
are also negatively associated with civilian fatalities but not statistically significant.
These results are obtained from regression specifications with district, year and
faction fixed effects. These capture variation in fatalities across districts, year, and
the different warring factions, respectively. However, a key concern that remains is the
possibility that chiefdoms with more ruling houses were targeted for reasons that suggest a
spurious relationship because of omitted variable bias. I take a few steps to address these
concerns. First, I address potential concerns that there may have been over reporting
on fatalities in locations with more ruling houses during the war, which may have been
because they are more accessible. I consider the role of diamonds and the presence of
non-natives or strangers in the chiefdoms, who have been described as political foot
soldiers for oppressive paramount chiefs (Reno, 2000). My analysis does not support this
claim. I further take advantage of the categories of fatalities in the dataset to conduct a
placebo test using combatant fatalities instead of civilian fatalities. Finally, I then use
a second conflict dataset and I repeat my analyses. My results remain robust, and the
findings suggest that ruling house rivalry is positively associated with lethal violence
against civilians in the Sierra Leone civil war.
In terms of mechanism, the evidence points to a civilian-combatant co-production
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of violence in a process that Kalyvas (2006) describes as denunciation. The claim is that
ruling houses provided information about their rivals to combatants who aimed to deter
and punish defection in areas where they enjoy some degree of control. This would suggest
that, the higher the number of ruling houses, and number of factions in the chiefdoms,
the more likely the chances of denunciation and counter-denunciation, and ultimately
more civilian deaths. My empirical analysis weakly supports this claim. But it is the
anecdotes during the war as captured by the United Nations Truth and Reconciliation
Reports (TRC) that provide the clearest evidence for the denunciation mechanism.
To further support the claim that denunciation is a possible mechanism for the
observed link between civilian fatalities and ruling house rivalry, I exploit the changes in
violence in the different phases of the war. In the latter part of the war, violence was more
indiscriminate as actors struggle for power at the national level after the 1997 military
coup (Smith, Gambette, & Longley, 2004). Almost by definition, selective violence is
unlikely when violence is indiscriminate (Kalyvas, 2006; Kalyvas & Kocher, 2009). As such
ruling house rivalry should not be linked to civilian fatalities, whether by denunciation or
otherwise. My empirical analysis confirms this claim.
This paper contributes to the literature that attempts to explain violence against
civilians or mass killings in conflict (Valentino et al., 2004; Kalyvas, 2006; Humphreys
& Weinstein, 2006; Weinstein, 2006; Kalyvas & Kocher, 2009; Querido, 2009; Balcells,
2010, 2011; Weidmann, 2011; Esteban et al., 2015; Brosché & Höglund, 2016; Raleigh
& De Bruijne, 2017; Wimmer & Miner, 2019). It is more closely related to studies that
provide strategic explanations for violence against civilians in civil wars. Weinstein (2006)
and Humphreys and Weinstein (2006) underscore the importance of the organizational
features of warring factions, while Kalyvas (2006) and Kalyvas and Kocher (2009) point to
incentives for territorial control by fighters, and for collaboration by civilians, in the Greek
and Vietnam civil wars, respectively in explaining violence against civilians. This paper
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joins the literature that aims to specify the incentive that civil war induces for civilians to
collaborate with warring factions in meting out lethal violence against civilians (Wimmer
& Miner, 2019; Balcells, 2010, 2011; Valentino et al., 2004).
Balcells (2010, 2011) are among the limited studies that account for political
competition in explaining lethal violence patterns. Balcells (2010, 2011) show that pre-war
power parity contributed to more direct violence in the Spanish Civil War. However, in
the Spanish Civil War, national level political competition ignited the war, and warring
factions in the various municipalities of Catalonia were, for the most part, armed wings of
national parties. In this case, political competition is endogenous to the conflict.
In the Sierra Leone case, the civil war was a shock to chiefdom politics, and
chiefdom political rivalry does not mirror national level political cleavages. I show that
political calculations among local rivals in a highly disaggregated political setting, that is
largely devoid of ethnic cleavages, is a key explanatory factor for selective violence in that
war. My analysis also goes a step further by showing that the exploitation of conflict for
political gain depends largely on the balance of power in the rivalry.
This paper also contributes to the broad literature on the role and effect of
customary institutions in the political and economic development in modern Africa
(Acemoglu, Reed, & Robinson, 2014; Logan, 2013; Baldwin, 2016b; Wig & Kromrey,
2018; Baldwin & Raffler, 2017). Acemoglu, Reed, and Robinson (2014) suggests more
competition for political leadership within the institution is an effective mechanism for
accountability in public goods provision. Drawing on evidence mostly from Zambia,
Baldwin (2016b) on the other hand, suggests that it is precisely the undemocratic nature
of chiefs that make them more effective. As a result of their unlimited tenure, and the
fact that they do not have elections to worry about, chiefs can have long time horizons
in planning, and can call on deep extended networks for collective action to deliver on
development objectives. In Liberia, Baldwin and Mvukiyehe (2015) find that the selection
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of clan chiefs through periodic elections does not lead to better collective action. Instead,
the study finds that elections encourage participation in contentious acts, such as protests
and riots, and decrease participation in collective action efforts. This paper highlights a
downside to political competition and raises questions about the best way to incorporate
traditional institutions in the political systems on the continent.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows; Section 2 outlines existing explanations
for lethal violence against civilians in civil wars and Section 3 gives a background to the
Sierra Leone civil war. Section 4 describes the chieftaincy system in Sierra Leone and
defines local political rivalry and how balance of power is captured in this study. In Section
5, I describe data sources used in the paper. Section 6 lays out the identification and
estimation strategy, and section 7 provides my main results, and I discuss the robustness of
the main findings in Section 8. In Section 9, I address concerns over possible confounding
factors and explore alternative hypotheses. I turn my attention to the mechanism in
Section 10, and the final section concludes with implications for the chieftaincy system in
Sierra Leone.
3.2 Theories of Selective Violence against Civilians
Sub-national level analyses of civil conflicts have brought greater understanding
to the causes, effects and dynamics of conflicts. Analyses grounded at the micro-level allow
us to understand how individual and group differences and engagement in war across time
and space affect conflict dynamics and outcomes (Verwimp, Justino, & Brück, 2009). A key
puzzle at the core of these analyses is the variation in civilian suffering during civil wars. At
least two broad strands of arguments have been put forth. One focuses on combatants and
their organizations. The theory is that, how combatants are recruited, who chooses to fight,
how they are deployed, disciplined, and what resources are available to combatant groups,
all determine whether or not they will perpetuate violence against civilians (Humphreys &
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Weinstein, 2006; Weinstein, 2006; Arjona & Kalyvas, 2012b). Humphreys and Weinstein
(2006) for instance, argue that using interviews of ex-combatants in the Sierra Leone civil
war, high levels of abuse against civilians were attributed to warring factions that did
not have control over their recruits or lack punishment mechanisms for indiscipline. The
theory also suggests that resource-rich factions are likely to attract opportunistic recruits
who would be more likely to use indiscriminate violence. Resource poor groups would
rely on social endowments, such as religion, ethnicity or ideology to recruit fighters, and
these recruits would be more likely to use selective violence. For instance, violence levels
will be low if warring factions operate in areas where they share the same identity as
civilians. However, in this theory civilians are complete victims with little agency in the
perpetuation of violence. Furthermore, the theory is also less informative about the type
of violence or its intensity. It is possible organizational factors may explain wide-spread
abuse of civilians, but not the intensity of abuse.
Other theories account for civilian agency in civil war violence. Kalyvas (2006)
suggests that in civil wars that are characterized by contested areas within a sovereignty
by competing warring factions, lethal violence against civilians is a result of military
incentive to control territory. In such a setting, the use of selective violence can be an
effective tool in areas where fighting factions enjoy dominant but not full control. However,
selective violence depends on the supply of asymmetric information that only civilians can
provide, and which warring factions need to help them to deter or punish defection. The
theory suggests civilians may collaborate by providing information about other civilians
(denounce) only if the likelihood of a retaliation is low. The theory predicts that areas
of complete control or no control are less likely to experience selective violence. This is
because in locations of no control, armed actors will demand information, but civilians
would not provide it, and conversely in locations of complete control, armed actors may
not need or act on information civilians may provide. Kalyvas (2006) and, Kalyvas and
Kocher (2009) in the Greek and Vietnam War, respectively, provide empirical support
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for this hypothesis. The Kalyvas control-collaboration theory puts civilian agency at the
center of explanations for selective violence against civilians. The theory is however not
specific about the motivations for civilian agency. The author generally points to settling
old feuds as possible motivation for civilians to collaborate with fighters to perpetuate
violence.
Recent research has contributed toward highlighting political factors specifically in
the explanation of selective violence. Wimmer and Miner (2019) describes ethnoterritorial
competition as a leading factor in explaining violence against civilians. They argue that
fighters will kill civilians in areas with almost equal share of populations of their own
co-ethnics and adversary’s co-ethnics, because even the slightest conflict has the potential
to shift territorial control. Balcells (2010, 2011) focuses on the role of political competition
as the primary factor in explaining violence in the Spanish civil war. The author uses
pre-war voting returns to show that pre-war political competition shaped direct violence
against civilians at the local level, and that lethal violence was highest in locations where
the two main competing political parties had very close results in pre-war elections. The
difference between these studies and the current paper is that, in Wimmer and Miner
(2019) politics or territorial control is driven by ethnic cleavages, and in Balcells (2010,
2011), political rivalry is endogenous to the conflict. The war started because of political
competition at the center, and militia at the municipal level were armed wings of the two
main national political parties.
I show that even in instances of exogenous conflict shocks, political actors will
aim to use war to gain political power, even at the expense of loss to their community.
This is contrary to literature that suggests that communities will act collectively to deter
fighters perpetrating civilian targeted violence (Rubin, 2018; Shaver, Shapiro, et al., 2015;
Berman, Shapiro, & Felter, 2011). I am able to more clearly highlight strategic political
considerations in explaining patterns of violence because I benefit from the availability of
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data on political rivalry in highly disaggregated political settings, largely devoid of ethnic
cleavages, and where local politics is delinked from national politics.
3.3 Background to the Sierra Leone Civil War
The Sierra Leone civil war raged from March 23rd 1991 to January 18th 2002.
According to the No Peace Without Justice (NPWJ) Sierra Leone conflict mapping project,
the war began when a group of armed forces of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF)
and National Patriotic Front for Liberia (NPFL) entered Kailahun District from Liberia
through the town of Bomaru in Upper Bambara Chiefdom (Smith et al., 2004). The
war quickly spread throughout the towns and villages of southern and eastern districts
that bordered Liberia in the first few years of the war. What came to be the main RUF
base “Camp Zogoda” was established in the Kenema district close to the Liberian border
(Smith et al., 2004). From here they orchestrated attacks on civilians in villages in the
region. Eventually the war reached all regions of the country. Although the RUF was
the main rebel group that initiated the war, by the time the war ended as many as eight
distinct fighting factions had been involved.
Most of the Sierra Leone civil war can be categorized as irregular or unconven-
tional civil war (Kalyvas, 2006; Balcells, 2010). Unlike conventional civil war, there were
no clear front lines where warring factions met to fight. In the Sierra Leone civil war,
the frontlines were villages and towns where civilians lived. Various fighting factions
took control of the same locations at different times over the duration of the war. Only
Freetown stayed under the control of the military until 1997. A key feature of this war was
the intensity of face-to-face violence against civilians. Children holding AK47s, amputated
women and children, and human remains in city streets were common images from the
war. Accounts of the war suggest fighting factions would assemble people perceived to be
supporters or sympathizers of enemy factions in local court houses and publicly execute
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them (Guberek et al., 2006). Estimates of civilian fatalities vary widely, ranging from
a low of 10,000 (Guberek et al., 2006) to a high of 75,000 (Sawyer, 2008). The war
also had many twists and turns. By the time the war ended in 2002, political power at
the national level changed hands four times, through two coup d’états, one democratic
election, and one internationally backed military intervention. In the latter part of the
war, violence against civilians became more discriminate. The reason for this is that
civilians all across the country put up a very strong resistance and protest against the
second military overthrow of the democratically elected government. The popular slogan
of the military and the RUF was “Operation No Living Thing”(Smith et al., 2004, p.91).
In this period, amputation of arms also skyrocketed and was intended to dis-empower
civilians, who insisted that the right to govern the country lies in their hands and they
give that right only through the ballot box.
The role of warring factions in inflicting untold violence against civilians is
emphasized in the literature (Guberek et al., 2006; Smith et al., 2004). However, detailed
qualitative studies of violence and victimization of civilians paint a more complex picture
that implicates unarmed local actors. Richards (2003) points out that a number of villages
that were only marginally hit by rebel activities, continued to be destroyed by local
actors, a reflection of local tension built up over many years. He argues that violence that
followed unopposed attacks were more costly. Richards (2003, p.13) notes the following
with respect to the R.U.F:
“The rebels were rarely if ever interested in holding the villages they sacked.
They had few troops, and needed to move on. So an attack would displace
the population and sow seeds of local dissensions, eg. by burning the houses
of only one faction in a land dispute. . . As villagers ventured to return they
might conclude from patterns of damage that the violence was an inside job”.
A post-war consultation on causes of violence in the local communities highlights anecdotes
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of betrayal and people participating in the destruction of their own communities. Old
local feuds and political rivalry were blamed for some of the destruction and harm that
happened in communities across the country (Richards, 2003).
3.4 Ruling Houses and the Paramount Chief Position
Core elements of the chiefdom politics as it has congealed in the past half century
includes an election of the paramount chiefs by a group of elites, known as chiefdom
councillors (formerly, Traditional Authorities). The electorate has grown over the years,
the average chiefdom has 554 councillors gazetted as the electorate. The Protectorate
Ordinance stipulated that only individuals from ruling houses are eligible to contest the
paramount chief position. Post-independence Sierra Leone kept this rule (M. Conteh,
2013). Ruling houses were likely warrior groups that conquered and protected land; it is
based on strong familial lineages and a distinction between first-comers and new-comers.
The British signed treaties with some of the houses that had claimed land, and these
became known as “treaty chiefs” (Richards, Bah, & Vincent, 2004). Furthermore, to raise
revenue and maintain order in the interior, the Protectorate Ordinance empowered chiefs
to form local governments in their native territories. The paramount chief position became
the apex of the institution. Ruling houses are thus the unit of political competition in all
149 chiefdoms. To many observers, ruling houses act like political parties in the chiefdoms.
W. Barrows (1976, p. 202) describes ruling houses as political parties operating in the
chiefdoms as follows: “Structurally, the semblance of a two- or multiparty system is built
into chiefdom politics because (almost) every chiefdom has at least two ruling families. In
fact, local people often use the terms ruling party and opposition party”.
For paramount chief candidates to gain support of the councillors they must
galvanize kinship networks, and form alliances among the lesser chiefs and village headmen
across the chiefdom. Ruling houses build networks and make social investments to build
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reputation both in and out of reigns, which is crucial in a system with intergenerational
political turnover. Once elected, paramount chiefs rule for life. As of 2016 the average
tenure was 15 years, but this number ranges from 1 to 47 years.1 Another option for
political turnover in the chiefdoms is a political settlement approach, where ruling houses
take turns at governing. This settlement approach was promoted in chiefdoms that were
combined (Amalgamated), but this option has rarely been taken (Tangri, 1976; Fenton,
1951). As a result, there is high variation in the balance of power among houses in
chiefdoms with multiple ruling houses. For instance, a survey of local historians and
archival research of ruling houses by Reed and Robinson (2013) shows that in Jaiama-
Bongor chiefdom there are seven ruling houses, but only one has had reign in the history
of the chieftaincy, whereas in Sella Limba chiefdom with four ruling houses, there is
an almost equal number of reigns. There is also variation in the number of paramount
chieftaincies in each chiefdom. On average some chiefdoms have had six paramount chiefs,
but some have had up to 15.
Up until 2004, the chiefdom administrations were responsible for providing public
goods, and, as custodians of rural land, they had the power to tax, mobilize labour and
administer justice. In the colonial era, the paramount chiefs had the full backing of the
British might in the form of police forces and prison facilities to help them overcome
any local challengers, provided the chiefs remained loyal to the colonial masters. As has
been widely documented elsewhere on the continent, chiefs were accountable only to the
colonial powers rather than the local people they governed. The fact that they had the
backing and protection of the British powers made them more powerful and despotic
than before the colonial encounter (Cooper, 2002; Mamdani, 1996; Acemoglu, Chaves,
Osafo-Kwaako, & Robinson, 2014b). The chieftaincy system in Sierra Leone perhaps
provides the clearest example of despotism. In addition to chiefs’ control over land, they
1 In very rare cases, PCs were removed by the British colonial masters. The post-independence era
constitution also give Presidents the power to remove PCs, however, this happens rarely and only in
particular chiefdoms that are politically sensitive to the central government.
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were steeped in the domestic slave trade until the late 1920s when it was legally banned
(Fanthorpe, 2001; Richards, 1996). But even then, chiefs could use bonded labour of
young men to work on large tracts of land they controlled. They had the power to banish
people, and strangers were left at their mercy. Every post-independence regime in the
country has also supported the chieftaincy system.
The authoritarian rule of the paramount chiefs raised the stakes in the political
contests in these chiefdoms. Historical accounts indeed point to conflicts and unrest in
the chiefdoms resulting from ruling house political rivalry within and across chiefdoms.
In his analysis of chiefdom conflict and unrest across the country dating back to 1912,
Tangri (1976, p. 313) notes:
"The leaders of opposition ruling houses were often frustrated in their at-
tempts to gain access to the local decision-making bodies by conventional
means. . . in a situation of widespread discontent, violence was the only means
of expression. . . "
This frustration of not being included in decisions encouraged fierce competition among
rival political elites, as politics was indeed a winner-take-all contest.
The literature on the war in Sierra Leone implicates the chieftaincy system
by pointing to intergenerational grievances between rural elites and young people. The
argument is that a slave culture which predates colonialism continued to be perpetuated
by chiefs, in which rights of young people over land and their labour was denied by chiefs
or used for their own benefit. This created the so called “lumpen” youth in rural areas
(Richards, 1996, 2005; Fanthorpe, 2001; Abdullah et al., 1997). This argument is a useful
theory about why so many young people became engaged in the war, but not sufficient
to explain the varied pattern of violence against civilians. My paper suggests a new
explanation, which is that strategic political considerations to tip the balance of power in
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chieftaincy politics may have been the logic that explains the pattern of lethal violence
against civilians observed in the war.
3.5 Data
In this section, I describe the data sources for both the war outcomes and the
political variables. I provide a definition of political rivalry, and how the balance of power
categories are captured in the data.
A. Political Variables
Acemoglu, Reed, and Robinson (2014) are the first to comprehensively document
ruling houses across chiefdoms in Sierra Leone.2 To build the dataset on ruling houses,
the authors combined information from the archives in Sierra Leone and London with
a survey of local historians from all 149 chiefdoms.3 Their key respondents were local
oral historians, who helped reconstruct the list of ruling houses, number of times each
had reigned, and number of past PCs for each chiefdom. The archival work was crucial
in documenting and confirming which chiefdoms were combined (amalgamated). The
companion work Reed and Robinson (2013), provides a detailed description and history of
each ruling house. Table 3.8 in the Appendix provides summary statistics of the chiefdom
political institution. The number of ruling houses per chiefdom ranges from 1(6% of cases)
to 12 (less than 1% of cases), with the modal number of ruling houses being 4. As Panel
(a) in Figure 1 shows there is no discernible pattern in the distribution of ruling houses
across the chiefdoms. Acemoglu, Reed, and Robinson (2014) argue that the intensity
of competition increases with the number of ruling houses. To empirically show this,
they developed a concentration of political power index, the Herfindahl Index, which is a
weighted average of the number of times each ruling house has reigned. The index ranges
2 I am very grateful to one of the authors of the paper, Reed, who was kind enough to talk me through
how they collected the data, and made the data available to me.
3 In July 2017 the outgoing President split up some chiefdoms to create 41 new ones. This analysis
uses the 149 chiefdom from the 2004 census.
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from 0 to 1, and a score closer to 0 suggests ruling houses in that chiefdom have gained
equal reign, and a score of 1 suggest, only one ruling house has dominated power. They
then show that the number of ruling houses is negatively correlated with the Herfindahl
Index of power concentration. Table 3.7 in the Appendix shows a statistically negative
correlation between the Herfindahl Index of ruling house dominance and the number of
ruling houses. This relationship is shown graphically in Figure 3.3 in the Appendix using
model 5 in Table 3.7.
Acemoglu, Reed, and Robinson (2014) are not the first to measure political
rivalry in this manner. Becker (1983) and Stigler (1972) have also demonstrated that the
number of candidates or political parties, is a useful measure of competition, just like
using the number and size of firms in market competition. Even though the number of
ruling houses is a useful measure of rivalry, it is not very informative about the balance of
power among competing houses in each chiefdom. For instance, the average chiefdoms
has had about six opportunities for the paramount chieftaincy, with maximum of 17. In
addition, on average the maximum time one ruling house has gained power is about 3, but
this ranges from 1 to 15. As of 2016, the longest serving paramount chief had reigned for
47 years. For the argument of this paper, it would be important to know how successful
ruling houses have been in getting hold of power in the chiefdoms, much like the effective
number of political parties (Laakso & Taagepera, 1979).
I use the Herfindahl Index to create three categorical variables to describe the
balance of power in the chiefdoms. First, I look at locations where, pre-war, multiple ruling
houses have shared equally the reign of the paramount chieftaincy. I call this category
Shared Power. Historically, power sharing was achieved through rotational arrangement
between ruling houses (Tangri, 1976). I then describe the case where only one ruling
house has dominated the chieftaincy even when there are more than one house in the
chiefdom. I call this case Monopoly Power. These two cases can be viewed as stable in
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terms of power dynamic among the ruling houses. The third category which is defined as
Unstable Power, is the situation in between these two scenarios.
The Herfindahl Index score varies for each of these categories and depends on
the number of ruling houses, N in each chiefdom. For instance, in the most simple case
for Shared Power, where a chiefdom with two ruling houses have had equal reigns at the
paramount chieftaincy, will have an index score of 0.5. For a scenario where there are
four ruling houses that have shared power equally would have Herfindahl Index score of
0.25. The simplest case of Monopoly Power is where only one ruling house has reigned
even when there are two houses. Herfindahl Index score will be 1 in this case.
The function below describes the relationship between the Herfindahl Index and
the number of ruling houses in the definition of the balance of power categories for all
chiefdoms with multiple houses.
F (h;N) =
(
h− 1
N
)
(
1− 1
N
) (3.1)
Where h is the Herfindahl Index score for any given number ruling house, N in a chiefdom,
and N ranges from 2 to 12. The function falls between 0 and 1, and it is 0 in the case
of full Shared Power, and takes value 1 in case of full Monopoly Power. As the number
of house, N increases in a Shared Power situation the Herfindahl Index score tends to
zero. In general, I categorize chiefdoms as Shared Power if the Herfindahl Index score is
equal to or less than the 10th percentile for each given N . This is because the closer the
index is to 0, the more likely it is that power has been shared more equally. I describe
16% of chiefdoms as having Shared Power among ruling houses. Monopoly Power have a
Herfindahl Index score at or above the 90th percentile. Here too, the closer we are to 1
for each given N the likely it is that one house has dominated power. There are about 25
chiefdoms (24% of chiefdoms) in this category, 16 of which have Herfindahl Index score of
1, like locations with only one ruling house, although qualitatively the power dynamics
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are very different. The Unstable Power category is essentially a residual from the two
extremes. The Herfindahl Index score for this category falls between the 10th percentile
and 90th percentile for any given N in a chiefdom . Sixty percent of chiefdoms are in this
category.
Figure 3.1: Ruling Houses and Conflict Event Locations and Fatalities
(a) Distribution of Ruling Houses
(b) Event Frequency and Magnitude of Fatali-
ties
B. Conflict Data
The paper relies on the UCDP Georeferenced Event Dataset (GED) Global
version 17.2 for the main results (Sundberg & Melander, 2013; Croicu & Sundberg, 2017).
The UCDP defines an event as “the incidence of the use of armed force by an organized
actor against another actor, or against civilians, resulting in at least one direct death in
either the best, low or high estimate categories at a specific location and for a specific
time” (Croicu & Sundberg, 2017).4
Using chiefdom shapefiles from the Sierra Leone Statistics Agency, and the
georeferenced information (latitude and longitude coordinates) for each unique conflict
event from 1991 to 2002, I create a chiefdom-level fatalities and conflict event frequency
for the war period. Panel (b) in Figure 3.1 shows the number of events and magnitude
4 Georeferenced information on conflict locations and fatalities in this dataset are largely obtained
from news media, both international and local, humanitarian organizations such as Red Cross, MSF,
the U.N., and government, international and private security forces that operated in Sierra Leone
during the war. This data is also partly supplemented by the No Peace Without Justice (NPWJ)
conflict mapping project (Smith et al., 2004).
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of fatalities within chiefdom boundaries. As the definition implies, the dataset provides
three estimates of fatalities for each unique dyad conflict event. I use the best estimate
throughout my analysis. The best and high estimate for all fatalities in this dataset are
20,514, and 32,524 respectively, from 1,495 unique deadly conflict events. Table 3.9 and
Table 3.10 in the Appendix provide detailed description of the data. The best estimate for
civilian fatalities is given as 9,767. As noted above, estimates of fatalities in the academic
literature on the war vary widely; Guberek et al. (2006) suggest 10,000, Keen (2005)
reports 50,000, and a high of 75,000 in Sawyer (2008).5 The average civilian fatalities per
event is about 5, and when aggregated at the chiefdom level it is about 60 deaths.
Other useful attributes in this dataset include the date each event started and
ended, and identification of actors in the dyads. Each unique event also has information
on precision of reporting on event location, timing and fatalities. About 93% are reported
with an event clarity of 1, and about 41% of event dates are reported to be almost exact.
Identification of actors involved in the conflict allows me to capture the number of different
actors that engaged in conflicts in each chiefdom. I estimate that on average each chiefdom
had about four different warring factions engaged in conflict at different times throughout
the war. To get the number of times each chiefdom was attacked throughout the war,
what I am calling in this paper conflict frequency, I sum up each unique conflict event in
the chiefdom. I estimate that on average each chiefdom experienced about 10 separate
attacks throughout the war. Table 3.10 in the Appendix provides information on conflict
dyads.
As part of my robustness check, I use the Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation
Commission (TRC) dataset (Conibere et al., 2004), which was independently generated
5 De Bruijne (2014, p. 8) who compares four other conflict event datasets for the Sierra Leone war notes
this about the UCDP-GED dataset; “The UCDP data strikes a middle ground between ACLED-
v4 [Armed Conflict Location Event Dataset-version 4] and the TRC [Truth and Reconciliation
Commission] data. In UCDPs reading, the Sierra Leone conflict has elements of a traditional conflict
between military and non-state actors (42% battles) but also reports high levels of one-sided violence
(58%)”.
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from the UCDP data. The TRC dataset was built from information given by witnesses in
the trial of some of the war actors that were deemed to have committed the worst crimes.
A convenient sampling approach was used, that is, only people willing to give statements
were included in the detailed interviews, which has potential for biases.6 In fact, some
have suggested that this data is biased towards showing atrocities committed by the main
rebel group the R.U.F (De Bruijne, 2014). Nonetheless, there are key aspects of the data
that would allow us to get a gut-check on the key argument suggested here.
The TRC data was collected between March 2002 and 2003, from 149 chiefdoms,
and consists of 7,706 witnesses and catalogues 40,242 violations. The deposition could
be related to one or multiple victims. The dataset identifies about 28,720 victims, which
implies some victims suffered multiple violations. The data provides specific categories of
violations, which are listed in Table 3.12 in the Appendix. killings is the main category of
interest. It takes value 1 if a witness says someone in their community was killed during
the war, and 0 otherwise. About 4,514 witnesses reported killings for the period 1991 to
2000. When compiled at the chiefdom level, the average number of witnesses reporting
killings is 20. Furthermore, the dataset also provides information about victims, which is
listed in Table 3.11 in the Appendix. About 2% of victims were listed as chiefs.7 Figure 3.4
in the Appendix shows the correlation between the two datasets. It is low, at 0.14, which
may be in part because the TRC data probably captures the extensive margin, whereas
the UCDP data captures intensity, and the data focused more on R.U.F atrocities.
C. Covariates
A possible concern in the empirical analysis in this paper is the potential
endogeneity in the variation in the number of ruling houses across chiefdoms. The number
6 The TRC states the following about the data; "These are convenience sample data, and as such they
are not a statistically representative sample of events in this conflict. These data do not support
conclusions about patterns, trends, or other substantive comparisons (such as over time, space,
ethnicity, age, etc.)
7 The dataset does not distinguish whether chiefs are PC or not. It is also unclear if individuals that
provided information about killing of chiefs are themselves chiefs.
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of ruling houses may be correlated with a number of factors that in turn affect frequency
of conflict events and civilian fatalities. To address these concerns, I test and control for
chiefdom level factors. Below I describe some of the observed covariates in my multivariate
regression analysis, which include: geographic, demographic, economic, and institutional
observables. Below I highlight some of the main covariates.
Geography: Geographic covariates are detailed in Table 3.13, and are obtained
from various sources. Glennerster et al. (2013) provide data on average slope, distance to
coast and distance to nearest river. Soil quality information is calculated from raster data
provided in Harmonised World Soil Index (HWSD). I modelled chiefdom-level historical
rainfall by using rainfall data from 30 rain stations in the chiefdoms across the country,
as reported by Gregory (1965). I used a simple rule to assign rainfall data- chiefdoms
that had rain stations are assigned the historical annual average reported from those
stations. Chiefdoms without rain stations are assigned readings from the nearest station,
or the average of multiple nearby stations. Some adjustments to this rule were made
for chiefdoms that have special features, such as being on a coast. Figure 3.5 in the
Appendix shows the spread of rainfall. The result matches well with other computed
rainfall information.
Demographic and Economic: The demographic and economic controls come from
Acemoglu, Reed, and Robinson (2014) and Glennerster et al. (2013). They include chiefdom
population density, area of chiefdoms in square kilometres, availability of diamonds and
non-diamond minerals, and distance from historical trade routes in kilometres. See Table
3.14 for detailed summary statistics.8
Soil Quality Covariates- Chiefdom-level soil quality variables are obtained from
Harmonised World Soil Index (HWSD) and include: topsoil salinity, percent of topsoil
8 For population density the only complete census data for chiefdom population before the war was
1963, which I use instead of census data taken immediately after the war in 2004 since most people
were still displaced.
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organic carbon, and drainage.
Institutional Covariates- This includes an indicator variable to capture if a
chiefdom was combined (amalgamation), number of missions in the chiefdoms in 1923,
and distance to nearest mission, both from Glennerster et al. (2013) but originally from
Nunn (2010). The indicator variable for the presence of pre-colonial politically centralized
ethnic groups is an indicator variable that takes value 1 if the chiefdom had ethnic groups
that had some degree of pre-colonial political centralization, and 0 otherwise. Acemoglu,
Reed, and Robinson (2014) provide information on number of paramount chiefs in the
history of each chiefdom and the average maximum reign of the paramount chief position.
Table 3.8 provide summary statistics of the chiefdom political institutions.
3.6 Estimation and Identification Strategy
3.6.1 Identification
A key concern for identification in this paper is the endogeneiety of the variation
in number of ruling houses. It is possible that chiefdoms with higher number of ruling
houses may have been specifically targeted for some unobservable reasons that may lead
to a spurious relationship between civilian fatalities and number of ruling houses. It might
also be that the positive correlation between civilian fatalities and number of ruling houses
is an artifact of over reporting, perhaps because chiefdoms with higher number of ruling
houses had the infrastructure to report more during the war. I take a few steps to address
these concerns.
I build on and reproduce the test for confounding variables by Acemoglu, Reed,
and Robinson (2014), and add other economically salient geographic variables including soil
quality and rainfall. Arguably, these are perhaps the most important indicators of economic
potential in these chiefdoms, because they directly affect agricultural productivity. A vast
majority of chiefdom populations are engaged in subsistence farming, where fertilizer is
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not used and rain is the only source of irrigation. One can expect more ruling houses to
be found in places with higher agriculture productivity potential, and a concern for this
paper would be that these high potential areas were also disproportionately targeted by
rebels during the war, because for instance they got their food supply from these areas.
Furthermore, I investigates whether pre-colonial and early colonial era institutions
may have shaped the distribution of ruling houses. To do this, this paper uses data from
Nunn (2010) that documents the number of Christian missions in the early 1920s in
Sierra Leone. Locations of missions would be wealthier or have services that attract
more population and ruling houses. Next, I test if pre-colonial political organizational
structures among ethnicities in Sierra Leone shaped the pattern of ruling houses settlement
across the chiefdoms. Michalopoulos and Papaioannou (2013) suggest that pre-colonial
ethnic organizational complexities in Africa strongly correlate with the level of economic
development today. In particular, locations with ethnicities that had more politically
centralized structures are shown to be more prosperous today. Using the work of Murdock
(1967), they spatially locate ethnicities across Africa and characterize their pre-colonial
political organizational structures. Two ethnic groups, the Temne and the Sherbro from
Sierra Leone are categorized to have a relatively centralized political structure in the pre-
colonial era. Using archival information from the 1930s with records of which ethnicities
were present in each chiefdom (SierraLeone, 1949), I identify chiefdoms with these two
ethnicities, and test for correlation with number of ruling houses, and find pre-colonial
centralized political structure among chiefdoms is not associated with the variation in the
number of ruling houses.
Table 3.1 below shows the results from an OLS regression model for number of
ruling houses on potential confounders, with district fixed effects. The results show that
chiefdom geographic attributes such as average annual rainfall and measures of soil quality
are uncorrelated with the number of ruling houses. It also shows that institutional proxies,
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such as number of Christian missions, and the presence of ethnicities with pre-colonial
political centralization are also uncorrelated with the number of ruling houses. The binary
variable, amalgamation, which takes value 1 if the chiefdom has been combined with
another, and zero otherwise, as expected, shows a strong correlation with number of ruling
houses. I add it as control in all the regression models.
Table 3.15 in the Appendix shows early development indicators that Acemoglu,
Reed, and Robinson (2014) show are also uncorrelated with ruling houses.
By showing that important determinants of agricultural productivity and pre-
colonial institutions are uncorrelated to the number of ruling houses, I add to the robustness
of the Acemoglu, Reed, and Robinson (2014) claim that the distribution of ruling houses
does not seem to follow any observable pattern. Historical records indeed suggest that the
settlement pattern of ruling houses may have been a historical accident (Reed & Robinson,
2013), suggesting a plausible exogeneity in the variation in the number of ruling houses.
I further show robustness of my results by using combatant fatalities as a placebo.
The idea is that because combatants fatalities are largely owed to strength, discipline and
strategy (Weinstein, 2005), fatalities among warring factions should not be associated
with chiefdom political rivalry. Lastly, I use a second dataset of conflict events generated
from a different process to repeat my main analysis.
3.6.2 Estimation
As my outcome at the event level is a count variable, I estimate the following
negative binomial model:
yic = δd + δT + δf + αcHc +Xc + εic (3.2)
Where yic represents civilian fatalities in conflict event i in chiefdom c. δd is fixed effect
for the 12 districts. The district fixed effects capture district level differences that stay
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constant over time. For instance, some districts may have people who historically are
more violent, and this may also be where you find chiefdoms with more ruling houses.
δT is year fixed effects for the 10-year war period. The time fixed effects for controlling
time varying factors during the war. For example, changes in appetite for violence as the
war progressed. δf is faction fixed effects for the four main fighting groups. The faction
fixed effects are crucial for capturing differences among warring factions (Humphreys &
Weinstein, 2006). For instance, the RUF was known to have targeted civilians as the
war went on compared to other forces. X ′c is a vector of variables that capture relevant
chiefdom level controls, including institutional, demographic, economic and geographic
factors. A list of these controls are given in Tables 3.8, 3.13, 3.14 in the Appendix. εic is
the error term. Throughout the analysis the errors reported are clustered at the chiefdom
level. The coefficient αc gives the estimate of the effect on civilian fatalities. I use both
the sign and size of αc to test the hypothesis in the paper. The coefficient, αc can be
interpreted as a αc increase in the expected log count of civilian fatalities for a one unit
change in number of ruling house at the 95% confidence level.
To test hypotheses around balance of power, I introduce a dummy variable for
each balance of power scenario to equation 1. For instance, for the case of Shared Power,
the equation looks as follows:
yic = δd + δT + δf + αcHc + σcSharedPowerc +Xc + εic (3.3)
Where Shared Power takes value 1 if chiefdom has shared power among multiple ruling
houses, and zero otherwise.
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3.7 Results
3.7.1 Main Results
In this section, I present estimates for the baseline results. I estimate equation
4.1 using both a Negative Binomial and OLS model. The OLS results are presented in
Table 3.17 in the Appendix. In Table 3.2 below I present results for the Negative Binomial
model. Column 1 is the most parsimonious model with only district fixed effects. In
column 2, I control for institution and add demographic and economic controls in column
3 and 4, respectively. I add faction fixed effects in column 5, and in column 6, the most
stringent model includes year fixed effects.
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Table 3.2: Negative Binomial Estimation Of Civilian Fatalities
Dependent Variable: Civilian Fatalities
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Number of Ruling Houses 0.07* 0.12*** 0.11** 0.12*** 0.11** 0.11***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Amalgamation -0.64** -0.57** -0.56** -0.51** -0.48*
(0.25) (0.25) (0.25) (0.26) (0.27)
Year Fixed Effects No No No No No Yes
Faction Fixed Effects No No No No Yes Yes
Economic Controls No No No Yes Yes Yes
Demographic Controls No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control for Institutions No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
District Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Outcome Mean 5.01 5.01 5.01 5.01 5.01 5.01
Outcome Standard Deviation 11.46 11.46 11.46 11.46 11.46 11.46
Number of Clusters 138 138 138 138 138 138
Observations 1,282 1,282 1,282 1,282 1,282 1,282
NOTE-Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Event level fatalities
using the best estimate for civilian fatalities in the chiefdom for the duration of the conflict in the UCDP
Georeferenced Event Dataset (GED) Global version 17.2 (2016). Missing data on outcome variable for
11 chiefdoms including: “Malegohun”, “Toli”, “Bombali Sebora”, “Libeisaygahun”, “Gbinle-Dixing”,
“Dembelia Sinkuni”, “Follosaba Dembelia”, “Timdale”; “Upper Banta”, and “YKK". All distances are in
km and are calculated with reference to chiefdom centroids. Fixed effects are for all district with data on
outcome variable. Year Fixed Effects are for all ten years of war. Geographic Controls include, log of
distance to major towns (Bo, Kenema, and Freetown), an indicator variable if the chiefdom had license
for mining (diamonds and non-diamond), distance to 1907 rail road. Demographic controls include log of
1963 population density, and chiefdom ethnolinguistic fractionlization index. Controls for institutions
include number of chiefs recalled and an indicator variable for the presence of pre-colonial politically
centralized ethnic groups.
As predicted, the coefficient on the number of ruling houses is positive and
statistically significant. To assess the magnitude, I take the marginal effect and present in
Table 3.16 in the Appendix. In column 6, the coefficient, α = 0.45(S.E = 0.17), which
suggests that one additional ruling house is associated with about 9% more civilian
fatalities in an event on average. This result is also similar to the OLS model in Table
3.17. This result suggest that chiefdom political rivalry is significant in explaining civilian
fatalities.
Next, I show results for the balance of power categories. To do this I estimate
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equation 4.2 by including binary variables for each balance of power category. Table
3.18 in the Appendix shows Marginal Effect estimates. Columns (1)-(4) in Table 3.18
shows estimates for the simplest scenarios for balance of power categories. For Shared
Power, it is the case where the number of ruling houses, N = 2 and Herfindahl Index
score, h = 0.5, which represent about 4% of cases in the sample. For the Monopoly Power
case, it is when the number of ruling houses, N = 2 and Herfindahl Index score, h = 1,
which also represents about 4% of cases in the sample. I run a separate regression for
each category to understand the link between specific balance of power cases and civilian
fatalities. To get a relative sense of effect among the three categories, I include all three
in my regression, with Unstable Power dropped to serve as reference category, as shown
in column (4) in Table 3.18.
Column (1) in Table 3.18 in the Appendix shows that the coefficient on Shared
Power is negative and statistically significant, (α = −2.21, S.E = 0.44), which suggests
that these chiefdoms are associated with about 44% fewer civilian fatalities per event
compared to places that don’t have power parity. The coefficient on Monopoly Power in
column (2) is negative and statistically significant (α = −1.92, S.E = 0.72), suggesting
that these cases have 38% fewer civilian deaths. Lastly, in column (3) Unstable Power
chiefdoms are associated with about 38% (α = 1.89, S.E = 0.42) more civilian fatalities
per event, compared to otherwise.
Columns (5) to (8) represent the general case for the balance of power categories
using the relationship in equation 3.1 above. The results are similar to the simple sign on
the coefficients. Column (5) in Table 3.18 in the Appendix suggest that Shared Power
chiefdoms are associated with about 28% (α = −1.41, S.E = 0.48) fewer civilian fatalities
per event compared to places that don’t have power parity. The coefficient on Monopoly
Power in column (6) is negative and not statistically significant (α = −0.74, S.E = 0.61)
. The coefficient on Unstable Power chiefdoms in column (7) are associated with 24%
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(α = 1.18, S.E = 0.45) more civilian fatalities per event, compared to otherwise.
For comparison among the three categories, I plot estimates from the models (4)
and (8) in Table 3.18 in the Appendix in Figure 3.2. The reference category in each model
is Unstable Power. The diamond shapes represent coefficients Plot for the simple cases,
and solid dots represent the general case. For the simple case, the results suggests that at
the 95% confidence level, the coefficients on Shared Power, and Monopoly Power have
similar magnitude, and are negative and statistically different from zero, which suggests
that relative to Unstable Power, chiefdoms where ruling houses have shared power or one
has dominated power are associated with lower fatalities. In terms of magnitude both have
about 37% fewer deaths, with the coefficient on Shared Power at (α = −1.86, S.E = 0.44),
and that for Monopoly Power at (α = −1.83, S.E = 0.69).
In the general case, the result for Shared Power is similar to the simple case,
with (α = −1.44, S.E = 0.48), suggesting 29% fewer deaths relative to Unstable Power
chiefdoms. The coefficient on Monopoly Power is negative but not statistically significant,
suggesting that, overall fatalities in these chiefdoms are not different from chiefdoms with
unstable power dynamic.
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NOTE- Base/comparison category is Unstable Power.
Figure 3.2: Coefficient Plot of Balance of Power
3.8 Robustness Checks
In this section, I present further evidence to support my main results. I first
conduct a placebo test, using combatant fatalities as the outcome. I then use a second
dataset generated from a different process to reproduce my main findings.
3.8.1 Combatant Fatality as a Placebo
In a civil war like in my case study, combatant fatalities result when warring
factions face each other. The pattern of deaths among combatants is largely determined
by other factors inherent to combat such as strength, discipline and strategy (Weinstein,
2005). Furthermore, about 43% of deadly events involved attacks between various warring
factions, and unlike civilians, combatants were much less likely to be residents of chiefdoms
they died in.9 This makes combatant fatalities an effective placebo for my analysis.
9 One of the warring factions in the later stages of the war of a composition of local vigilanties, that
often had ties to the chiefdom institutions, but we still don’t see any effect of rivalry and combatant
fatalities.
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As my main dataset separates combatant and civilian fatalities, I am able to
test this idea. I estimate equation 4.1 but with combatant fatalities as the dependent
variable as shown in Table 3.3 below. The coefficients on number of ruling houses are
all insignificant, and much smaller in magnitude. This result suggests, as expected that
combatant fatalities are not associated with ruling house rivalry.
Table 3.3: Negative Binomial Estimation Of Combatant Fatalities
Dependent Variable: Combatant Fatalities
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Number of Ruling Houses 0.04 0.06 0.03 -0.01 0.04 0.01
(0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06)
Amalgamation -0.02 0.03 0.15 0.11 -0.05
(0.30) (0.29) (0.29) (0.28) (0.28)
Year Fixed Effects No No No No No Yes
Faction Controls No No No No Yes Yes
Economic Controls No No No Yes Yes Yes
Demographic Controls No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control for Institutions No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
District Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Outcome Mean 5.22 5.22 5.22 5.22 5.22 5.22
Outcome Standard Deviation 13.17 13.17 13.17 13.17 13.17 13.17
Number of Clusters 138 138 138 138 138 138
Observations 1,282 1,282 1,282 1,282 1,282 1,282
NOTE-Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Controls identical
to those in main results table above.
3.8.2 A Second Dataset
Next, I use a second dataset that was generated from the Truth and Reconciliation
Commission depositions. The appealing aspect of this dataset is that the information
covers all 149 chiefdoms, consists of 7,706 witnesses that catalogues 40,242 violations. The
depositions could be related to one or multiple victims. Witness report in these depositions
identified about 28,720 victims. The data provides specific categories of violations, which
are listed in Table 3.12 in the Appendix. killings is the main category of interest. Because
in this dataset killings are reported as a binary variable, I estimate the following Logit
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model with similar controls as in Table 3.2, without the year fixed effects.
Let dic be a binary variable, such that dic = 1, if a witness i in chiefdom c reported
a wartime death, and dic = 0 otherwise, then conditional on a number of covariates, then
the probability P (d) of a wartime death in chiefdom c is given as follows:
P (d = 1|X) = G(δd + δT + δf + αcHc +Xc + εic) (3.4)
Where X is covariates similar to those in equation 1 above.
I present the Logit model estimates in Table 3.20 to assess if the sign on the
coefficient α here is consistent with that of the main dataset. Column 1 in Table 3.20
is identical to column 6 in the main results in Table 3.2, and there is a positive and
statistically significant link between political rivalry and probability of killing reported in
this data as well. This is consistent with results from my main findings. However, the
coefficients on the dummies for each of the balance of power categories in columns (2) to
(5) are not statistically significant. This suggests that the results for the balance of power
categories are not consistent with the main findings. This may not be surprising because
the models in my main dataset capture the effect of ruling house rivalry at the intensive
margins, whereas here the model captures the effect at the extensive margin.
3.9 Alternative Explanation and Possible Confound-
ing Factors
Next, I explore a series of alternative hypotheses and possible confounding factors
for the observed relationship between civilian fatalities and number of ruling houses.
104
Game of Chiefs
Reporting Bias
A general concern with conflict event datasets like the one used in this paper is
over reporting bias from big cities or locations that are connected either through media
or road networks (Weidmann, 2016). In this study, this would mean that the pattern of
civilian fatalities observed is a result of over reporting in some areas and not in others.
Perhaps chiefdoms with more ruling houses reported more because they are closer to
major towns with news media or they may have better road networks that would have
facilitated the movement of humanitarian organizations who helped to collect information
about fatalities during the war. To rule out this concern, I create an interaction term of
the nearest distance, from chiefdom centroid to the three major headquarter towns in the
East, South and North of the country. If over-reporting is happening in more accessible
chiefdoms, it would have most likely happened via these towns, and we can expect the
effect of the number ruling houses on fatalities to disappear. I present results of this
analysis in Table 3.19 in the Appendix. The result shows that the average effect holds
even after interacting number of ruling houses with distance to the major towns.
3.9.1 Frequency of Attacks and Ruling Houses
A key argument suggested in this paper is that conflict was largely a shock to the
local political systems in the chiefdoms. However, if we observe a link between frequency
of attacks and ruling houses, then it is possible that some of the conflict events may have
been a result of direct confrontation among ruling houses, or somehow incited by the
ruling house rivalry, which would undermine the claim that conflict events in the chiefdoms
were exogenous shocks. This may also have implications for the type of mechanisms that
explain the main effect. For instance, it may suggest that the reigning paramount chiefs,
who are likely to be more resourced would do most of the targeting of other rival ruling
houses. This is unlikely as chiefs and other local elites were just as likely to be killed in
the war.
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To explore this argument, I estimate a model with the number of events in
each chiefdom as the dependent variable. I only use events that were unopposed attacks,
which are events where there is only one warring faction involved in the conflict dyad,
and civilians were the other side in the dyad. Unopposed attacks account for about 57%
of events in the dataset. If ruling house rivalry contributed to the frequency of events,
then we are more likely to observe it in unopposed attacks than in events where warring
factions attack the positions of other fighters.
The model is estimated at the chiefdom level and is represented by 3.5 below. yc
is number of unopposed attacks for the duration of the war. The covariates are identical
to equation 4.1 above.
yc = δd + δT + δf + αcHc +Xc + εc (3.5)
The result in Table 3.4 suggests that ruling house rivalry is not associated with the number
of attacks in each chiefdom. The sample include only 129 chiefdoms, but even when I
repeat the analysis for all attacks, I still find a null effect in my strictest model as column
5 in Table 3.21 in the Appendix shows.
106
Game of Chiefs
Table 3.4: Ruling House Rivalry and Frequency of Unopposed Deadly Events
Number of Unopposed Deadly Events
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Number of Ruling Houses 0.08** 0.06 0.07* 0.05 0.05
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Amalgamation 0.18 0.15 0.21 0.16
(0.20) (0.21) (0.21) (0.17)
Faction Controls No No No No Yes
Economic Controls No No No Yes Yes
Demographic Controls No No Yes Yes Yes
Control for Institutions No Yes Yes Yes Yes
District Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Outcome Mean 10.29 10.29 10.29 10.29 10.29
Outcome Standard Deviation 9.46 9.46 9.46 9.46 9.46
Observations 129 129 129 129 129
NOTE-Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Dependent
variable is the number of unopposed event for chiefdom obtained from the UCDP Georefer-
enced Event Dataset (GED) Global version 17.2 (2016), which list conflict dyads. Unopposed
events are those with civilians are on the receiving end of the dyad. The listed conflict events
are collapsed at the chiefdom level, to the number of events in each chiefdoms. Unopposed
event happend in 129 chiefdoms. All other controls are identical to those in in main results
table. There are no year fixed effect in the model.
Greed and other Grievance
One of the leading factors in the literature on the war is the role of diamonds.
The notion of "blood diamonds" gained popularity because of the Sierra Leone war. In
Table 3.19 I show that the presence of diamonds interacted with the number of ruling
houses does not alter my results. In fact, I show that the presence of diamonds is not
statically associated with civilian fatalities, a finding that is consistent with other empirical
research on the war (Bellows & Miguel, 2009; Raleigh & De Bruijne, 2017). Furthermore,
the political economy literature on the war suggests political strategies, which pre-date
the war, involved armed and violent political networks installed by central government,
that in some chiefdoms worked in collaboration with the paramount chiefs, and in others
in opposition, may have been rekindled during the war. Reno (2000, p. 34) argues that in
the build up to the war, some paramount chiefs used their power to grant land access to
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strangers to build violent political networks that they then used to target rivals within
and outside their chiefdoms.10 He states that “[c]hiefs had built up local political power
by controlling their [illicit diamond mining] strangers and using them to marshal support
for their preferred local headmen candidates and to intervene in disputes in neighbouring
areas". This argument suggests the availability of strangers as a mechanism, as they were
the foot soldiers in these violent political networks.
I argue that the effect observed here is likely not through the channel of strangers.
I test this idea by creating a binary variable for chiefdoms where the proportion of strangers
reported in a pre-war census is in the top 20 quintile, and interacted it with the number
of ruling houses. The result in Table 3.19 shows that the mechanism suggested by Reno
(2000) may not have accounted for the pattern of civilian fatalities observed in the conflict.
3.10 Mechanism
In this section I explore possible mechanisms for the observed positive association
between number of ruling houses and civilian fatalities. I do this in two steps. First, I
present some anecdotes to suggest the role of denunciation in civilian fatalities. Second, I
provide some empirical evidence to support the denunciation argument.
Anecdotes of Civilian-Combatant Co-production of Violence
Anecdotes and qualitative literature on the war departs from the empirical
studies that solely highlight the role of warring faction in explaining violence. These
stories highlight people participating in the destruction of their own communities because
of old grudges. Consultations on causes of violence in communities across the country
is captured by the sentiment in this quote from one of the participants (Richards, 2003,
p.13) “our village was destroyed, only 5 percent by the RUF, and 95 per cent by our own
indigenous rebels”.
10 strangers people born outside the chiefdom and having no claim to land (Tangri, 1976; Fenton, 1951).
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Survival strategies devised by villagers were made futile by insiders. In the
Mende land, for instance, such strategies included hiding in places called sorkoihun (’in
corners’). But as Richards (2003, p.33), suggests that revenge and local feuds resulted in
hiding sites being often "betrayed by disgruntled local informers". A witness at the Truth
and Reconciliation Commission pointed out how costly these betrayals were:
“My brother in law was captured from his hiding place and was brought to
town. He was placed before us and shot. He fell down and one of the RUF
men went closer and fired at his head. He died on the spot and was thrown
into the bush.”(Guberek et al., 2006, p.493)
These stories suggest a type of collaboration between insurgents and civilians,
where civilians provided information, and rebels used it to commit violence. In the Kalyvas
(2006) control-collaboration model, this is denunciation. I argue that denunciation is a
key mechanism for the observed link between ruling houses and civilian fatalities.
3.10.1 AMatch-up betweenWarring Factions and Ruling Houses
Although I am not able to observe denunciation empirically, and more importantly
link it to number of ruling houses, I argue that denunciation and counter-denunciation
would be more prevalent in locations that saw repeated and lengthy conflicts, and
experienced more warring factions. With more ruling houses, the potential for a match-up
between a disgruntled rival and insurgents increases. This match-up leads to more civilians
informing, and more fatalities. The Kalyvas (2006) control-collaboration would suggest
that the presence of many factions would discourage denunciation as actors would weigh
the risk of retaliation. I argue that this is a strict condition, as people are less likely to be
able to weigh this risk accurately because it depends on their ability to assess if factions
are strong enough to keep control of their area for a long time. Nonetheless, the longevity
of the Sierra Leone civil war made it possible for different factions to occupy the same
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locations at different times, an ideal scenario for denunciations and counter-denunciations.
To execute this empirically, I create a triple interaction term that includes a
binary variable that captures whether the chiefdom experienced two or more fighting
factions in the course of the war, a binary variable for whether the chiefdom has more
than two ruling houses and a binary variable for whether the chiefdom was a base. I define
a base as a locations that experienced conflict length for 180 days or more. According to
the UCDP dataset, 37% of chiefdoms experienced conflict for over 180 days. In addition, I
also investigate how this mechanism varies with the balance of power categories. I create
a triple interaction term for each balance of power category and a binary variable that
captures whether the chiefdom experienced two or more fighting factions and a binary
variable for whether the chiefdom was a base. The idea here is to get a sense of under
which power control condition the mechanism would be more potent. The model estimated
is similar to that in column 5 in Table 3.4 above.
I present the results of this analysis in Table 3.5 below. Column (1) tests the
mechanism hypothesis for the main results. The coefficient on the triple interaction term
is statistically significant but negative. The coefficient on the double interaction term
with Two or More Factions and More Than Two Houses factions and ruling house is
positive but not statistically significant. The coefficients on the two binary variables
for Base and Two or More Factions are positive and statistically significant, consistent
with the hypothesis. In column (2), I test to see how the mechanism works in Shared
Power context. The coefficient on the triple interaction term is statistically significant
and negative, which is consistent with the findings from Figure 3.2 above. In Column
(3), the coefficient on the triple interaction term with Unstable Power is negative and
not statistically significant. The coefficient on the triple interaction term in column (4)
is positive and statistically significant, suggesting that in Monopoly Power situations,
more factions are associated with more fatalities, which is different from the findings
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from Figure 3.2 above. Finally, in column (5) I include the interaction terms for two
power categories Shared Power, and Monopoly Power, with Unstable Power serving as
reference category. The result suggests that relative to Unstable Power, Monopoly Power
is associated with more civilian fatalities when there are multiple warring factions in
chiefdom that was a Base, while holding Shared Power contexts constant.
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Table 3.5: Multiple Factions and Bases as Potential Mechanism
Dependent Variable: Civilian Fatalities
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Two/More Houses (binary) 0.83
(0.61)
Two/More Houses X Two/More Factions X Base -1.97***
(0.46)
Two/More Faction X Two/More houses 0.37
(0.62)
Shared Power X Two/More Factions X Base -1.06** -0.81
(0.51) (0.52)
Shared Power X Two/More Factions 0.13 0.28
(0.68) (0.71)
Shared Power 0.29 0.01
(0.56) (0.59)
Unstable Power X Two/More Factions X Base -0.09
(0.43)
Unstable Power X Two/More Factions -0.27
(0.69)
Unstable Power 0.41
(0.62)
Monopoly Power X Two/More Factions X Base 1.06** 0.89*
(0.52) (0.52)
Monopoly Power X Two/More Factions 0.12 0.15
(0.83) (0.86)
Monopoly Power -0.74 -0.68
(0.77) (0.81)
Two/More Factions 2.12*** 2.78*** 2.93*** 2.82*** 2.68***
(0.76) (0.81) (0.73) (0.81) (0.93)
Base (binry) 2.22*** 0.83*** 0.72** 0.39 0.54*
(0.42) (0.26) (0.36) (0.29) (0.31)
Number of Ruling Houses 0.20*** 0.20*** 0.19*** 0.19**
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Amalgamation -0.22 -0.41 -0.54 -0.53 -0.45
(0.38) (0.43) (0.42) (0.42) (0.44)
District Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Faction Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
All Contronls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Outcome Mean 59.1 59.1 59.1 59.1 59.1
Outcome Standard Deviation 82.4 82.4 82.4 82.4 82.4
Observations 138 138 138 138 138
NOTE-Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All other controls are identical to
those in main results table. There are no year Fixed Effect in the model.
112
Game of Chiefs
3.10.2 Local Political Rivalry in The Phases of the War
Given that the above analysis is not a direct demonstration of the mechanism
advanced by this paper, I use the different phases of the war to pressure test the link
between the possibility of denunciation and civilian fatalities. The Truth and Reconciliation
Commission characterizes the war in three phases; "’conventional target warfare’ between
March 1991-November 1993; ‘guerrilla warfare’ between November 1993 and March 1997;
and ‘power struggles and peace efforts’ lasting until the end of May 2000" (Guberek et al.,
2006, p.4). Each of these phases had different implications for violence against civilians.
Many have suggested that lethal violence against civilians in the later part of the war
was largely indiscriminate. A popular slogan by fighting factions was “Operation No
Living Thing” (Smith et al., 2004, p.91). Figure 3.6 in the Appendix shows a sharp rise
in atrocities after 1997. I argue that the conjectured mechanism would be irrelevant in
explaining indiscriminate civilian fatalities.
For analytical power, I divide the war into two phases, 1991 to 1996 inclusive, as
phase one, which includes 721 conflict events in the dataset, and 1997 to 2002, inclusive,
as phase two, and includes 774 events. I present the result in Table 3.22. For the first half
of the war, my analysis shows a positive association between rivalry and civilian fatalities,
this effect is bigger than the baseline effect. In the second phase on the other hand, I find
a null effect, as expected.
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Table 3.6: Ruling Houses and Civilian Fatalities in the Phases of the War
Dependent Variable: Civilian Fatalities
1991-2002 1991-1996 1997 - 2002
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Number of Ruling Houses 0.11** 0.11*** 0.19*** 0.20*** 0.11 0.07
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.08) (0.08)
Amalgamation -0.51** -0.48* -0.94*** -0.99*** -0.15 0.07
(0.26) (0.27) (0.34) (0.37) (0.41) (0.39)
All Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes No Yes
Outcome Mean 5.01 5.01 5.32 5.32 4.82 4.82
Outcome Standard Deviation 11.46 11.46 12.02 12.02 10.92 10.92
Number of Clusters 138 138 118 118 100 100
Observations 1,282 1,282 665 665 617 617
NOTE-Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All other controls are
identical to those in main results table
3.11 Conclusion
In this paper, I established a link between political rivalry and civilian fatalities
in one of Africa’s most written about civil wars. I combined a highly disaggregated conflict
events dataset with data on political rivalry in a decentralized political setting. Because
both incidence of conflict and political rivalry are plausibly exogenous, this micro-level
analysis of civil war fatalities presented in this case study perhaps provides the clearest
instance of a political logic that shaped civilian survival outcomes. By doing this, this
paper joins others in highlighting strategic interactions between unarmed civilians and
warring factions in understanding patterns of violence in civil wars. Furthermore, the
political settings are much more local such that ethnic cleavages are muted. As such, this
paper lends a strong support to the argument that political actors will use external shocks
to gain political advantage.
A few implications follow. By putting the focus on local political rivalry in
explaining civil war outcomes, this paper encourages policy interventions that aim to
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prevent violent conflicts to take politics as fundamental in understanding conflict effects,
and not as a manifestation of ethnic or religious cleavages. This paper suggests that as
long as stakes are high in politics, individual political actors or groups may use every
necessary means, even civil wars, to gain political power.
This paper also has implications for the best way to integrate traditional insti-
tutions in modern democratic Africa. Governance reform efforts often aim to introduce
competitiveness in the selection of chiefs. Acemoglu, Reed, and Robinson (2014) argue
that competition even in these traditional institutions can serves as an effective check on
political power in ways that lead to better economic outcomes. The findings here highlight
a potential drawback to competition and suggest a careful investigation of how political
competition shapes other social dimensions, such as collective action and social cohesion.
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Appendix
Table 3.7: Number of Ruling Houses and Herfindahl Index of Ruling House
Dominance
Dependent Variable: Herfindahl Index of Ruling House Dominance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Ln(Number of Ruling Houses) -0.25*** -0.31*** -0.29*** -0.55***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.06)
Number of Ruling Houses -0.05*** 0.07***
(0.01) (0.02)
Amalgamation 0.09 0.08 0.05
(0.06) (0.06) (0.05)
Number of Chiefs Recalled -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.03***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Observations 147 147 147 147 147
R-squared 0.21 0.33 0.56 0.57 0.61
Robust standard errors in parentheses and clustered at chiefdom level
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
NOTE- Data from Acemoglu, Reed, and Robinson (2014). The Herfindahl index has
mean 0.54 (SD 5 0.24). Geographic controls are a dummy for the presence of mining
permissions in the 1930s, distance to coast, distance to nearest river, distance to 1895 trade
routes, distance to 1907 railroad, and minimum distance to Bo, Kenema, or Freetown. I
also added river density.
Figure 3.3: Ruling Houses and Concentration of Power Index.
116
Game of Chiefs
Table 3.8: Chiefdom Institutional Summary Statistics
Institutional Covariates
Variables N Mean SD
Number of ruling houses 149 3.95 2.15
Number of P. Chiefs in History of Chiefdom 149 5.79 2.59
Maximum Reign by One Ruling House 149 3.45 1.73
Chiefdoms with Shared Power (binary) 149 0.16 0.37
Chiefdoms with Monopoly Power (binary) 149 0.24 0.43
Chiefdom with Unstable Power (binary) 149 0.60 0.49
Herfindahl index of power concentration 149 0.55 0.24
Amalgamation (binary) 149 0.31 0.46
Number of missions (1923) 161 0.14 0.40
Distance to 1923 missions (km) 158 52.58 41.90
Presence of Hierarchical Tribe (binary) 146 0.28 0.45
NOTE-Data obtained from various sources, some sources have information from
oustide chiefdoms, hence N is higher than 149. Missing data also for some covari-
ates. The number of ruling houses, Amalgation, number of P. Chiefs,Maximum
Reign, and Herfindahl index are obtained from Acemoglu, Reed, and Robinson
(2014). Author Genarated binary variables for balance of power categories. The
number of missions in the chiefdom in 1923 obtained from Glennerster et al.
(2013) and originally from Nunn (2010), and information on pre-colonial tribal
organization obtianed from (Michalopoulos & Papaioannou, 2013).
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Table 3.9: UCDP Conflict Data Summary Statistics
War Covariates (UCDP Data)
Variables N Mean SD
Event Level Stats
Civilian Fatalities 1495 5.06 11.46
Combatant Fatalities 1495 5.22 13.17
Civilian Fatalities -1991-1996 721 5.32 12.01
Civilian Fatalities -1997 -2002 774 4.82 10.91
Number of Events 1991-1996 721
Number of Events 1997 - 2002 774
Chiefdom Level Stats
Civilian Fatalities 138 59.14 82.41
Combatant Fatalities 138 57.71 88.7
Number of Factions 138 3.68 1.74
Number of Attacks 138 9.78 9.27
Total Days of Conflict 138 238.54 351.51
NOTE- Conflict covariates are for the period 1991 to 2002 from
the UCDP Georeferenced Event Dataset (GED) Global version 17.2
(2016). It is missing data on outcome variables for 11 chiefdoms in-
cluding: “Malegohun”, “Toli”, “Bombali Sebora”, “Libeisaygahun”,
“Gbinle-Dixing”, “Dembelia Sinkuni”, “Follosaba Dembelia”, “Tim-
dale”; “Upper Banta”, and “YKK..
118
Game of Chiefs
Table 3.10: UCDP Data: Conflict Dyads
Conflict Dyads Frequency Percent
AFRC - Civilians 164 10.97
Government of Guinea - RFDG 4 0.27
Government of Nigeria - Civilians 5 0.33
Government of Sierra Leone - AFRC 143 9.57
Government of Sierra Leone - Civilians 118 7.89
Government of Sierra Leone - Kamajors 75 5.02
Government of Sierra Leone - RUF 409 27.36
Government of Sierra Leone - WSB 1 0.07
Kamajors - Civilians 17 1.14
Kamajors - RUF 6 0.4
LURD - Civilians 1 0.07
NPFL - Civilians 10 0.67
NPFL - ULIMO 1 0.07
RUF - Civilians 533 35.65
RUF - ULIMO 3 0.2
ULIMO - Civilians 3 0.2
ULIMO - J - ULIMO - K 2 0.13
Total 1,495 100
NOTE-.Conflict covariates are for the period 1991 to 2002 from the UCDP
Georeferenced Event Dataset (GED) Global version 17.2 (2016). It is missing data
on outcome variables for 11 chiefdoms including: “Malegohun”, “Toli”, “Bombali
Sebora”, “Libeisaygahun”, “Gbinle-Dixing”, “Dembelia Sinkuni”, “Follosaba
Dembelia”, “Timdale”; “Upper Banta”, and “YKK..
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Table 3.11: TRC Data: Victim Types
Victim Type Frequency Percent
Agricultural 12314 57.76
Business Person 709 3.33
Chief 487 2.28
Clerical 75 0.35
Elder 15 0.07
Journalist 7 0.03
Miner 168 0.79
None / Unknown 56 0.26
Political 163 0.76
Professional 275 1.29
Religious Leader 129 0.61
Skilled Worker 1349 6.33
Student 2754 12.92
Teacher 702 3.29
Trader 1650 7.74
Unskilled 467 2.19
Total 21320 100.00
NOTE-Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC)
dataset (Conibere et al., 2004)
Table 3.12: TRC Data: List of Violations
List of Violations Frequency Percent
Abduction 5968 14.83
Amputation 378 0.94
Arbitrary Detention 4835 12.01
Assault / Beating 3246 8.07
Destruction of Property 3404 8.46
Drugging 59 0.15
Extortion 1273 3.16
Forced Cannibalism 19 0.05
Forced Displacement 7983 19.84
Forced Labour 1834 4.56
Forced Recruitment 331 0.82
Killing 4514 11.22
Looting of Goods 3044 7.56
Physical Torture 2051 5.10
Rape 626 1.56
Sexual Abuse 486 1.21
Sexual Slavery 191 0.47
Total 40,242 100
NOTE-Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) dataset
(Conibere et al., 2004)
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Figure 3.4: Scatter Plot of Civilian Fatalities from the two Dataset
Table 3.13: Chiefdom Geographic Summary Statistics
Geographic Covariates
Variables N Mean SD
Average slope of chiefdom 156 7.55 4.15
Distance to the coast (km) 161 88.11 67.55
Average annual rainfall-15 to 20 years average (Inches) 166 117.05 23.18
Soil w/excessive drainage (%) 161 0.02 0.11
Topsoil salinity (Elco) (dS/m) 161 0.25 0.47
Organic carbon (%) 161 1.22 0.32
Distance to Nearest Major Town (km) 147 79.40 44.37
Distance to 1895 Mitchell Trade Route(km) 149 20.19 19.94
Distance to 1907 Railroad (km) 149 44.19 30.34
NOTE-Data obtained from various sources, some sources have information from oustide
chiefdoms, hence N is higher than 149. Missing data also for some covariates. Geographic
controls are, distance to coast, distance to nearest river, distance to 1895 trade routes, distance
to 1907 railroad, and minimum distance to Bo, Kenema, or Freetown.Soil quality controls
are obtained from Glennerster et al. (2013) and calculated using GIS software from rasters
provided in the Harmonised World Soil Index (HWSD). Rainfall data calculated using GIS
software, where each chiefdom is assigned rainfall data collected by the nearest distance to any
of 38 rainfall station across the country from 1941- 1960 (Gregory, 1965).
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Table 3.14: Chiefdom Economic and Demographic Summary Statistics
Economic and Demographic Covariates
Variables N Mean SD
1900 Tax per 100 km-squared 87 0.85 1.18
1900 Tax per 1000 1963 Population 86 0.03 0.03
1930 Mining Permits (binary) 149 0.17 0.38
Number of diamond permits 144 2.64 5.63
Non-diamond permits (binary) 144 0.33 0.47
Number of non-diamond permits 144 1.50 2.98
Pre-War Chiefdom Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization (1963 census) 149 0.31 0.21
Pre-war Poupalation Density (1985 Census) 149 54.8 46.67
Pre-War Proportion of Strangers (1963) 148 0.23 0.14
NOTE-Data obtained from various sources, some sources have information from oustide chiefdoms, hence N
is higher than 149. Missing data also for some covariates. Economic and demographic controls are a dummy
for the presence of mining permissions in the 1930s, distance to coast, distance to nearest river, distance
to 1895 trade routes, distance to 1907 railroad 1900 Tax information from Acemoglu, Reed, and Robinson
(2014). Ethno-Linguistic Fractionalization index , stranger and population denisty from Glennerster et al.
(2013).
Figure 3.5: Distribution of Historic Average Annual Rainfall
——————————————————–
122
Game of Chiefs
Ta
bl
e
3.
15
:
Ru
lin
g
H
ou
se
s
an
d
Ea
rly
D
ev
el
op
m
en
t
C
or
re
la
te
s
D
ep
en
de
nt
Va
ria
bl
e:
N
um
be
r
of
Ru
lin
g
H
ou
se
s
VA
R
IA
BL
ES
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
(9
)
19
00
Ta
x
pe
r
10
0
km
-s
q
-0
.2
0
(0
.1
8)
19
00
Ta
x
pe
r
10
0
19
63
Po
pu
la
tio
n
2.
42
1.
67
(7
.6
6)
(7
.6
0)
19
00
Ta
x
pe
r
19
63
Po
pu
la
tio
n
pe
r
St
ra
ng
er
-0
.0
0
(0
.0
0)
19
30
s
M
in
in
g
pe
rm
its
-0
.2
1
(0
.3
3)
D
ist
an
ce
to
C
oa
st
(k
m
)
-0
.0
0
(0
.0
1)
D
ist
an
ce
to
R
iv
er
(k
m
)
-0
.0
1
(0
.0
2)
D
ist
an
ce
to
18
95
Tr
ad
e
R
ou
te
(K
m
)
-0
.0
1
(0
.0
1)
D
ist
an
ce
to
19
07
R
ai
lL
in
e
(k
m
)
-0
.0
1
(0
.0
1)
M
in
im
um
D
ist
an
ce
to
M
aj
or
To
w
ns
(k
m
)
-0
.0
1*
*
(0
.0
1)
A
m
al
ga
m
at
io
n
3.
12
**
*
2.
95
**
*
2.
94
**
*
2.
66
**
*
2.
68
**
*
2.
67
**
*
2.
69
**
*
2.
71
**
*
2.
70
**
*
(0
.5
5)
(0
.5
9)
(0
.5
7)
(0
.3
8)
(0
.3
9)
(0
.3
9)
(0
.3
9)
(0
.4
0)
(0
.4
0)
N
um
be
r
of
C
hi
ef
s
R
ec
al
le
d
0.
10
0.
07
0.
09
0.
06
0.
06
0.
07
0.
07
0.
06
0.
06
(0
.1
1)
(0
.1
1)
(0
.1
1)
(0
.0
7)
(0
.0
7)
(0
.0
8)
(0
.0
8)
(0
.0
7)
(0
.0
7)
O
bs
er
va
tio
ns
85
84
84
14
7
14
7
14
7
14
7
14
7
14
7
R
-s
qu
ar
ed
0.
52
0.
52
0.
52
0.
48
0.
48
0.
48
0.
48
0.
49
0.
50
N
O
T
E
-
D
at
a
ob
ta
in
ed
fr
om
A
ce
m
og
lu
,R
ee
d,
an
d
R
ob
in
so
n
(2
01
4)
.
A
ll
di
st
an
ce
s
ar
e
in
km
an
d
ar
e
ca
lc
ul
at
ed
w
ith
re
fe
re
nc
e
to
ch
ie
fd
om
ce
nt
ro
id
s.
In
co
ls.
1–
3,
19
00
ta
xe
s
ar
e
in
po
un
ds
st
er
lin
g
an
d
ar
e
eq
ua
lt
o
th
e
av
er
ag
e
no
m
in
al
an
nu
al
hu
t
ta
x
as
se
ss
m
en
t
by
th
e
go
ve
rn
m
en
t
be
tw
ee
n
18
99
an
d
19
02
.
O
ne
ob
se
rv
at
io
n
is
dr
op
pe
d
in
co
ls.
2
an
d
3
be
ca
us
e
19
63
ce
ns
us
da
ta
ar
e
no
t
av
ai
la
bl
e
fo
r
on
e
ch
ie
fd
om
,D
ib
ia
.
In
co
lu
m
n
10
th
er
e
is
a
m
iss
in
g
da
ta
fo
r
ci
vi
lia
n
de
at
hs
in
on
e
ch
ie
fd
om
.
T
ho
us
an
ds
of
st
ra
ng
er
s
is
th
e
19
63
ce
ns
us
co
un
t,
in
th
ou
sa
nd
s,
of
th
e
nu
m
be
r
of
“i
nd
ig
en
ou
s”
(e
.g
.,
A
fri
ca
ns
of
no
n-
K
rio
Si
er
ra
Le
on
ea
n
de
sc
en
t)
re
sid
en
ts
of
th
e
ch
ie
fd
om
no
t
bo
rn
th
er
e.
T
he
ou
tc
om
e
in
co
l.
4
is
du
m
m
y
fo
r
w
he
th
er
th
e
go
ve
rn
m
en
t
ha
d
gi
ve
n
pe
rm
iss
io
n
to
m
in
e
in
th
e
ch
ie
fd
om
be
tw
ee
n
19
35
an
d
19
40
.
Tr
ad
e
ro
ut
es
in
co
l.
7
ar
e
fr
om
M
itc
he
ll
(1
96
2)
w
ho
m
ap
s
th
e
m
aj
or
tr
ad
e
ro
ut
es
id
en
tifi
ed
by
G
ov
er
no
r
R
ow
e
du
rin
g
a
co
un
tr
yw
id
e
ex
pe
di
tio
n
in
18
95
.
T
he
ra
ilr
oa
d
in
co
l.
8
be
ga
n
op
er
at
io
n
in
18
97
;t
he
fu
ll
ro
ut
e
wa
s
co
m
pl
et
ed
in
19
07
an
d
ce
as
ed
op
er
at
io
n
pe
rm
an
en
tly
in
19
74
.
T
he
m
aj
or
to
w
ns
in
co
l.
9
ar
e
B
o,
K
en
em
a,
an
d
Fr
ee
to
w
n,
th
e
th
re
e
la
rg
es
t
ci
tie
s
by
po
pu
la
tio
n
in
20
04
;t
he
se
ci
tie
s
w
er
e
al
so
pr
om
in
en
t
in
19
00
.
123
Game of Chiefs
Table 3.16: Marginal Effect of Ruling Houses on Civilian Fatalities
Dependent Variable: Civilian Fatalities
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES dydx dydx dydx dydx dydx dydx
Number of Ruling Houses 0.32* 0.55*** 0.46** 0.51*** 0.46** 0.45***
(0.18) (0.19) (0.19) (0.18) (0.19) (0.17)
Amalgamation -2.52*** -2.24** -2.16** -1.94** -1.73*
(0.96) (0.93) (0.89) (0.91) (0.92)
Year Fixed Effects No No No No No Yes
Faction Controls No No No No Yes Yes
Economic Controls No No No Yes Yes Yes
Demographic Controls No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control for Institutions No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
District Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Outcome Mean 5.01 5.01 5.01 5.01 5.01 5.01
Outcome Standard Deviation 11.46 11.46 11.46 11.46 11.46 11.46
Number of Clusters 138 138 138 138 138 138
Observations 1,282 1,282 1,282 1,282 1,282 1,282
NOTE-Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Event level fatalities
using the best estimate for civilian fatalities in the chiefdom for the duration of the conflict in the UCDP
Georeferenced Event Dataset (GED) Global version 17.2 (2016). Missing data on outcome variable
for 11 chiefdoms including: “Malegohun”, “Toli”, “Bombali Sebora”, “Libeisaygahun”, “Gbinle-Dixing”,
“Dembelia Sinkuni”, “Follosaba Dembelia”, “Timdale”; “Upper Banta”, and “YKK. All distances are
in km and are calculated with reference to chiefdom centroids. Fixed effects are for all district with
data on outcome variable. Year Fixed Effects are for all ten years of war. Geographic Controls include
log of 20-year average annual rainfall, top soil organic content, log of distance to major towns ( Bo,
Kenema, and Freetown), an indicator variable if chiefdom had license for mining (all mining, diamonds
and non-diamond) distance to 1907 rail road. Demographic controls include log of 1963 population density,
and chiefdom ethnolinguistic fractionlization index. Controls for institutions include number of chiefs
recalled and an indicator variable for the presence of pre-colonial politically centralized ethnic groups.
124
Game of Chiefs
Table 3.17: OLS Estimate for Baseline Results
Dependent Variable: Civilian Fatalities
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Number of Ruling Houses 0.42* 0.66*** 0.54** 0.61** 0.59** 0.58**
(0.23) (0.24) (0.25) (0.24) (0.23) (0.23)
Amalgamation -2.85** -2.52** -2.53* -2.57** -2.46*
(1.24) (1.23) (1.29) (1.27) (1.29)
Year Fixed Effects No No No No No Yes
Faction Controls No No No No Yes Yes
Economic Controls No No No Yes Yes Yes
Demographic Controls No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control for Institutions No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
District Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Outcome Mean 5.01 5.01 5.01 5.01 5.01 5.01
Outcome Standard Deviation 11.46 11.46 11.46 11.46 11.46 11.46
Number of Clusters 138 138 138 138 138 138
Observations 1,282 1,282 1,282 1,282 1,282 1,282
R-squared 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.06
NOTE-Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Event level fatalities
using the best estimate for civilian fatalities in the chiefdom for the duration of the conflict in the UCDP
Georeferenced Event Dataset (GED) Global version 17.2 (2016). Missing data on outcome variable for
11 chiefdoms including: “Malegohun”, “Toli”, “Bombali Sebora”, “Libeisaygahun”, “Gbinle-Dixing”,
“Dembelia Sinkuni”, “Follosaba Dembelia”, “Timdale”; “Upper Banta”, and “YKK. All distances are
in km and are calculated with reference to chiefdom centroids. Fixed effects are for all district with
data on outcome variable. Year Fixed Effects are for all ten years of war. Geographic Controls include
log of 20-year average annual rainfall, top soil organic content, log of distance to major towns ( Bo,
Kenema, and Freetown), an indicator variable if chiefdom had license for mining (all mining, diamonds
and non-diamond) distance to 1907 rail road. Demographic controls include log of 1963 population
density, and chiefdom ethnolinguistic fractionlization index. Controls for institutions include number
of chiefs recalled and an indicator variable for the presence of pre-colonial politically centralized ethnic
groups.
125
Game of Chiefs
Ta
bl
e
3.
18
:
M
ar
gi
na
lE
ffe
ct
of
Ba
la
nc
e
of
C
at
eg
or
ie
s
C
iv
ili
an
Fa
ta
lit
ie
s
M
ar
gi
na
l
E
ffe
ct
s-
Si
m
pl
e
C
as
e
C
iv
ili
an
Fa
ta
lit
ie
s
M
ar
gi
na
l
E
ffe
ct
s-
G
en
er
al
C
as
e
VA
R
IA
BL
ES
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
Po
we
r
Sh
ar
ed
-2
.2
1*
**
-1
.8
6*
**
-1
.4
1*
**
-1
.4
4*
**
(0
.4
4)
(0
.4
4)
(0
.4
8)
(0
.4
8)
Po
we
r
M
on
op
ol
y
-1
.9
2*
**
-1
.8
3*
**
-0
.7
4
-0
.7
9
(0
.7
2)
(0
.6
9)
(0
.6
1)
(0
.5
9)
U
ns
ta
bl
e
Po
we
r
1.
89
**
*
1.
18
**
*
(0
.4
2)
(0
.4
5)
N
um
be
r
of
Ru
lin
g
H
ou
se
0.
41
**
0.
46
**
*
0.
38
**
0.
38
**
0.
44
**
*
0.
48
**
*
0.
45
**
*
0.
44
**
*
(0
.1
6)
(0
.1
7)
(0
.1
6)
(0
.1
6)
(0
.1
6)
(0
.1
6)
(0
.1
6)
(0
.1
6)
A
m
al
ga
m
at
io
n
-1
.6
3*
-1
.9
0*
*
-1
.5
5*
-1
.5
5*
-1
.6
2*
*
-1
.6
6*
*
-1
.5
7*
-1
.5
7*
(0
.8
7)
(0
.8
7)
(0
.8
2)
(0
.8
2)
(0
.8
2)
(0
.8
2)
(0
.8
1)
(0
.8
1)
A
ll
C
on
tr
ol
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
O
ut
co
m
e
M
ea
n
5.
01
5.
01
5.
01
5.
01
5.
01
5.
01
5.
01
5.
01
O
ut
co
m
e
St
an
da
rd
D
ev
ia
tio
n
11
.4
6
11
.4
6
11
.4
6
11
.4
6
11
.4
6
11
.4
6
11
.4
6
11
.4
6
N
um
be
r
of
C
lu
st
er
s
13
8
13
8
12
9
12
9
12
9
12
9
12
9
12
9
O
bs
er
va
tio
ns
1,
28
2
1,
28
2
1,
18
8
1,
18
8
1,
18
8
1,
18
8
1,
18
8
1,
18
8
N
O
T
E
-
R
ob
us
t
st
an
da
rd
er
ro
rs
in
pa
re
nt
he
se
s.
**
*
p<
0.
01
,*
*
p<
0.
05
,*
p<
0.
1.
Ev
en
t
le
ve
lf
at
al
iti
es
us
in
g
th
e
be
st
es
tim
at
e
fo
r
ci
vi
lia
n
fa
ta
lit
ie
s
in
th
e
ch
ie
fd
om
fo
r
th
e
du
ra
tio
n
of
th
e
co
nfl
ic
t
in
th
e
U
C
D
P
G
eo
re
fe
re
nc
ed
Ev
en
t
D
at
as
et
(G
ED
)
G
lo
ba
lv
er
sio
n
17
.2
(2
01
6)
.
M
iss
in
g
da
ta
on
ou
tc
om
e
va
ria
bl
e
fo
r
11
ch
ie
fd
om
s
in
cl
ud
in
g:
“M
al
eg
oh
un
”,
“T
ol
i”
,
“B
om
ba
li
Se
bo
ra
”,
“L
ib
ei
sa
yg
ah
un
”,
“G
bi
nl
e-
D
ix
in
g”
,
“D
em
be
lia
Si
nk
un
i”
,
“F
ol
lo
sa
ba
D
em
be
lia
”,
“T
im
da
le
”;
“U
pp
er
B
an
ta
”,
an
d
“Y
K
K
".
A
ll
di
st
an
ce
s
ar
e
in
km
an
d
ar
e
ca
lc
ul
at
ed
w
ith
re
fe
re
nc
e
to
ch
ie
fd
om
ce
nt
ro
id
s.
Fi
xe
d
eff
ec
ts
ar
e
fo
r
al
ld
ist
ric
t
w
ith
da
ta
on
ou
tc
om
e
va
ria
bl
e.
Ye
ar
Fi
xe
d
E
ffe
ct
s
ar
e
fo
r
al
lt
en
ye
ar
s
of
w
ar
.
G
eo
gr
ap
hi
c
C
on
tr
ol
s
in
cl
ud
e,
lo
g
of
di
st
an
ce
to
m
aj
or
to
w
ns
(B
o,
K
en
em
a,
an
d
Fr
ee
to
w
n)
,a
n
in
di
ca
to
r
va
ria
bl
e
if
th
e
ch
ie
fd
om
ha
d
lic
en
se
fo
r
m
in
in
g
(d
ia
m
on
ds
an
d
no
n-
di
am
on
d)
,d
ist
an
ce
to
19
07
ra
il
ro
ad
.
D
em
og
ra
ph
ic
co
nt
ro
ls
in
cl
ud
e
lo
g
of
19
63
po
pu
la
tio
n
de
ns
ity
,a
nd
ch
ie
fd
om
et
hn
ol
in
gu
ist
ic
fra
ct
io
nl
iz
at
io
n
in
de
x.
C
on
tr
ol
s
fo
r
in
st
itu
tio
ns
in
cl
ud
e
nu
m
be
r
of
ch
ie
fs
re
ca
lle
d
an
d
an
in
di
ca
to
r
va
ria
bl
e
fo
r
th
e
pr
es
en
ce
of
pr
e-
co
lo
ni
al
po
lit
ic
al
ly
ce
nt
ra
liz
ed
et
hn
ic
gr
ou
ps
.
126
Game of Chiefs
Ta
bl
e
3.
19
:
Te
st
in
g
A
lte
rn
at
iv
e
H
yp
ot
he
se
s
D
ep
en
de
nt
V
ar
ia
bl
e:
C
iv
ili
an
Fa
ta
lit
ie
s
VA
R
IA
BL
ES
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
N
um
be
r
of
Ru
lin
g
H
ou
se
s
0.
29
**
*
0.
32
**
*
0.
20
**
*
(0
.0
9)
(0
.1
1)
(0
.0
8)
Ru
lin
g
H
ou
se
s
X
D
ia
m
on
d
-0
.0
6
(0
.0
5)
N
um
be
rs
of
D
ia
m
on
d
M
in
es
0.
02
(0
.0
2)
Ru
lin
g
H
ou
se
s
X
D
ist
an
ce
to
N
ea
re
st
M
aj
or
To
w
ns
-0
.0
0
(0
.0
0)
D
ist
an
ce
to
N
ea
re
st
M
aj
or
To
w
ns
(k
m
)
0.
00
(0
.0
0)
Ru
lin
g
H
ou
se
s
X
Pr
op
of
St
ra
ng
er
s
-0
.0
6
(0
.0
9)
Pr
op
or
tio
n
of
St
ra
ng
er
s
0.
48
(0
.5
2)
A
m
al
ga
m
at
io
n
-0
.6
8
-0
.6
2
-0
.6
2
(0
.4
4)
(0
.4
3)
(0
.4
0)
A
ll
C
on
tr
ol
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
O
ut
co
m
e
M
ea
n
5.
01
5.
01
5.
01
O
ut
co
m
e
St
an
da
rd
D
ev
ia
tio
n
11
.4
6
11
.4
6
11
.4
6
O
bs
er
va
tio
ns
13
8
13
8
13
7
N
O
T
E
-R
ob
us
t
st
an
da
rd
er
ro
rs
in
pa
re
nt
he
se
s.
**
*
p<
0.
01
,*
*
p<
0.
05
,*
p<
0.
1.
C
on
tr
ol
s
id
en
tic
al
to
th
os
e
in
m
ai
n
re
su
lts
ta
bl
e.
127
Game of Chiefs
Table 3.20: Logit Model of Killing Reported By Witness Depositions-TRC Data
Dependent Variable: Witness Report Killing
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Number of Ruling Houses 0.03* 0.03* 0.04** 0.04** 0.04**
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Shared Power -0.02 0.02
(0.09) (0.10)
Monopoly Power 0.11 0.11
(0.09) (0.09)
Unstable Power -0.08
(0.08)
Amalgamation -0.07 -0.07 -0.09 -0.09 -0.09
(0.12) (0.13) (0.12) (0.13) (0.13)
District Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
All Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Outcome Mean 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11
Outcome Standard Deviation 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.32
Number of Clusters 149 149 149 149 149
Observations 28,720 28,720 28,720 28,720 28,720
NOTE-Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Controls
identical to main results table. Controls do not include year Fixed Effects.
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Table 3.21: Ruling House Rivalry and Frequency of Deadly Events(All)
Dependent Variable: Number of Deadly Events
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Number of Ruling Houses 0.10*** 0.08** 0.09** 0.07* 0.05
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03)
Amalgamation 0.11 0.11 0.17 0.13
(0.20) (0.20) (0.21) (0.16)
Faction Controls No No No No Yes
Economic Controls No No No Yes Yes
Demographic Controls No No Yes Yes Yes
Control for Institutions No Yes Yes Yes Yes
District Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Outcome Mean 9.78 9.78 9.78 9.78 9.78
Outcome Standard Deviation 9.23 9.23 9.23 9.23 9.23
Observations 138 138 138 138 138
NOTE-Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Dependent variable
is the number of unopposed event for chiefdom obtained from the UCDP Georeferenced Event Dataset
(GED) Global version 17.2 (2016), which list conflict dyads. Missing data on outcome variable for
11 chiefdoms including: “Malegohun”, “Toli”, “Bombali Sebora”, “Libeisaygahun”, “Gbinle-Dixing”,
“Dembelia Sinkuni”, “Follosaba Dembelia”, “Timdale”; “Upper Banta”, and “YKK. All other controls are
identical to those in in the main results table. There are no year Fixed Effect in the model.
Figure 3.6: Brutality Over Time In the War
(a) Fatalities (UCDP data) (b) Amputation(TRC Report)
129
Game of Chiefs
Table 3.22: Ruling Houses and Civilian Fatalities in the Phases of the War
Dependent Variable: Civilian Fatalities
1991-2002 1991-1996 1997 - 2002
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Number of Ruling Houses 0.11** 0.11*** 0.19*** 0.20*** 0.11 0.07
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.08) (0.08)
Amalgamation -0.51** -0.48* -0.94*** -0.99*** -0.15 0.07
(0.26) (0.27) (0.34) (0.37) (0.41) (0.39)
All Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes No Yes
Outcome Mean 5.01 5.01 5.32 5.32 4.82 4.82
Outcome Standard Deviation 11.46 11.46 12.02 12.02 10.92 10.92
Number of Clusters 138 138 118 118 100 100
Observations 1,282 1,282 665 665 617 617
NOTE-Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All other controls are
identical to those in main results table
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Chapter 4
Chiefs, Courts, and Upholding
Property Rights:
Quasi-Experimental Evidence from
Sierra Leone
131
Abstract
Land disputes are unavoidable and costly to resolve in the formal courts in contexts
with weak property rights and low state capacity. In order to relax the pressure on
strained formal courts, many countries permit parallel informal dispute resolution forums.
This paper investigates the extent to which one such forum-Chiefdom Land Committees
(CLCs)-in Sierra Leone is able to resolve land disputes. I constructed a dataset of ligated
cases at local courts across the country and implement difference-in-difference design to
estimate the effect of the CLCs on land caseload in the formal courts. Contrary to the
policy goals, I find that on average, chiefdoms with CLCs have higher land caseload in
the formal courts three years on. By adopting the CLCs, chiefdoms plausibly made land
issues more salient, but, instead of providing final resolutions, CLCs are conduits for the
formalization of land disputes.
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4.1 Introduction
In most of sub-Saharan Africa property rights over land are less protected
(World Bank, 2007). Land ownership and usage rights are less individualist and are
based on customary laws that are typically unwritten (Toulmin, 2009; Boone, 2013).
Even where formal laws allow individual rights, these are often poorly defined. This
generally discourages investments, depresses agriculture productivity (Besley & Ghatak,
2010; World Bank, 2007; Feder & Feeny, 1991; Deininger & Chamorro, 1999) and many
times gives rise to land disputes, some of which can lead to violent conflicts (van der Haar
& van Leeuwen, 2019; Van Leeuwen & Van Der Haar, 2016; Huggins, Cloreal, et al., 2005;
Huggins, 2009).
Pervasive lack of capacity in state legal institutions further hinders upholding any
rightful claims to land. Claimants that take land disputes to the formal courts find that
the court systems lack resources, are typically not trustworthy, and are costly to access
(Deseau, Levai, Schmiegelow, et al., 2019; Price, 2018; Logan, 2017). As a claimant do
you then go to informal parallel dispute resolution forums? But these forums are typically
captured by local elites who may not be impartial arbiters in land dispute resolution
(Unruh & Turray, 2006; Goldstein & Udry, 2008; Hartman, Blair, & Blattman, 2018).
In order to help claimants and to protect and uphold property rights, one
approach states often pursue is to focus on building the capacity of state legal institutions
and make them more trustworthy by providing people with truthful information about
improved service delivery (Acemoglu, Cheema, Khwaja, & Robinson, 2018). Another is to
educate individuals to privately and peaceful resolve their disputes while minimizing state
engagement in dispute resolution (Blattman, Hartman, & Blair, 2014; Hartman et al.,
2018). In this paper, I investigate whether a hybrid state-customary dispute resolution
mechanism can be a viable option to resolve land disputes, and by extension, help uphold
land property rights.
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I study this question in the Sierra Leone context where land disputes in rural
areas are a thorny issue for the government and the formal court systems. Rights over land
in these areas are based on unwritten customary rules and norms that vary in different
parts of the country. Customary rights are legally recognized, although such rights are not
adequately protected as properties and associated rights are not registered (R. L. Barrows,
1974; Unruh & Turray, 2006; Renner-Thomas, 2010; Johnson, 2011; Ryan, 2018). At
the same time, the formal court system in Sierra Leone is marked by long delays, high
costs and mistrust. This is especially the case for the lowest courts-the local courts-that
are grossly under resourced, lack trained personnel and are unable to meet the demand
for justice in their jurisdictions (Suma, 2014; Park, 2008). Local courts are critical for
upholding and protecting rights for land in rural areas. Most land cases that make it to
the superior courts in the provinces originate from the local courts and remain unresolved
for years. Furthermore, various analyses of the causes of the decade-long civil war in the
country point to captured economic resources such as land, by the traditional authorities
that alienated the youths and other vulnerable groups (Abdullah et al., 1997; McIntyre,
Aning, & Addo, 2002; Richards, 2005; Fanthorpe, 2006), which undermines traditional
modes of dispute resolution.
As part of the 2015 National Land Policy, the government proposed the intro-
duction of Chiefdom Land Committees (CLCs) to administer rural land in an equitable
manner, and to help resolve land disputes among community members through third-party
mediation. The policy does not change, but instead builds on the existing customary
laws that govern land administration and land dispute resolution. The CLCs can be best
viewed as a hybrid state-customary order in the spirit of Boege, Brown, and Clements
(2009), as the CLCs get legitimacy and support from the state. The state also saw the
CLCs as a way to emphasize principles of fairness, such as deliberation and inclusiveness
in customary ways of land dispute resolution. The Policymakers expected the CLCs to
reduce land cases that end up in the formal court system, through two possible channels:
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preventing disputes in the first place because of better land administration, and mediation
through CLCs for disputes that arise anyways.
Whether this hybrid state-customary land dispute resolution forum has any
effect on land cases litigated at the formal courts is the focus of my empirical analysis. I
surveyed all the chiefdom administrations in early 2019 and found that only 51 out of 149
chiefdoms had adopted CLCs. I use this variation in the policy adoption, and ten years of
local court records (from 2009 to 2018) in a difference-in-difference design to estimate the
average treatment effect (ATT) of CLCs on both the likelihood of observing land cases,
and the volume of land cases litigated at the formal courts.
The results suggest that on the extensive margin, formal courts in non-compliant
chiefdoms were just as likely to hear land cases as those in chiefdoms with CLCs. However,
at the intensive margins, formal courts in chiefdoms with CLCs, on average saw higher
land caseloads (δ = 1.76, s.e = 0.71) than formal courts in non-compliant chiefdoms. This
effect is large given that the mean number of cases in the formal courts is 1.28 per year
for the study period.
The program effect holds after a series of robustness checks. I exploit the time
series nature of the outcome variable to conduct falsification test and show that for each
year prior to the policy implementation, there was no effect on the number of land cases
in the formal courts. In addition, because the policy targeted land disputes, I use the
number of other civil cases (non-land) as a placebo outcome and I show that the policy
had no effect on these types of cases. Finally, I use the total number of all cases, and
the case types in a triple difference specification, and the result is consistent with the
difference-in-difference estimation.
I explore three possible channels to further understand this observed effect. First,
I assess whether the land reform and activities of the CLCs brought to the surface pent-up
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land concerns among vulnerable groups like strangers1 or from chiefdoms that are more
prone to have land disputes, for instance because they have relatively high degrees of
unemployment or are close to urban centers (Nuhu, 2019; Lombard, 2016). My analysis
does not find support for this argument. The policy did not seem to have had any
effect on chiefdoms that adopted CLCs and have a higher proportion of strangers, higher
unemployment or are closer to major towns.
Secondly, I explore whether, rather than solving land disputes, the CLCs are
instead conduits of land cases to the formal court system. This can happen via interaction
with CLCs, where the CLCs refer cases to the formal courts. In addition, a potential
drawback to informal or alternative dispute resolution is that resolutions are often perceived
as less final (Crook, 2004), so that people that are unsatisfied with CLC resolution may
proceed to formal courts with their land cases.
Thirdly, I explore whether the observed effect is a result of the CLCs making
land issues more salient. The idea is that the CLC activities may educate people of
their rights over land, and those that can respond, for example the more educated, or
people with relatively higher income, can take their land cases directly to the formal
courts. There is merit to this mechanism because despite the stated policy goals my
data collection revealed that the actual number of land cases in the local courts are a
magnitude lower than non-land cases. This does not necessarily mean that the prevalence
of land disputes is low, but it is more likely that people do not seek justice or may go
to other dispute resolution mechanisms. By making land dispute resolution more salient
the policy may have prompted people to bring their disputes to the courts, and hence
increase land caseload in treatment chiefdoms.
There is some evidence to support both of these latter explanations. For instance,
chiefdoms that adopted the CLCs and potentially have higher income or secondary
1 Strangers are people born outside the chiefdom and have no claim to land. They must seek permission
from paramount chief to access land for cultivation and livelihood (Tangri, 1976; Fenton, 1951)
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education tend to drive the main result. Similarly, of the chiefdoms that adopted CLCs,
the ones that said they referred land cases to either the local or magistrate courts also had
higher land caseloads in the local courts. These findings suggests that this hybrid forums
are more likely a link for state formalization of disputes rather than forums of resolution.
This paper directly contributes to the debate about how to uphold and secure
rights over land in contexts where property rights are weak (Crook, 2004; Toulmin, 2009;
Collins & Mitchell, 2018; Unruh & Turray, 2006). While informal alternative dispute
resolution mechanisms, primarily provided by non-state actors, are the predominant way
people address everyday disputes (Logan, 2017), the evidence presented here suggests
that for land disputes, even when the state sanctions informal dispute resolution channels,
people might still prefer to bring their cases to the formal court system. This may be
because resolution in the formal systems might be perceived as final or at least more
permanent than they will get from the informal system. This is similar to the finding
from Ghana as Crook (2004) shows from his survey of litigants.
It also contributes to the broader debate about how to provide critical public
goods such as access to justice in developing countries. To this end, the merits and
demerits of having plural justice systems is discussed in the literature (D’Aoust & Sterck,
2016; Tamanaha, 2011; Swenson, 2018; Chirayath, Sage, & Woolcock, 2005). While
evidence exists that they help extend access to justice (Price, 2018), little evidence exists
about their direct impact on the capacity of formal justice systems. In the Sierra Leone
context, and with land cases, I show a preference for formal courts, where people bring
their land cases to the formal courts perhaps because they are unsatisfied with resolutions
from the informal mechanism or because informal forums motivated them to directly
seek justice in the formal courts. In a similar vein, Acemoglu et al. (2018) show that
by providing truthful information about formal courts in Pakistan, people switch from
informal forums to the state forums in addressing disputes. They argue that "motivated
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reasoning", where a positive experience with the state courts not only changes people’s
beliefs about the state institution, but also encourages citizens to use the formal state
processes. My findings in relation to Acemoglu et al. (2018) suggests a potential trade-off
between investing in informal dispute resolution channels versus working to build the
capacity of formal state courts.
Finally, this paper is among the first to make a direct empirical link between a
land reform and land disputes litigated in formal courts. The vast majority of literature on
the impact of land reforms focus on economic outcome such as investment and productivity
(Besley & Ghatak, 2010; World Bank, 2007; Feder & Feeny, 1991; Deininger & Chamorro,
1999), while ignoring reform effect on land disputes.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: section II describes the context,
starting with a description of the land tenure system, and the intervention to extend land
tenure, and to prevent and resolve land disputes. In section III, I describe the data and
empirical strategy. I present results in section IV. I conduct robustness checks in section
V and explore explanations for the observed effect in Section VI. Section VII concludes.
4.2 The Context
4.2.1 Land Tenure In Sierra Leone
In Sierra Leone, the institution that governs land in rural areas is customary law.
These are undocumented informal laws that vary from one locality to the next (Kanu
& Henning, 2019; Oredola-Davies, 2006). In the absence of formal land demarcation,
registration and titling, claims and counter claims over rural land have given rise to
considerable disputes over farm land in rural areas in post-conflict Sierra Leone (Unruh &
Turray, 2006). These disputes can range from minor altercations among rival claimants,
over particular pieces of land, to violent clashes against foreign land deals in the chiefdoms.
As custodians of rural land, paramount chiefs (PCs) are key players in preventing and
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resolving disputes over land. No meaningful land transaction is completed in the chiefdoms
without the stamped approval of the PCs, even when it involves the state (Ryan, 2018;
Johnson, 2011; Bottazzi, Goguen, & Rist, 2016). However, paramount chiefs may not
be impartial arbiters in resolving disputes over land in rural areas. Land is frequently
used as a political and economic tool by chiefs. The capture of critical resources such as
land is argued to have formed the foundation of the decade-long civil war in the country
(Jackson, 2007; Unruh & Turray, 2006; Sawyer, 2008; Richards, 2005).
4.2.2 The 2015 National Land Policy Reform
A key policy reform effort after the war aimed to secure rights over land for the
rural populations, particularly for women and the youth who had been marginalized by
local elites in pre-war era (Sawyer, 2008). The 2015 National Land Policy is the result of a
second attempt at this goal. The first effort at this goal was initiated in 2003 immediately
following the end of the war. But the effort did not succeed at the cabinet level because
opponents to the policy argued it was not consulted enough with relevant stakeholders
like the paramount chiefs and land holding families (Government of Sierra Leone, 2015).
What eventually became the 2015 National Land Policy was extensively consulted across
the country, starting as early as 2011. The policy itself is a bundle of interventions in land
governance and usage at various levels in the country. In terms of governance, the policy
proposed a National Land Commission that is decentralized at the various administrative
levels of the country. The Chiefdom Land Committee (CLC) represents the National Land
Commission at the chiefdom level. The focus of my analysis of the policy is at this level.
The CLCs are headed by paramount chiefs, and are to be comprised of landown-
ers and "persons ordinarily resident" in the chiefdoms. The policy also suggests that
membership to the CLC must "respect gender, ethnic diversity, and social political dy-
namic". Under the policy, the responsibility for communal land is now vested in the
CLC. The policy states, "It [the Chiefdom Land Committee] shall vet/approve all land
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transactions and perform all other functions relating to the disposal of communal land
presently performed by the Chiefdoms Councils" (Government of Sierra Leone, 2015,
p.72-73). While the policy did not change the existing dual land tenure system in the
country, the intended goal of vesting land decisions in a diverse committee of locals was
to reduce the overwhelming influence of the paramount chiefs in land decisions in their
chiefdoms.
Recognizing that the formal court system is overwhelmed and lacks the capacity
to handle most civil disputes, the CLCs were to also act as new forums for dispute
resolution for land disputes. It states that, "At the chiefdom level the CLC...will develop
and maximize opportunities to formalize the application of Alternative Dispute Resolution
mechanisms such as negotiation and mediation to reduce the number of cases that end
up in the court system" (Government of Sierra Leone, 2015, p.76). In the rural areas,
the local courts are courts of first instance for civil cases in the formal court system in
Sierra Leone (Government of Sierra Leone, 1991). Most land cases that get in the formal
court system start here. These local courts, which were headed by paramount chiefs
until 2011 gained a reputation of being biased and favor only the local elites in power
(Sawyer, 2008). With the CLCs, policymakers hoped to ensure fairer outcomes in land
dispute resolution, and to reduce caseloads in the formal courts. People in rural areas
can report land disputes to identified members of the CLC, who can then bring it to the
wider committee for deliberations. Prior to the CLCs, only the paramount chief and a
fewer lesser chiefs received land dispute claims at the chiefdoms level.
4.2.3 CLCs as Hybrid Forums
Theoretically, the CLCs can be best viewed as a "hybrid order" (Boege et al.,
2009). CLCs get legitimacy from the state, unlike various other traditional channels of
land dispute resolution. In addition, the CLCs combine customary norms with formal
state processes such as open deliberation, impartiality, and representation of interest group
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in land administration and dispute resolution. The expectation is that these ’Weberian’
state features will help prevent land capture by local elites and lead to a more equitable
access to land, which would prevent land disputes. Disputes that inevitably arise can also
be resolved satisfactorily through CLC mediation.
However, despite these goals, the policy does not specify the actual implemen-
tation or day-to-day running of the CLCs. Importantly also, there was no means of
enforcement, punishment or reward for chiefdoms adopting CLCs. In fact, the policy was
launched by the President without much administrative resource and finance to implement
it (S. Conteh, 2015). It was largely left to the chiefdoms to adopt CLCs and implement
it in their own ways. The result is a variation in what CLCs do and how they are run.
One exception to this variation is that almost all of the CLCs addressed land disputes
in the community. While I can’t distinguish these two mechanisms of the policy, my
analysis aims to understand the extent to which the policy impacted land caseload in
formal courts.
4.3 Data and Identification Strategy
4.3.1 Data
I combined two original sources of data for the analyses in this paper. I hired
and trained a team of experienced enumerators to collect ten years of administrative
records of cases litigated at local courts across the country, and to conduct a survey of all
the chiefdom administrations to understand if and how chiefdom land committees were
implemented.
Land Dispute Litigation: In Sierra Leone each chiefdom has at least one
local court, some chiefdoms have up to four in our data collection. Most rural people are
encouraged to address all land disputes through the local courts, although they can also
bring the case to higher courts like the magistrate courts. This makes local courts an
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ideal place to capture litigation over land cases across the country. My research team and
I collected information from all functioning local courts in each chiefdom. We visited 248
local court locations, but only 199 courts had any data. When aggregated, this includes
130 chiefdoms that had court data for some years in the study period. Panels (a) and (b)
in Figure 4.7 in the Appendix show the location of local courts with respect to population
density and variation in costs across the country.
At the local courts the main source of information were the case logs. Each court
has case logs where the court clerks are suppose to record all cases that are brought to
that court each year. These records are all handwritten in blue ledger that is provided by
the government. Figure 4.8 in the Appendix shows a typical case log. Critical information
in the case log generally includes, case number, date case was filed, the names of the
plaintiff and defendant, the cause or claim, various cost items to file a case in that court,
and date of hearing. We aimed to collect information from logs from 2009 to 2018.
We obtained on average 3.6 years of records per court or 5.5 years of record per
chiefdom making for a total of 711 court-year observations in the full dataset. For each
year record we counted/recorded the number of all civil cases in a programmed tablet.
Next we determined which of the litigation were over land. The type of case is easily
obtained from the cause or claim of the filing but the researchers also worked closely with
the court clerk to identify case types. Each logged case also has a separate file with details
on testimonies and witnesses, all of which helps determine what the case was about. We
took photos of recorded pages where we found cases about land as the example in Figure
4.9b in the Appendix. Panel (a) in Figure 4.1 shows the pattern of land cases for the
study period. Panels (b) and (c) show the spread of cases post-treatment (2015 - 2018)
and pre-treatment, respectively. Table 4.6 in the Appendix provides summary statistics
of the outcome variables and other court related variables.
Low Land Caseloads in the Local Courts: It is worth noting at this point
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that despite the stated policy objective of reducing land cases in the local courts, it turns
out land cases are only a tiny fraction of cases in the local courts. During the pilot
phase of my research, I was told by many court clerks and community leaders that people
are encouraged to resolve land cases at a much lower level before bringing them to the
local courts. For example, land disputes within families are encouraged to be resolved at
the family level. My data collection also confirms this claim. The average court in my
full dataset receives about than 1.3 land cases per year, compared to 51.4 for non-land
cases. It does appear that the policy goal with respect to caseload in the courts was not
informed by much evidence. At best, on would expect that the policy would have no
effect, however, as I will show, the CLC presence did lead to increase in land cases in the
courts. Whether this is desirable or not very much depends on if the emphasis is placed
on dispute resolution, as intended by the Sierra Leone policymakers, or access to formal
courts. The policy may have achieved the latter.
Data Attrition and Balance Concerns: As can be seen from the maps in
4.1, there are some holes in the data, especially in the pre-treatment period, where the
data is available only for 58 local courts out of the 248 visited. Some courts also did not
have consecutive years of data. This can potentially lead to biases in the average effect of
the intervention if observations are not balanced between treatment and controls groups.
In Tables 4.7 and 4.8 in the Appendix, with the exception of 2009, I show that there is
some degree of balance in proportion of observations for each year between treatment and
control especially for the latter years . In addition, at the chiefdom level, I have at least
one observation per year between 2010 and 2018 for 130 chiefdoms.
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Figure 4.1: Spatial Pattern of Land cases and Treatment Locations
(a) All Land Cases (b) Land Cases Post Treatment
(c) Land Cases Pre-Treatment (d) Treatment Locations-Shaded
Note:- Darker colors indicate high number of cases. Dots are Location of Local Courts.
White spaces in panels a, b, and c indicate missing data.
To further address potential concerns from data attrition and balance in my
estimation, I first use a restricted sample of the data from courts with consecutive years of
observations that span at least one pre-treatment period for both treatment and control.
This ensures balance in treatment and control. I relax this data restriction and use the
full dataset. I compare my estimates with estimates from the restricted sample to get a
sense of bias implications for population average effects.
Chiefdom Administration Survey: In early 2019, I also lead a research
team to conduct a survey of all 149 chiefdoms to investigate which chiefdoms had land
committees and how they operated. 2 We interviewed key officials on the chiefdoms
administration who would know if their chiefdom had CLCs. Most of the officials we
interviewed would participate on CLCs if their chiefdom adopted the policy. See Table
2 Some chiefdoms were split up in 2017 and increased the total number of chiefdoms to 191. But by
the time we conducted the survey, most of the newly created chiefdoms did not yet have a chiefdom
administration, and more importantly local courts, which were the points of data collection. Hence
we use the old administrative divisions in this study
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4.9 in the Appendix for the types of respondents we interviewed. Only 51 chiefdoms
reported having CLCs. Tables 4.10, 4.11, and 4.12 provide information on membership
selection,composition of CLCs, and case mediation activities, respectively of the CLCs.
Unsurprising also is the variation in how the policy is being implemented for those that
adopted it. For instance about 36% of CLCs charge fees to hear land cases. In terms of
membership composition, less than half of chiefdoms include vulnerable groups such as
youth and women as shown in Table 4.11. The way members on the CLCs are selected
also varies as shown in Table 4.10.
One crucial exception to this variation is that almost all of the CLCs (over 98%
as shown in Table 4.12) play a mediation role in resolving land disputes among community
members. In this paper the main treatment is the presence of CLC in the chiefdoms. I
also explore variation in how CLCs are run, for instance, whether chiefdoms with CLCs
that refer cases to the court system, are more likely to contribute to cases litigated at the
local courts.
Other Datasets: In my analysis of the drivers of the observed effect, I use the
2015 census to obtain the chiefdom level proportion of primary education attainment
and proportion of employment in the non-agriculture sector. I use mean distance from
chiefdom centroid to the nearest major town, which I obtained from the Acemoglu, Reed,
and Robinson (2014) dataset.
4.3.2 Identification Strategy
As noted above, some chiefdoms failed to implement CLCs three years after
the policy. An implicit assumption this paper makes is that those chiefdoms that had
CLCs in 2018 had them for some or all of the post treatment period, whereas those
chiefdoms that did not have CLCs by 2018 never adopted it. This allows me to create a
control and treatment group and utilize the longitudinal nature of the court data in a
difference-in-difference (DiD) design to estimate the causal effect, given by the average
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treatment effect (ATT). An immediate concern with the main treatment is that there
might be some systematic reason why some chiefdoms have CLCs and not others. I show
spatially in Panel (d) in Figure 4.1 locations that adopted the policy. There is a slight
density in the North of the country where the incumbent government that passed the
policy has a stronghold. However, such a selection is highly likely to be unrelated to
the studied outcomes. Table 4.14 in the appendix shows result from a linear probability
model of potential determinant policy compliance. It suggests that the presence of mining
activities in the chiefdom is positively associated with CLC adoption, whereas distance to
the nearest major towns 3 is negatively associated with CLC adoption. I control for these
with chiefdoms and court fixed effects.
Difference-in-Difference estimation is the most appropriate in the evaluation of
large-scale policy programs if longitudinal data exist for outcomes before and after the
intervention for both the control and treatment groups (Ashenfelter & Card, 1984). The
critical identifying assumptions in this design are that there is a counterfactual parallel
trend in the outcome for the treatment and control group, and that the allocation of
treatment assignment is unrelated to outcomes at the baseline. When these assumptions
hold, the DiD estimator removes biases in post-treatment period differences between the
treatment and control group that could be the result of inherent differences between those
groups, as well as biases from differences over time in the treatment group resulting from
trends due to other causes of the outcome (Wooldridge, 2002; Angrist & Pischke, 2008).
Visual inspection of Figure 4.2 below appears to show that the parallel trend assumption
holds for the restricted data, where data includes only courts with 5 consecutive years
of data. I show parallel trends for unrestricted data in panel (a) in Figure 4.10 in the
Appendix. The trend is stronger when all the data is used. Panel (b) in the same figure
shows the trend for all cases.
3 The towns include provincial head quarter towns of Bo, Kenema, Makeni, and the capital, Freetown
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Figure 4.2: Visual Inspection of Parallel Trends with restricted data
Vertical axis is the number of land cases per year in each local court
in treatment and control chiefdoms.
4.3.3 Estimation
I estimate the effect of the intervention using the least squares regression model
below:
yict = αc + βt + δIct + cXict + εict (4.1)
where yict is the outcome variable for court i in chiefdom c at time t. When the outcome
is a binary, I estimate a linear probability model. αc is the court fixed effects, and βt
is year fixed effects. Ict is an interaction dummy for treatment in chiefdom c, and post
treatment period, t . Xict are relevant court level controls such as costs of filing cases, and
finally the error term is given by εict. The coefficient of interest is δ, which is the ATT.
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4.4 Results-Average Treatment Effects
In this section I present the main results of my analysis. I presents two sets of
results, one with the restricted sample that has consecutive years of court data from 2013
to 2018, which spans three pre-treatment years, inclusive, and for the full data. The idea is
to compare the result from the restricted data that is a balanced sample in treatment and
control, with results from my full sample, where estimates may be bias as a result data
attrition. I begin with a graphical representation of a simple difference of the outcomes,
and then proceed with the estimation results.
4.4.1 Simple Differences
Panel (a) in Figure 4.3 below shows results for the extensive margin. The
outcome is an indicator variable that takes value 1 if case type is a land case, and zero
otherwise. In this way, the outcome can be interpreted as the likelihood of observing land
cases at the formal courts. I show graphically that although there is a difference between
treatment and control in the pre-treatment period, this difference does not change in the
post-treatment period, suggesting that the program had no effect at the extensive margin.
Panel (b) captures the intensive margin, which is number of land cases in local courts per
year. As noted earlier the land caseload in courts were low before the reform and picked
up after, but generally land case level in courts remain low. Panel (b) shows that the
difference between control and treatment chiefdoms in the pre-treatment period grows
in the post-treatment period. The change in difference is about 1.5 land cases. I show a
similar result for the unrestricted data in Figure 4.11 in the Appendix.
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Figure 4.3: Simple Difference of Outcomes- Restricted Data
(a) Extensive Margin (b) Intensive Margin
4.4.2 Estimation Results with Restricted Data
Extensive Margin
Table 4.1 below shows results from estimating equation 4.1 above. The outcome
is the likelihood of observing land cases at the formal courts. The model is fitted with year
and court fixed effects. The ATT is given by the coefficient on the variable DiD. In column
(1) in the table the data is restricted to include only courts that have five consecutive
years of data from 2014 to 2018. In column (2) data is restricted to include courts with
six consecutive years of data spanning 2013 to 2018, and in column (3) seven years of data
from 2012 to 2018. The coefficient on the DiD estimator are not statistically significant
(δ = −0.02, s.e = 0.1), but noticeable also is that the sign changes from negative in column
(1) and makes a big positive jump in column (3) where δ = 0.2, s.e = 0.2. These models
suggest that the intervention did not have a detectable effect on the extensive margins.
A possible interpretation of this result is that the land administration channel through
which policymakers expected CLC intervention would help reduce the risk of land conflict
made no difference.
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Table 4.1: ATT for Likelihood of Observing Land Cases-
Restricted Data
Land Case (Binary)
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3)
DiD -0.02 0.07 0.20
(0.10) (0.20) (0.20)
Year Fixed Effects x x x
Court Fixed Effect x x x
Outcome Mean 0.4 0.35 0.34
Outcome Standard Deviation 0.49 0.48 0.47
Number of Courts 56 39 31
Court-year observations 272 224 208
R-squared 0.53 0.44 0.49
NOTE-Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at the
chiefdom level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Columns 1, 2, and
3 on include 45, 31 and 25 chiefdoms respectively. Treatment group
make up, 26%, 20% and 25% in columns 1, 2, and 3 respectively.
Number of Land Cases Litigated at Local Courts
Similarly, Table 4.2 below shows results from the main OLS estimation, but
now the outcome variable is the number of land cases. The model is fitted exactly the
same was as in Table 4.1 above. Columns (1) to (3) have the same restrictions. As can
be seen from the table the ATT of the intervention ranges from δ = 1.47, s.e = 0.85 to
δ = 1.95, s.e = 0.75 with the tightest data restriction, which is statistically significant at
the 5% confidence interval. Noticeable also is that the coefficients and standard errors are
stable even as the sample drops. The magnitude of the ATT is also large. For instance in
column (3), it is about 70% of the standard deviation of the outcome mean.
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Table 4.2: ATT on Land Cases-Restricted Data
Number of Land Cases
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3)
DiD 1.47* 1.82** 1.95**
(0.85) (0.80) (0.75)
Year Fixed Effects x x x
Court Fixed Effect x x x
Outcome Mean 1.53 1.26 1.26
Outcome Standard Deviation 3.26 2.77 2.81
Number of Courts 56 39 31
Court-year observations 272 224 208
R-squared 0.48 0.44 0.45
NOTE-Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at the
chiefdom level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Columns 1, 2, and
3 on include 45, 31 and 25 chiefdoms respectively. Treatment group
make up, 26%, 20% and 25% in columns 1, 2, and 3 respectively.
4.4.3 Estimation Results with Full Dataset
In this section I relax the data restrictions and use the full dataset to run models.
On the one hand the restricted data provides the most robust estimate, but I loose
statistical power when looking at potential mechanisms. I relax the data restriction
to make sure the estimates are not too different from the restricted sample. Table 4.3
below shows the estimation results with the number of land cases as outcome variable.
Column (1) is estimated with year and chiefdom fixed effects without controls. Column
(2) introduces court level controls including mean cost of using courts, number of years of
court records in each court, and mean cost in each court. Column (3) adds court fixed
effects.
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Table 4.3: ATT on Land Cases- Unrestricted Data
Number of Land Cases
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3)
DiD 1.76** 1.65** 1.46**
(0.71) (0.67) (0.73)
Year Fixed Effects x x x
Chiefdom Fixed Effects x x
Court Controls x x
Court Fixed Effects x
Outcome Mean 1.28 1.28 1.28
Outcome Standard Deviation 2.8 2.8 2.8
Number of Chiefdoms 130 129 129
Court-year observations 706 689 689
R-squared 0.36 0.37 0.52
NOTE- Court controls include mean cost and number of record
years. Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at the chiefdom
level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
The results suggest that at the intensive margin, the intervention increased land
cases in the formal courts by 62% of outcome standard deviation (δ = 1.76, s.e = 0.71)
in column (1), which fall to 53% (δ = 1.46, s.e = 0.73) in the most stringent model in
column (3). Notable here also is that magnitudes are similar to the results with the
restricted dataset in Table 4.2 above. In Table 4.15 in the Appendix, I present the results
table for probability of observing land cases with the full sample. The coefficients are
similar to that in the restricted model, but they are also not statistically significant.
The fact the magnitude of the estimates from the restricted and unrestricted
data for both of these outcomes assuages potential bias concerns resulting from data
attrition. I proceed in the next section with a series of robustness checks of the results for
the intensive margins.
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4.5 Robustness Checks
To bolster the internal validity of the results above, I conduct three additional
robustness tests in this section. I start with a formal placebo test, using a leads and lags
analysis. Secondly, since the policy targeted land cases, I also use civil cases at the local
courts as a second placebo outcome. Finally, I use the case type to introduce a third
dimension of variation in a triple difference specification, where the outcome is now the
number of all cases (land and non-land) in the courts.
4.5.1 Placebo Tests
Leads and Lags ATT
I exploit the time series nature of the caseload in courts to conduct a falsification
test by estimating the ATT on the treated for each year data is available. I use both
the the restricted and full dataset. The full dataset allows me to compare treatment and
control chiefdoms as far back as 2010. To do this, I use a variation of equation 4.1 above
to estimate the following model:
yict = αc + βt +
2018∑
t=2009
δt(Ici) + cXict + εict (4.2)
where δt is now the ATT for each year t from, 2014 to 2018 with the restricted
data, and 2009 to 2018 in the full dataset. This formulation allows me to show a formal
placebo test for the intervention by showing that the ATT for each pre-treatment year is
not statistically different from zero. I present a graphical representation of the results
below in Figure 4.4 below for the restricted sample. The diamond shapes are standardized
coefficients with error bars from running 4.2 above.
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Figure 4.4: Formal Falsification Test- With Restricted Sample
Y-axis represent standardized coefficient from estimating 4.2 above
using the restricted data from as shown in model (3) in Table 4.16
in the Appendix. Error bars are for 95% confidence intervals.
From Figure 4.4 above, the ATT is statistically indistinguishable from zero for
2014, the first pre-treatment year. In the post treatment period the magnitude of ATT
gradually increases and dips slightly again in 2018. In Figure 4.12 in the Appendix, I
show the same analysis with the full sample. I run equation 4.2 using both chiefdom
and court fixed effects models in columns 1, and 2 respectively from Table 4.16 in the
Appendix. Using the model with the chiefdom fixed effects, the results show that prior
to the intervention in 2015 the ATT for each year is statistically zero. Post intervention,
the coefficients generally trend positive and are different from zero for two of the three
years after the intervention. The picture is similar with the more restrictive model with
the court fixed effects. Although the coefficients for the yearly ATT are not statistically
significant at the 5% level, it is easy to see why the average effect over the three years is
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statistically significant.
Civil Cases as Placebo
I conduct a second placebo test by using the number of other civil cases (non-land
cases) as my outcome variable. This additional placebo test addresses possible concerns
that courts in treatment chiefdoms are in general more active. If this is the case one would
effect to find an effect even for non-land cases, even though the policy did not target
non-land cases. The table below present the results. I use the full sample. Column (1)
estimates are with year and chiefdom fixed effects without controls. Column (2) introduces
court level controls including mean cost of using courts, and number of years of court
records in each court. Column (3) adds court fixed effects. From Table 4.4 below, as
expected the coefficients on the DiD estimator are all not statistically different from zero.
Table 4.4: Placebo Test with Civil Cases
Number of Other Civil Cases(non-Land)
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3)
DiD 34.65 39.58 36.30
(23.39) (30.02) (38.39)
Year Fixed Effects x x x
Chiefdom Fixed Effects x x
Court Controls x x
Court Fixed Effects x
Outcome Mean 51.38 51.38 51.38
Outcome Standard Deviation 65.2 65.2 65.2
Number of Chiefdoms 130 129 129
Court-year observations 706 689 689
R-squared 0.58 0.60 0.71
NOTE- Court controls include mean cost and number of record years. Robust standard
errors in parentheses clustered at the chiefdom level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Although not statistically different from zero, the estimate on civil cases are
large and positive. A potential concern maybe that part of the effect captured is a
result of differential trends in conflict in these chiefdoms. This a reasonable concern
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given chiefdoms self-selected in the treatment. To alleviate this concern I run a triple
difference-in-difference in the next section.
4.5.2 Triple Difference Estimation
Finally, I use the number of all cases (both land and non-land) as the outcomes,
and introduce a third dimension of variation, using the case types in a difference-in-
difference-in-difference (DiDiD) design to help further isolate the treatment effect (Cancian
& Levinson, 2005). The idea here is to show that intensity of all cases in formal courts
in treatment chiefdoms is higher for courts that recorded any land cases. The indicator
variable for land cases is used as treatment. This third dimension of variation addresses
potential concerns that the ATT from the difference-in-difference may have resulted from
chiefdoms that have higher number of land disputes adopting the treatment. To do this, I
use the following specification:
Yict = αc + βt + γa + δIca + ψIat + ρIct + φ(It × Ic × Ia) + εict (4.3)
where Yict is number of cases of all types. I normalized this outcome the diving by the
mean number of all cases from the local courts for the study period. I do this to bring the
order of magnitude closer to that of number of land cases to make it easier for comparison.
γa is case type fixed effect, and γa is 1 if case type is land case, αc is the court fixed
effects, and βt is year fixed effects. Ica is a interaction of treated chiefdom and a dummy
for case type, Iat is a interaction dummy for case type and post treatment period, and Ict
is interaction dummy for post-treatment and treatment. This is essentially the DiD from
equation 4.1 above. The triple difference is given by It × Ic × Ia, where It is dummy for
post treatment period, Ic is dummy for treatment, and Ia is dummy for case type, which
is 1 when any land case is observed. φ is the estimate for the triple difference.
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Table 4.5 below shows the result of my estimation. The outcome for all three
models is the number of all cases (land and non-land). In Table 4.17, in the Appendix
I show the same results without the normalization. In column (1), I present results for
the DiD, and in column (2) I present result with for the triple difference (DiDiD) with
the unrestricted data. In column (3) the results are for the DiDiD with the restricted
data with a balanced sample in treatment and control. The coefficient on the DiD in
Column (1) is not statistically significant. In columns (2) and (3) the coefficients on triple
difference estimator (DiDiD) are statistically significant at the 5% and 1%, respectively.
The interpretation is that treatment chiefdoms with local courts that recorded any land
case, saw on average higher number of cases overall. And like with the main result,
this increase is larger than the mean number of cases. This result suggests indeed the
intervention had an impact on land cases litigated at the local courts.
Table 4.5: Triple Difference Estimation
Number of All Cases (normalized)
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3)
DiD (Post X CLC Chiefdom) 0.74 0.17 -0.18
(0.65) (0.44) (0.13)
DiDiD (Post X CLC Chiefdom X Case Type) 1.03** 1.56***
(0.48) (0.57)
CLC Chiefdom X Case Type ( Land) -0.78* -1.48**
(0.42) (0.63)
Post X Case Type (Land) 0.07 -0.19
(0.18) (0.23)
Case Type (Land) 0.11 0.39
(0.12) (0.33)
Year Fixed Effects X X X
Court Fixed Effect X X X
Outcome Mean 1.00 1.00 1.03
Outcome Standard Deviation 1.26 1.26 1.34
Number of Chiefdoms 130 130 45
Court-year observations 706 706 272
R-squared 0.71 0.72 0.75
NOTE-Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at the chiefdom level. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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4.6 Possible Explanations For the Observed Effects
The analyses so far suggests that the increase in the number of land cases
litigated at the local courts is causally linked to the intervention. This effect is also
large, over 50% of the standard deviation of the mean annual land cases per court in the
study period. This finding is the opposite of the stated policy objective, and my research
hypothesis going into the study was also aligned with that of the policymakers. However,
does this opposite effect suggest that the policy was undesirable? To start with, my
data suggests that policymakers may have misjudged land caseload in the formal courts.
Panels (a) and (b) in Table 4.10 in the Appendix show that although civil cases have been
trending upwards, land cases were in fact a small part of this increase. In this period the
typical court received about 1.3 land cases compared to about 51.4 for non-land cases.
Could people be bringing theirs land cases to the formal courts for the "right" reasons?
For example, perhaps because the effect of the CLCs is empowering people about their
land rights which prompts them to seek justice? In this section, I turn my attention to
exploring possible explanations for the observed effects.
Throughout this section I use the unrestricted data to gain statistical power. As
I showed in Section 4.4.3 the estimate obtained from using the unrestricted data is similar
to that from the restricted data. Furthermore, the ideas I explore provide suggestive
evidence for the drivers of the observed effect of the intervention.
4.6.1 CLCs Expose Pent-up Land Concerns from Vulnerable
Groups or Chiefdoms Potentially Prone to More Land
Disputes
A big part of the land reform policy, and activities of the CLCs, was to administer
land in a more equitable manner in the chiefdoms. By aiming to loosen the grip of the
local authorities over land in the provinces, policymakers hoped to extend land tenure
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to vulnerable groups such as women, youths and strangers. Observers of the policy
reform suggest that the reform would be beneficial to strangers across the chiefdoms,
because thereto strangers are generally landless and must rely on chiefs to use land
in the chiefdoms(Sawyer, 2008). I investigate how this group responds to the policy.
Similarly, the policy may have also played out differently in chiefdoms with higher levels
of unemployment or because they are close to major towns. Peri-urban areas are known
to be prone to land disputes (Nuhu, 2019; Lombard, 2016).
To investigate this, I use the 2015 census data to generate a binary variable
that takes value 1 for chiefdoms with above median proportion of strangers in the
population and 0 otherwise. For employment, the variable is 1 for chiefdoms below median
employment levels, and 0 otherwise.4 For proximity to major towns, I use geospatial
data from Acemoglu, Reed, and Robinson (2014) to create a binary variable that takes
value 1 for chiefdoms above median nearest distance to major towns, and 0 otherwise.
Descriptive statistics for these binary variables are given in Table 4.13 in the Appendix.
These variables are interacted with the DiD estimator and the interaction term shows any
differential impact of the policy.
I present the results of these analysis in Table 4.18 in the Appendix. Each column
correspond to the models in Table 4.3 above. As can be seen the coefficient on each of
the interaction terms are not statistically significant. Notable also is that the main ATT
remains significant in columns (1), (δ = 2.03, s.e = 1.05) and (2), (δ = 1.80, s.e = 0.95).
In column (3) the main ATT becomes insignificant, but the magnitude is comparable to
that of the main result (δ = 1.83, s.e = 1.11). These results suggest that the impact of
the policy is not driven by a response to the policy from vulnerable groups or chiefdoms.
4 As time series data for employment at the chiefdom level is not available, the assumption I make
here is that the 2015 figure represents a stock that captures the relative difference in employment
across chiefdoms. The same assumption holds for the proportion of strangers in the population.
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4.6.2 CLCs as Conduits of Land Cases in the Formal Courts
Research elsewhere suggests that because alternative dispute resolution channels
are often not able to provide final resolutions to cases litigants are more likely to take
land cases to the formal court system (Crook, 2004). It is also possible that in this case
study too, instead of resolving land cases, CLCs are either directly or indirectly conduits
of land cases to the local courts. The direct channel may include instances where CLCs
refer cases to the courts, either local courts or magistrate courts. In the chiefdoms survey,
about 43% of the CLCs reported sending land cases to local or magistrate courts. Another
option, which is not directly captured in my data, is that people who may be unsatisfied
with resolutions from CLCs may still take their disputes to the formal court system. This
is limited by the availability of other channels to justice, for example, the existence of a
magistrate court in the chiefdom or close by.
To test these ideas, I create an interaction term of DiD estimator and a binary
variable that takes value 1 for chiefdom with CLCs that make case referrals to either a
local or magistrate court, and 0 otherwise. This variable is a post-treatment measure, so
the coefficients on the interaction term does not explain the ATT, but it shows whether
there are differences in impact between chiefdoms with CLCs that send cases to the courts
and those with CLCs but don’t send cases. Furthermore, since the location of formal
courts impacts people’s ability to bring cases there, I create a triple interaction with the
DiD estimator, CLC case referrals and a binary variable that takes value 1 if the chiefdom
also has a magistrate court.
Model (1) in Figure 4.5 below shows the coefficient plot from column (1) in Table
4.19 in the Appendix. The interaction term is indeed significant at the 95% level, and it
suggests chiefdoms with CLCs that make land cases referral to the formal courts have
about 1.79 more land cases litigated at the local courts than those that have CLCs but
do not make case referrals. Importantly also is that the coefficient on the DiD estimate is
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now negative and not statistically significant. This suggests that the main impact may
be driven by the CLCs that make case referrals. Model (2) is a triple interaction of DiD
estimator, CLC cases referral and the presence of a magistrate court. This coefficient is
significant at the 99% level, and the magnitude of 2.97 is more than double the mean
number of land litigation for the study period. In addition, the coefficient on the main
effect is no longer significant. These results provide correlational evidence for the argument
that CLCs are indeed direct conduits of cases that end up in the formal court system.
Figure 4.5: Coefficient Plot of CLC Land Case Referral
X-axis represent standardized coefficient from columns (1) and (2)
in Table 4.19 in the Appendix. Model 1 shows coefficient of the
interaction of CLC case referral and the DiD estimator. Model 2 is
similar but with a triple interaction with the presence of magistrate
courts. Error bars are for 95% confidence intervals.
4.6.3 Issue Salience
Finally, I explore the role of issue salience in explaining the observed effect. The
argument is that the presence and activities of CLCs make land issues more salient. For
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instance, the CLCs may educate people of their land rights. People that are able to
respond may decide to bring their land disputes directly to the formal courts including
the local courts in the chiefdoms. The ability of people to respond in this way will depend
on their level of education and incomes (Logan, 2017). Although not a direct test of the
issue salience argument, I investigate whether the effect is stronger in chiefdoms with high
levels of education and income.
I again rely on the 2015 census data and create a binary variable that takes value
1 for chiefdoms with above median secondary level education attainment, and 0 otherwise.
For income, I use the proportion of non-agriculture labor in each chiefdom as a proxy for
relative income difference among chiefdoms.5 I create a binary variable that takes value
1 for chiefdoms with above median proportion of non-agriculture labor and 0 otherwise.
Descriptive statistics for these binary variables are give in Table 4.13 in the Appendix.
Panels (a) and (b) in Figure 4.6 below show results for education and non-
agriculture labor respectively. The coefficients on the interaction terms are the same
and are both statistically significant. They suggest that a chiefdom whose secondary
education attainment is above median, or that as above median non-agriculture labor,
and adopted CLCs has about 1.90 more land cases litigated in the local courts. The effect
for the baseline category is no longer statistically significant. This suggests that the ATT
is driven by chiefdoms that have relatively higher levels of education or potentially higher
income. My interpretation is that these are the chiefdoms with people that are able to
respond to the introduction of the CLCs.
5 Non-agriculture labor is used widely in development economics as a proxy for income in developing
country contexts (Gollin, Lagakos, & Waugh, 2014; Haggblade, Hazell, & Reardon, 2007)
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Figure 4.6: Response to Issue Salience
(a) Coefficient Plot for Secondary Education (b) Coefficient Plot for Non-Agriculture Labor
X-axis represent standardized coefficient from in Table 4.20 in the
Appendix. Error bars are for 95% confidence intervals.
4.7 Conclusion
Lack of capacity in state legal institutions means informal dispute resolution
channels handle the vast majority of everyday civil disputes in many developing countries.
Previous work shed doubt on the viability of these informal forums to address land disputes.
The central question of this research is whether an informal channel supported by the
state can help resolve land disputes and thus reduce land caseload in the formal court
system. This case study from Sierra Leone suggests instead of resolving land disputes the
informal forums are more likely conduits of land cases to the formal courts. It is plausible
that the involvement of the state through the CLCs raised the salience of land issues, but
as resolutions through informal channels may be perceived as not final, people that are
unsatisfied with outcomes from these channels may still pursue a more final resolution in
the formal court system. My analysis in fact shows that the CLCs themselves do direct
case referrals of land cases to the formal courts. Another plausible channel is that people
may have responded to the salience of land dispute by sidestepping the informal forum
altogether and bringing land cases directly to the formal courts. As my analysis suggest,
this would be the case for those who can respond, such as the the more educated and the
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relatively more resourced.
This finding from Sierra Leone matter for our understanding of how to protect
and upload property rights under customary land tenure regimes. The results raises
questions about how to address poor legitimacy in customary land dispute resolution
mechanisms, and whether effective linkages can be made between customary and non-
customary property rights. It does seems in this case that state institutions cannot be
easily replaced by informal channels of dispute resolution. The case suggests investment
of resource to build informal disputes resolution mechanism should accompany efforts to
build the capacity of the formal courts systems as well.
The positive side of this unexpected result is that informal dispute resolution
channels may be more important for providing access to justice through the formal systems.
This happens when people are empowered and are able to seek justice. Emphasising
this positive aspect of informal dispute resolution channels in policy reforms, while also
investing in state capacity, probably provides the best chance to uphold land property
rights in contexts with weak property right regimes.
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Appendix
Figure 4.7: Local Court Locations and Cost
(a) Courts and Population Density (b) Costs of Using Court Varies
Figure 4.8: Typical Case Log at the Local Courts
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Figure 4.9: Example Land Cases
(a) Land Case: It reads; "for upholding
plaintiff grand-father’s land land bush for a
period of thirty years now"
(b) Land Case: It reads; "for putting illegal
building on plaintiff land at Masingbe Road
Koakayima Town"
Table 4.6: Outcome and Court Level Control Descriptive
Statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev.
Number of Land Cases 711 1.28 2.80
Land Case (Binary) 711 0.40 0.49
Other Civil Cases 711 51.38 65.21
Total Cases 711 52.66 66.14
Mean Court Cost (Le) 711 5857.93 10297.27
Number of Record Years 706 5.48 2.89
Source:- Authors Calculation from local court administrative
data
165
Chiefs and Upholding Property Rights
Table 4.7: Observation by Year
Control Group
Year Observations Percent
2009 12 2.47
2010 14 2.89
2011 22 4.54
2012 25 5.15
2013 30 6.19
2014 40 8.25
2015 51 10.52
2016 72 14.85
2017 93 19.18
2018 126 25.98
Total 485 100
Source:- Authors Calculation from lo-
cal court administrative data
Table 4.8: Number of Observa-
tions by Year
Treatment Group
Year Observations Percent
2009 2 0.9
2010 6 2.71
2011 9 4.07
2012 7 3.17
2013 7 3.17
2014 14 6.33
2015 20 9.05
2016 35 15.84
2017 50 22.62
2018 71 32.13
Total 221 100
Source:- Authors Calculation from lo-
cal court administrative data
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Table 4.9: Respondents Interviewed
Interview Respondent Freq. Percent
Chiefdom Administrator 22 14.77
Chiefdom Secretary 8 5.37
Chiefdom Speaker 25 16.78
Chiefdom Treasury Secretary 61 40.94
Chiefdom Council member (councilor) 1 0.67
Paramount Chief 5 3.36
Section Chief 6 4.03
Religious leader (Imam, Pastor etc) 1 0.67
Regent Chief 4 2.68
Village Elder or Notable 16 10.74
Total 149 100
Source:- Author’s Chiefdom Administration Survey
Table 4.10: Chiefdom Land Committee and Member Selection
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev.
CLC Members Selected by Chiefdom Administration 51 0.45 0.50
CLC Member Selected by PC/Regent Chief 51 0.53 0.50
Chiefs Appoint Community Members to the CLC 51 0.31 0.47
CLC Members Selected by Other Community Members 51 0.39 0.49
CLC Members are "Elected" 51 0.12 0.33
People Volunteer to be on CLC 51 0.06 0.24
Source:- Author’s Chiefdom Administration Survey
Table 4.11: Composition of Chiefdom Land Committees
Which Groups Are Represented on CLC in this Chiefdom?
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev.
Section Chiefs 51 0.67 0.48
Village Headmen 51 0.51 0.50
PC/Regent Chief 51 0.57 0.50
Chiefdom Speaker 51 0.39 0.49
Landholding Families 51 0.41 0.50
Local Council Representatives 51 0.27 0.45
Youth Representative 51 0.45 0.50
Women Representative 51 0.45 0.50
Religious Leaders (Imam/Pastor) 51 0.35 0.48
Traditional Healers 51 0.04 0.20
Members of Secret Society 51 0.04 0.20
Source:- Author’s Chiefdom Administration Survey
167
Chiefs and Upholding Property Rights
Table 4.12: Mediation Role of Chiefdom Land Committees
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev.
Does CLC Hear Land Dispute Cases Between People in Community 51 0.98 0.14
Number of Land Dispute per Month 50 0.29 0.22
Does CLC Charge to Hear land Cases 50 0.36 0.49
Amount Charge ( SL LE) 12 87083.33 82254.00
Does CLC Refer Case to Local/Magistrate Court or Village Level 51 0.43 0.50
Source:- Author’s Chiefdom Administration Survey
Table 4.13: Summary Statistics for Hypothesis Testing
Variables Obs Mean Std. Dev.
Above Median Secondary Education 154 0.43 0.50
Above Median Stranger Population 154 0.45 0.50
Above Median Non-Agriculture Labor 154 0.40 0.49
Chiefdom Has Magistrate Court 149 0.13 0.33
Below Median Employment 154 0.37 0.48
Above Median Distance to Nearest Town 149 0.30 0.46
Source:- Data on secondary education, stranger population, employment, and
non-agriculture labor calculated using 2015 census data. Data on median distance
to towns (km) taken from Acemoglu, Reed, and Robinson (2014), and these include,
Freetown, Bo, Kenema and Makeni. Location of magistrate obtained by author
from local court survey.
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Table 4.14: Determinants of Policy Compliance
CLC Compliance
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
PC Tenure Years (by 2016) 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00)
Number of Ruling Houses -0.00 -0.01
(0.02) (0.02)
Chiefdom Primary Edu. Attainment -0.30 -0.89
(1.18) (1.49)
Chiefdom Non-Ag Labor 0.17 0.01
(0.41) (0.50)
Mining License 1930 0.25* 0.27**
(0.13) (0.13)
Ln(Distance to Nearest Major Town) -0.18 -0.23*
(0.11) (0.13)
Amalgamation 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.04
(0.09) (0.11) (0.09) (0.09) (0.08) (0.09) (0.10)
Population Density (2015) 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00 0.00* 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Ethnoliguistic Fractionalization 0.13 0.14 0.15 0.10 0.05 0.20 0.12
(0.25) (0.25) (0.25) (0.27) (0.25) (0.25) (0.28)
District Fixed Effects X X X X X X X
Observations 149 149 149 149 149 149 149
R-squared 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.22 0.21 0.24
NOTE-.Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at the chiefdom level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Figure 4.10: Visual Inspection of Parallel Trends
(a) Trends for Land Cases with unrestricted data (b) Trends for all cases
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Figure 4.11: Simple Difference of Outcomes- Unrestricted Data
(a) Extensive Margin (b) Intensive Margin
Table 4.15: ATT for Likelihood of Observing Land Cases-
Unrestricted Data
Land Case (Binary)
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3)
DiD 0.09 0.10 0.06
(0.13) (0.15) (0.16)
Year Fixed Effects x x x
Chiefdom Fixed Effects x x
Court Controls x x
Court Fixed Effect x
Outcome Mean 0.4 0.4 0.4
Outcome Standard Deviation 0.49 0.49 0.49
Number of Chiefdoms 130 129 129
Court-year observations 706 689 689
R-squared 0.52 0.52 0.59
NOTE-Court controls include mean cost and number of record
years. Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at the
chiefdom level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 4.16: Formal Placebo Test
Number of Land Cases
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3)
Treatment X 2009 1.48
(1.12)
Treatment X 2010 0.68 -0.33
(1.04) (0.39)
Treatment X 2011 -0.37 -1.56
(1.40) (0.96)
Treatment X 2012 0.47 -0.33
(1.22) (0.47)
Treatment X 2013 1.84 0.18
(1.65) (1.17)
Treatment X 2014 1.40 -0.64 0.45
(1.55) (0.76) (0.75)
Treatment X 2015 1.71 0.10 1.23
(1.20) (0.81) (0.76)
Treatment X 2016 2.60** 0.68 0.88
(1.18) (0.85) (0.89)
Treatment X 2017 3.33* 1.67* 3.30**
(1.76) (1.01) (1.62)
Treatment X 2018 2.56** 1.08 2.47*
(1.01) (0.81) (1.34)
Chiefdom Fixed Effects X
Year Fixed Effects X X X
Court Controls X X X
Court Fixed Effects X X
Outcome Mean 1.28 1.28 1.53
Outcome Standard Deviation 2.8 2.8 3.3
Number of Chiefdoms 129 129 45
Court-year observations 689 689 267
R-squared 0.38 0.52 0.50
NOTE-Court controls include mean cost and number of record
years. Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at the chief-
dom level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Figure 4.12: Formal Falsification Test- With Restricted Sample
Y-axis represent standardized coefficient from estimating 4.2 above. Model with
diamond on error bar is with court fixed effects from model (2) in Table 4.16,
and the other is with chiefdom fixed effects. Error bars are for 95% confidence
intervals.
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Table 4.17: Triple Difference Estimation
Number of All Cases (Land and Non-land)
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3)
DiD 39.11 9.11 -9.25
(34.00) (23.32) (6.62)
DiDiD 54.36** 82.06***
(25.11) (30.26)
Treatment X Case Type (Land) -40.90* -77.80**
(22.04) (33.10)
Post-Treatment X Case Type (Land) 3.54 -9.78
(9.69) (11.94)
Case Type (Land) 6.03 20.71
(6.45) (17.21)
Year Fixed Effect X X X
Court Fixed Effect X X X
Outcome Mean 52.66 52.66 54.23
Outcome Standard Deviation 66.14 66.17 70.65
Number of Chiefdoms 130 130 45
Court-year observations 706 706 272
R-squared 0.71 0.72 0.75
NOTE-Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at the chiefdom level. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 4.18: Pent-UP Land Concerns From Vulnerable Groups
Number of Land Cases
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3)
DiD 2.03* 1.80* 1.83
(1.05) (0.95) (1.11)
DiD Above Median Stranger Population -1.02
(1.13)
Above Medin Stranger Popultaion -2.39***
(0.35)
DiD X Below Median Employment Level -0.50
(1.21)
Below Median Employment Level 2.95***
(0.95)
DiD X Below Median Distance to Major Town -0.52
(1.35)
Below Median Distance to Major Town 1.19***
(0.33)
Chiefdom Controls X X X
Year Fixed Effect X X X
Court Fixed Effect X X X
Outcome Mean 1.28 1.28 1.28
Outcome Standard Deviation 2.8 2.8 2.8
Number of Chiefdoms 130 130 130
Court-year observations 706 706 706
R-squared 0.52 0.52 0.52
NOTE-Chiefdom controls include 2015 census population density and distance to nearest
major town. Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at the chiefdom level. *** p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 4.19: CLCs As Direct Conduits Of Land Cases
Number of Land Cases
VARIABLES (1) (2)
DiD -0.20 -0.45
(0.95) (0.92)
DiD X Refer Cases to Courts 1.79**
(0.78)
DiD X Refer Cases to Courts X Magistrate Court Presence 2.97***
(0.98)
Refer Cases to Courts -1.50 -1.62
(1.09) (1.31)
Magistrate Court Presence 0.03
(0.98)
Year Fixed Effect X X
Court Fixed Effects X X
Outcome Mean ( Full Sample) 1.28 1.28
Outcome Standard Deviation ( Full Sample) 2.8 2.8
Number of Chiefdoms 44 44
Court-year observations 218 218
R-squared 0.51 0.52
NOTE-Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at the chiefdom level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,
* p<0.1.
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Table 4.20: Issues Salience and Response
Number of Land Cases
VARIABLES (1) (2)
DiD 0.25 0.25
(0.54) (0.54)
DiD X Above Median Non-Ag Labor 1.90**
(0.85)
Above Median Non-Ag Labor 0.28
(0.83)
DiD X Above Median Secondary Education 1.90**
(0.85)
Above Median Secondary Education 2.85***
(0.54)
DiD X Magistrate Presence
Magistrate Court Presence
Chiefdom Control X X
Year Fixed Effect X X
Court Fixed Effect X X
Outcome Mean 1.28 1.28
Outcome Standard Deviation 2.8 2.8
Number of Chiefdoms 130 130
Court-year observations 706 706
R-squared 0.52 0.52
NOTE-Chiefdom controls include 2015 census population density and distance to
nearest major town. Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at the chiefdom
level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
This thesis uses Sierra Leone as a case study to address critical research questions regarding
traditional institutions in the modern African state. The three papers that make up this
thesis have collectively addressed questions about the impact these institutions continue
to have on economic, social and political outcomes in Sierra Leone. They show that while
traditional institutions can be used to fill critical gaps in public goods provision in rural
areas, they may do so in unequal ways. The incentives that govern the institutions makes
chiefs perhaps more responsive in their immediate community, rather than the wider state.
There are also limits on the type of public goods and service traditional authorities
can influence. A key area they are often required to act is dispute resolution, especially
for land and other civil disputes in rural areas. This thesis suggests a potential weakness
of traditional authorities in handling land dispute resolutions, and that there might be a
preference for resolutions through formal courts whenever possible.
Lastly, this thesis addresses questions about how the salience of the selection
process of leaders of the institution matters for affecting social outcomes. The Sierra
Leone chieftaincy institution selects leaders through elections by a small group of local
taxpayers in the chiefdom. The intensity of competition for the office is shown to have
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negative consequences for social cohesion and possibly collective action.
A key theoretical implication from the collective findings from this thesis is that
it puts the salience of ethnicity in affecting political outcomes in Africa into context. In
the wider literature on African politics, ethnicity matters for most political and economic
outcomes, especially in cross-country analyses. This case study observes politics at the
chiefdom level, where political actors and competitors share the same ethnicity. Yet, I
observe similar effects often associated with ethnicity. This case study perhaps stands out
in suggesting that politics in Africa can look much like politics in the West, where the
benefits of politics follow the most politically salient unit of organisation, which may not
necessarily be ethnicity or religion. In the literature on politics in the West, this is often
dubbed as advantages of political alignment.
This thesis perhaps triggers further research on traditional institutions at the
sub-national level. With the exception of a few recent studies there is a dearth of research
in this area. Such research will shed much clearer light on how traditional institutions
affect political and economic outcomes on the continent. Instead of national boundaries,
research can focus on establishing, and using geographic boundaries of different traditional
chiefdoms, kingdoms and territories, which will help isolate the effect of the institutions
on outcomes.
179
References
Abdullah, I., Bangura, Y., Blake, C., Gberie, L., Johnson, L., Kallon, K., . . . Zack-
Williams, A. (1997). Lumpen youth culture and political violence: Sierra leoneans
debate the ruf and the civil war. Africa Development/Afrique et Développement,
22 (3/4), 171–215.
Abraham, A. (1978). Mende government and politics under colonial rule: a historical
study of political change in sierra leone, 1890-1937. Sierra Leone University Press
Freetown.
Acemoglu, D., Chaves, I. N., Osafo-Kwaako, P., & Robinson, J. A. (2014a). Indirect rule
and state weakness in africa: Sierra leone in comparative perspective (Tech. Rep.).
National Bureau of Economic Research.
Acemoglu, D., Chaves, I. N., Osafo-Kwaako, P., & Robinson, J. A. (2014b, May).
Indirect rule and state weakness in africa: Sierra leone in comparative perspective
(Working Paper No. 20092). National Bureau of Economic Research. Retrieved from
http://www.nber.org/papers/w20092 doi: 10.3386/w20092
Acemoglu, D., Cheema, A., Khwaja, A. I., & Robinson, J. A. (2018). Trust in state and
non-state actors: Evidence from dispute resolution in pakistan.
Acemoglu, D., Reed, T., & Robinson, J. A. (2014). Chiefs: Economic development and
elite control of civil society in sierra leone. Journal of Political Economy, 122 (2),
319–368.
Alesina, A., Hohmann, S., Michalopoulos, S., & Papaioannou, E. (2018). Educational
180
inequality and intergenerational mobility in africa.
Angrist, J. D., & Pischke, J.-S. (2008). Mostly harmless econometrics: An empiricist’s
companion. Princeton university press.
Arjona, A. M., & Kalyvas, S. N. (2012a). Recruitment into armed groups in colombia:
A survey of demobilized fighters. In Understanding collective political violence (pp.
143–171). Springer.
Arjona, A. M., & Kalyvas, S. N. (2012b). Recruitment into armed groups in colombia:
A survey of demobilized fighters. In Y. Guichaoua (Ed.), Understanding collective
political violence (pp. 143–171). London: Palgrave Macmillan UK. Retrieved from
https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230348318_8 doi: 10.1057/9780230348318_8
Ashenfelter, O., & Card, D. (1984, November). Using the longitudinal structure of earnings
to estimate the effect of training programs (Working Paper No. 1489). National
Bureau of Economic Research. Retrieved from http://www.nber.org/papers/
w1489 doi: 10.3386/w1489
Balcells, L. (2010). Rivalry and revenge: Violence against civilians in conventional civil
wars. International Studies Quarterly, 54 (2), 291–313.
Balcells, L. (2011). Continuation of politics by two means: Direct and indirect violence in
civil war. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 55 (3), 397–422.
Baldwin, K. (2013). Why vote with the chief? political connections and public goods
provision in zambia. American Journal of Political Science, 57 (4), 794–809.
Baldwin, K. (2016a). Hereditary rule in democratic africa: Reconciling citizens and
chiefs. Growing democracy in Africa: Elections, accountable governance and political
economy, 199–218.
Baldwin, K. (2016b). The paradox of traditional chiefs in democratic africa. Cambridge
University Press.
Baldwin, K. (2019). Elected mps, traditional chiefs, and local public goods: Evidence
on the role of leaders in co-production from rural zambia. Comparative Political
181
Studies, 52 (12), 1925–1956.
Baldwin, K., & Mvukiyehe, E. (2015). Elections and collective action: Evidence from
changes in traditional institutions in liberia. World Politics, 67 (4), 690–725.
Baldwin, K., & Raffler, P. (2017). Traditional leaders, service delivery, and electoral
accountability. Cambridge University Press New York, NY.
Baldwin, K., & Raffler, P. (2019). Traditional leaders, service delivery, and electoral
accountability. Decentralized Governance and Accountability, 61–90.
Barrows, R. L. (1974). African land reform policies: the case of sierra leone. Land
Economics, 50 (4), 402–410.
Barrows, W. (1976). Grassroots politics in an african state: integration and development
in sierra leone. Holmes & Meier Pub.
Bates, R. H. (1974). Ethnic competition and modernization in contemporary africa.
Comparative political studies, 6 (4), 457–484.
Bates, R. H. (1981). Markets and states in tropical africa: The political basis of agricultural
policies. Univ of California Press.
Becker, G. S. (1983). A theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence.
The quarterly journal of economics, 98 (3), 371–400.
Bellows, J., & Miguel, E. (2009). War and local collective action in sierra leone. Journal
of public Economics, 93 (11-12), 1144–1157.
Berman, E., Shapiro, J. N., & Felter, J. H. (2011). Can hearts and minds be bought?
the economics of counterinsurgency in iraq. Journal of Political Economy, 119 (4),
766–819.
Besley, T., & Ghatak, M. (2010). Property rights and economic development. In Handbook
of development economics (Vol. 5, pp. 4525–4595). Elsevier.
Blattman, C., Hartman, A. C., & Blair, R. A. (2014). How to promote order and property
rights under weak rule of law? an experiment in changing dispute resolution behavior
through community education. American Political Science Review, 108 (1), 100–120.
182
Boege, V., Brown, M. A., & Clements, K. P. (2009). Hybrid political orders, not fragile
states. Peace Review, 21 (1), 13–21.
Boone, C. (2003). Political topographies of the african state: Territorial authority and
institutional choice. Cambridge University Press.
Boone, C. (2013). Land regimes and the structure of politics: patterns of land-related
conflict. Africa, 83 (1), 188–203.
Bottazzi, P., Goguen, A., & Rist, S. (2016). Conflicts of customary land tenure in rural
africa: is large-scale land acquisition a driver of ‘institutional innovation’? The
Journal of Peasant Studies, 43 (5), 971–988.
Bratton, M., & Van de Walle, N. (1994). Neopatrimonial regimes and political transitions
in africa. World politics, 46 (4), 453–489.
Brosché, J., & Höglund, K. (2016). Crisis of governance in south sudan: electoral politics
and violence in the world’s newest nation. The Journal of Modern African Studies,
54 (1), 67–90.
Burgess, R., Jedwab, R., Miguel, E., Morjaria, A., & Padró i Miquel, G. (2015). The
value of democracy: evidence from road building in kenya. American Economic
Review, 105 (6), 1817–51.
Cancian, M., & Levinson, A. (2005). Labor supply effects of the earned income tax credit:
Evidence from wisconsin supplemental benefit for families with three children (Tech.
Rep.). National Bureau of Economic Research.
Cartwright, J. R. (1970). Politics in sierra leone 1947-1967. University of Toronto Press.
Chirayath, L., Sage, C., & Woolcock, M. (2005). Customary law and policy reform:
Engaging with the plurality of justice systems.
Collins, A., & Mitchell, M. I. (2018). Revisiting the world bank’s land law reform agenda
in africa: The promise and perils of customary practices. Journal of agrarian change,
18 (1), 112–131.
Conibere, R., Asher, J., Cibelli, K., Dudukovich, J., Kaplan, R., & Ball, P. (2004).
183
Statistical appendix to the report of the truth and reconciliation commission of
sierra leone. Benetech Human Rights Data Analysis Group, 1 (38).
Conteh, M. (2013). The institution of paramount chieftaincy in sierra leone: An intro-
duction to its history and electoral process. National Electoral Commission–Sierra
Leone, Freetown (www. nec-sierraleone. org).
Conteh, S. (2015). Now that the sierra leone land policy 2015 has been officially launched
– an open letter to president koroma. Retrieved from "https://sierralii.org/
content/now-sierra-leone-land-policy-2015-has-been-officially
-launched-%E2%80%93-open-letter-president"(Accessed14April2020)
Cooper, F. (2002). Africa since 1940: the past of the present (Vol. 1). Cambridge
University Press.
Cooper, F. (2019). Africa since 1940: the past of the present (Vol. 13). Cambridge
University Press.
Croicu, M., & Sundberg, R. (2017). Ucdp ged codebook version 17.1. Department of
Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University.
Crook, R. C. (2004). Access to justice and land disputes in ghana’s state courts: The
litigants’ perspective. The Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law, 36 (50),
1–28.
D’Aoust, O., & Sterck, O. (2016). Who benefits from customary justice? rent-seeking,
bribery and criminality in sub-saharan africa. Journal of African Economies, 25 (3),
439–467.
De Bruijne, K. (2014). Introducing the sierra leone local-location event dataset (sll-led).
Armed Conflict Location Dataset.
Deininger, K., & Chamorro, S. J. (1999). Investment and income effects of land regular-
ization: the case of nicaragua. The World Bank.
Deseau, A., Levai, A., Schmiegelow, M., et al. (2019). Access to justice and economic
development: Evidence from an international panel dataset (Tech. Rep.). Université
184
catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et . . . .
Esteban, J., Morelli, M., & Rohner, D. (2015). Strategic mass killings. Journal of Political
Economy, 123 (5), 1087–1132.
Fanthorpe, R. (2001). Neither citizen nor subject¿lumpen’agency and the legacy of native
administration in sierra leone. African Affairs, 100 (400), 363–386.
Fanthorpe, R. (2006). On the limits of liberal peace: Chiefs and democratic decentralization
in post-war sierra leone. African affairs, 105 (418), 27–49.
Feder, G., & Feeny, D. (1991). Land tenure and property rights: Theory and implications
for development policy. The World Bank Economic Review, 5 (1), 135–153.
Fenton, J. S. (1951). Outline of native law in sierra leone. Government Printer.
Glennerster, R., Miguel, E., & Rothenberg, A. D. (2013). Collective action in diverse
sierra leone communities. The Economic Journal, 123 (568), 285–316.
Goldstein, M., & Udry, C. (2008). The profits of power: Land rights and agricultural
investment in ghana. Journal of political Economy, 116 (6), 981–1022.
Gollin, D., Lagakos, D., & Waugh, M. E. (2014). The agricultural productivity gap. The
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 129 (2), 939–993.
Government of Sierra Leone, S. L. (1991). The constitution of sierra leone. Retrieved
from https://sierralii.org/sl/legislation/act/1991/6-0
Government of Sierra Leone, S. L. (2015). National land policy of sierra leone. Retrieved
from http://extwprlegs1.fao.org/docs/pdf/sie155203.pdf
Gregory, S. (1965). Rainfall over sierra leone. Department of Geography, University of
Liverpool Research Paper , 23–38.
Guberek, T., Guzmán, D., Silva, R., Cibelli, K., Asher, J., Weikart, S., . . . Grossman,
W. M. (2006). Truth and myth in sierra : An empirical analysis of the conflict,
1991-2000. A Report by the Benetech Human Rights Data Analysis Group and the
American Bar Association. Palo Alto, CA: Benetech.
Haggblade, S., Hazell, P. B., & Reardon, T. (2007). Transforming the rural nonfarm
185
economy: Opportunities and threats in the developing world. Intl Food Policy Res
Inst.
Hartman, A. C., Blair, R. A., & Blattman, C. (2018). Engineering informal institutions:
Long-run impacts of alternative dispute resolution on violence and property rights in
liberia (Tech. Rep.). National Bureau of Economic Research.
Herbst, J. (2000). States and power in africa: Comparative lessons in authority and
control (Vol. 149). Princeton University Press.
Hodler, R., & Raschky, P. A. (2014). Regional favoritism. The Quarterly Journal of
Economics, 129 (2), 995–1033.
Huggins, C. (2009). Land in return, reintegration and recovery processes: Some lessons
from the great lakes region of africa. Uncharted territory: Land, conflict and
humanitarian action, 67–91.
Huggins, C., Cloreal, J., et al. (2005). From the ground up: Land rights conflict and
peace in sub-saharan africa.
Humphreys, M., & Weinstein, J. M. (2006). Handling and manhandling civilians in civil
war. American Political Science Review, 100 (3), 429–447.
Jackson, P. (2007). Reshuffling an old deck of cards? the politics of local government
reform in sierra leone. African Affairs, 106 (422), 95–111.
Johnson, O. E. (2011). Reforming the customary land tenure system in sierra leone:
A proposal. ECONOMIC CHALLENGES AND POLICY ISSUES IN EARLY
TWENTY-FIRST-CENTURY SIERRA LEONE .
Kalyvas, S. N. (2006). The logic of violence in civil war. Cambridge University Press.
Kalyvas, S. N., & Kocher, M. A. (2009). The dynamics of violence in vietnam: An analysis
of the hamlet evaluation system (hes). Journal of Peace Research, 46 (3), 335–355.
Kanu, E. A., & Henning, C. H. (2019). An assessment of land reform policy processes in
sierra leone: A network based approach (Tech. Rep.). Working Papers of Agricultural
Policy.
186
Kasara, K. (2007). Tax me if you can: Ethnic geography, democracy, and the taxation of
agriculture in africa. American political science review, 159–172.
Keen, D. (2005). Conflict and collusion in sierra leone. James Currey (imprint of Boydell
& Brewer Ltd.).
Kramon, E., & Posner, D. N. (2013). Who benefits from distributive politics? how the
outcome one studies affects the answer one gets. Perspectives on Politics, 461–474.
Laakso, M., & Taagepera, R. (1979). “effective” number of parties: a measure with
application to west europe. Comparative political studies, 12 (1), 3–27.
Logan, C. (2009). Selected chiefs, elected councillors and hybrid democrats: popular
perspectives on the co-existence of democracy and traditional authority. The Journal
of Modern African Studies, 47 (1), 101–128.
Logan, C. (2013). The roots of resilience: Exploring popular support for african traditional
authorities. African Affairs, 112 (448), 353–376.
Logan, C. (2017). Ambitious sdg goal confronts challenging realities: Access to justice is
still elusive for many africans.
Lombard, M. (2016). Land conflict in peri-urban areas: Exploring the effects of land
reform on informal settlement in mexico. Urban Studies, 53 (13), 2700–2720.
Lu, S., & Wang, H. (2020). Distributive politics in china: Regional favouritism and
expansion of construction land. Urban Studies, 0042098019835677.
Mamdani, M. (1996). Citizen and subject: Contemporary africa and the legacy of late
colonialism. Princeton University Press.
McIntyre, A., Aning, E. K., & Addo, P. N. N. (2002). Politics, war and youth culture in
sierra leone: An alternative interpretation. African Security Studies, 11 (3), 6–15.
Michalopoulos, S., & Papaioannou, E. (2013). Pre-colonial ethnic institutions and
contemporary african development. Econometrica, 81 (1), 113–152.
Murdock, G. P. (1967). Ethnographic atlas: a summary. Ethnology, 6 (2), 109–236.
Nuhu, S. (2019). Peri-urban land governance in developing countries: understanding
187
the role, interaction and power relation among actors in tanzania. In Urban forum
(Vol. 30, pp. 1–16).
Nunn, N. (2010). Religious conversion in colonial africa. American Economic Review,
100 (2), 147–52.
Nunn, N., & Wantchekon, L. (2011). The slave trade and the origins of mistrust in africa.
American Economic Review, 101 (7), 3221–52.
Oredola-Davies, F. (2006). Land and pro-poor change in sierra leone.
Park, A. S. (2008). Consolidating peace: rule of law institutions and local justice practices
in sierra leone. South African Journal on Human Rights, 24 (3), 536–564.
Price, C. (2018). Alternative dispute resolution in africa: Is adr the bridge between
traditional and modern dispute resolution. Pepp. Disp. Resol. LJ , 18 , 393.
Querido, C. M. (2009). State-sponsored mass killing in african wars—greed or grievance?
International Advances in Economic Research, 15 (3), 351.
Raleigh, C., & De Bruijne, K. (2017). Where rebels dare to tread: A study of conflict
geography and co-option of local power in sierra. Journal of Conflict Resolution,
61 (6), 1230–1260.
Reed, T., & Robinson, J. (2013). The chiefdoms of sierra. Manuscript, Harvard Univ.
http://people. fas. harvard. edu/treed/history. pdf .
Renner-Thomas, A. (2010). Land tenure in sierra leone: The law, dualism and the making
of a land policy. AuthorHouse.
Reno, W. (2000). Shadow states and the political economy of civil wars. In Greed and
grievance: Economic agendas in civil wars (p. 43-68). Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.
Richards, P. (1996). Fighting for the rain forest: war, youth and resources in sierra leone,
james currey. Oxford.
Richards, P. (2003). The political economy of internal conflict in sierra leone.
Richards, P. (2005). To fight or to farm? agrarian dimensions of the mano river conflicts
(liberia and sierra leone). African Affairs, 104 (417), 571–590.
188
Richards, P., Bah, K., & Vincent, J. (2004). Social capital and survival: prospects for
community driven development in post-confict sierra leone (Tech. Rep.). World
Bank, Social development Department.
Rubin, M. A. (2018). Rebel territorial control and civilian collective action in civil war:
Evidence from the philippines. Available at SSRN 3290760 .
Ryan, C. (2018). Large-scale land deals in sierra leone at the intersection of gender and
lineage. Third World Quarterly, 39 (1), 189–206.
Sawyer, E. (2008). Remove or reform? a case for (restructuring) chiefdom governance in
post-conflict sierra leone. African Affairs, 107 (428), 387–403.
Shaver, A., Shapiro, J., et al. (2015). The effect of civilian casualties on wartime informing:
Evidence from the iraq war. Journal of Conflict Resolution.
SierraLeone. (1949). Sierra leone protectorate handbook. duplicated]. Bo: Chief Commis-
sioner’s Office, 40.
Sierra Leone Chief Commissioner’s Office, S. L. (1942 -1960). Sierra leone protectorate
handbook. Bo.
Smith, L. A., Gambette, C., & Longley, T. (2004). Conflict mapping in sierra leone:
violations of international humanitarian law from 1991 to 2002: executive summary.
No Peace Without Justice.
Stigler, G. J. (1972). Economic competition and political competition. Public Choice,
13 (1), 91–106.
Suma, M. (2014). Sierra leone justice sector and rule of law. The Open Society Initiative
for West Africa. Retrieved from http://www.osiwa.org/wp-content/uploads/
2015/02/sierra_leone_justice_and_rule_of_law_report_3_4.pdf
Sundberg, R., & Melander, E. (2013). Introducing the ucdp georeferenced event dataset.
Journal of Peace Research, 50 (4), 523–532.
Swenson, G. (2018). Legal pluralism in theory and practice. International Studies Review,
20 (3), 438–462.
189
Tamanaha, B. Z. (2011). The rule of law and legal pluralism in development. Hague
Journal on the Rule of Law, 3 (1), 1–17.
Tangri, R. (1976). Conflict and violence in contemporary sierra leone chiefdoms. The
Journal of Modern African Studies, 14 (2), 311–321.
Toulmin, C. (2009). Securing land and property rights in sub-saharan africa: the role of
local institutions. Land use policy, 26 (1), 10–19.
Unruh, J. D., & Turray, H. (2006). Land tenure, food security and investment in postwar
sierra leone. FAO LSP WP, 22 .
Valentino, B., Huth, P., & Balch-Lindsay, D. (2004). “draining the sea”: mass killing and
guerrilla warfare. International Organization, 58 (2), 375–407.
van der Haar, G., & van Leeuwen, M. (2019). War-induced displacement: Hard choices in
land governance. Land, 8 (6), 88.
Van Leeuwen, M., & Van Der Haar, G. (2016). Theorizing the land–violent conflict nexus.
World Development, 78 , 94–104.
Verwimp, P., Justino, P., & Brück, T. (2009). The analysis of conflict: A micro-level
perspective. Sage Publications Sage UK: London, England.
Wantchekon, L., Klašnja, M., & Novta, N. (2015). Education and human capital
externalities: evidence from colonial benin. The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
130 (2), 703–757.
Weidmann, N. B. (2011). Violence “from above” or “from below”? the role of ethnicity in
bosnia’s civil war. The Journal of Politics, 73 (4), 1178–1190.
Weidmann, N. B. (2016). A closer look at reporting bias in conflict event data. American
Journal of Political Science, 60 (1), 206–218.
Weinstein, J. M. (2005). Resources and the information problem in rebel recruitment.
Journal of Conflict Resolution, 49 (4), 598–624.
Weinstein, J. M. (2006). Inside rebellion: The politics of insurgent violence. Cambridge
University Press.
190
Wig, T., & Kromrey, D. (2018). Which groups fight? customary institutions and communal
conflicts in africa. Journal of Peace Research, 55 (4), 415–429.
Wimmer, A., & Miner, C. (2019). The strategic logic of ethnoterritorial competition:
Violence against civilians in africa’s civil wars. Journal of Global Security Studies.
Woodberry, R. D. (2012). The missionary roots of liberal democracy. American political
science review, 106 (2), 244–274.
Wooldridge, J. M. (2002). Econometric analysis of cross section and panel data mit press.
Cambridge, MA, 108 .
World Bank, G. (2007). World development report 2008: Agriculture for develop-
ment. World Bank Group Washington D.C. U.S.A. Retrieved from https://
siteresources.worldbank.org/INTWDR2008/Resources/WDR_00_book.pdf
191
